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STRUCTURING THE FINANCIAL SERVICE CONGWMERATES OF THE 

FUTURE: DoES THE CHOICE OF CORPORATE FORM TO HOUSE NEW 

FINANCIAL ACTIVITIES OF NATIONAL BANKS MATTER? 

. CONSTANCE Z. WAGNER1 
ABSTRACT 
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act became law on November 12, 1999, 
bringing to an end a twenty year effort to expand bank powers by amending 
the Glass-Steagall Act and the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956. 
Although styled as banking reform legislation, the new law will have a wide­
ranging impact on the financial services industry generally. A wave of 
merger activity will likely occur in this industry because many of the legal 
restrictions on bank affiliations with other financial services providers have 
been removed. An end result of the new legislation will be the creation of 
financial services conglomerates offering a combination of banking, 
securities, and insurance products under one roof. 
The appropriate corporate structure for expanded banking activities 
was a key issue in the debates over the new legislation, specifically whether 
banks should be allowed to conduct new financial activities exclusively 
through a bank holding company affiliate or whether use of a bank operating 
subsidiary should also be permitted. Under Gramm-Leach-Bliley, the 
primary vehicle for new activities will be the bank holding company affiliate. 
Bank operating subsidiaries may also be used by national banks for a more 
limited range of new activities and subject to certain restrictions and 
conditions not applicable in the case of the holding company affiliate. The 
new law reflects a compromise position in the corporate structure debate. 
Given the polemical nature of the debate, such a compromise was probably 
essential to ensure passage of the legislation. Nevertheless. the compromise 
is not justified in drawing a distinction between the bank holding company 
affiliate and the bank operating subsidiary as vehicles for new activities. 
The author reaches this conclusion after analyzing the history of the 
1 Assistant Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law. I would like 
to thank Cynthia Lichtenstein, Patricia A. McCoy, Michael P. Malloy, and Douglas 
R. Williams for their helpful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this 
article. I gratefully acknowledge the fmandal support of the Saint Louis University 
School of Law and the research assistance of Kristi Heim and Ron Kwentus, SLU 
Law Class of 1999, and Ryan K. Manger, SLU Law Class of2001. 
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corporate structure debate and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley compromise from a 
public policy perspective. She suggests further that Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
represents a missed opportunity to clarify what is at stake and has resulted 
instead in a further obfuscation of the issues. 
I. 	 INTRODUCTION: THE NEW WORLD OF DEREGULATED 
FINANCIAL ACTIVITIES FOR NATIONAL BANKS AND 
THEm AFFILIATES 
Banking in the U.S. is a heavily regulated industry due to the 
important role that banks play in economic life.2 National banks, the focus 
of this article, have been restricted historically in the conduct of their 
operations in many and various ways, including controlled entry, restrictions 
on structure, expansion, geographic location and pennissible activities, 
limitations on portfolio composition, minimum capitalization requirements, 
customer disclosure requirements, and continuous government reporting and 
supervision of operations.3 Critics of the bank regulatory system have 
charged that sweeping changes in the marketplace, including technological 
developments and the phenomenon of globalization, have rendered such 
regulation at least partially obsolete and in need of overhaul.4 From the 
2 Banks perfonn the essential functions of issuing transaction accounts, serving as 
a back up source of liquidity to all other institutions, and serving as the transmission 
belt for monetary policy. See E. Gerald Corrigan, Are Banks Special?, FED. REs. 
BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS ANN. REp. 1982, at 7. The role of banks has also been 
described as processing payments and settlements, intennediating between savers 
and borrowers, and helping to spread risk from markets and institutions who wish to 
avoid risk to those who are willing and able to assume it. See ROBERT E. LITAN & 
JOTHANANRAUCH, AMERICAN FINANCE FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY 11-13 (1997). 
3 For a description of these limitations, see KENNETH SPONG, BANKING 
REGULATION: ITS PURPOSES, IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTS 51-220 (4th ed. 
1994); see also MICHAELP. MALLOY, BANK REGULATION 34-195 (1999). 
4 For recent government studies of the need for financial regulation refonn, see 
Report of The President's Commission on Financial Structure & Regulation, 93rd 
Congo I (1973); Blueprint For Reform: The Report ofthe Task Group on Regulation 
ofFinancial Services, 98th Congo 1 (1984); Bush Task Group Report on Regulation 
ofFinancial Services: Blueprintfor Reform, Hearings Before a House Subcommittee 
Iofthe Committee on Government Operations, 99th Congo I, pt. I and 2 (1985); The 
Banking Industry in Turmoil: A Report on the Condition of The Us. Banking 
Industry and the Bank Insurance Fund, Presented to the Financial Institution 
Subcommittee of The House Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 101 st 
Congo 2 (1990); Modernizing the Financial System, Us. Treasury Department 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1907844
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perspective of the banks themselves, the most problematic areas of 
.. regulation in recent years have been geographic and activities restrictions 
• 	 contained in federal statutes. 5 Briefly stated, these restrictions confined bank 
operations to a single state, with very limited exceptions, and constrained 
bank services to a narrow spectrum of activities traditionally engaged in by 
• 	 banks or deemed to be incidental to such activities. 
While geographic and activities constraints have been defended on a 
variety of policy grounds,6 these restrictions have long been unpopular with 
many bankers, bank regulators, and economists. Such restrictions have been 
identified as a precipitating cause of the declining competitiveness of the 
American commercial banking industry, as compared to other financial 
institutions in the U.S. and to banks in other countries. Banks have 
experienced stiff competition in their core businesses of deposit-taking and 
lending in recent years from non-depository financial institutions, including 
mutual funds, insurance companies, pension funds, finance companies, and 
government entities. These changes are the result of advances in computer 
technology that have facilitated information processing and led to the 
development of new financial instruments by non-bank financial institutions 
that compete directly with traditional bank products. Because of legal 
restrictions, banks have been unable to respond by expanding into new lines 
of business and new geographic locations.? Such restrictions have a negative 
Recommendations for Safer, More Competitive Banks, FED. BANKING L. REPORTS, 
No. 1377 (1991); LlTAN & RAUCH, supra note 2. 
5 See Financial Services Restructuring: Hearings on H.R. 10 and H.R. 668 Before 
the House Comm. on Banking and Financial Services, 105th Congo (1997) 
(testimony of William T. McConnell on behalf of the American Bankers Ass'n). 
6 Restrictions on geographic expansion have been justified on the grounds that 
the size of banking organizations should be limited to prevent the undue 
concentration of economic power. Such restrictions also reflect a preference for 
locally controlled banks that will develop local economies. See SPONG, supra note 
3, at 137-38. The policy rationales for activities restrictions are discussed infra in 
Section II.A. 
7 The resulting erosion in banks' core businesses is evidenced by various 
... 	 indicators. For example, the total assets held by U.S. banks increased in absolute 
terms but declined relative to the share held by all domestic financial service firms 
between 1980 and 1990. Total deposits declined in the same period. See JAMES R. 
BARTH, ET AL., THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN BANKING 73-75 (1992). The percentage 
of U.S. financial assets held by domestic commercial banks declined precipitously 
over the period 1950-1989, with significant gains shown by pension funds and 
mutual funds. See id. at 82-83; see also George G. Kaufman, Is Banking a 
Declining Industry? A Historical Perspective, ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES, May/Jun. 
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impact on bank profits and deprive consumers of the lower priced and better 
quality services that would be available if more competition were allowed.s 
Removing such restrictions would also allow banks to take advantage of 
increased economies of scope and scale, which could be passed along to 
consumers in the form of lower prices for services, and to reduce the 
riskiness of their portfolios through diversification.9 
Banks have lobbied in recent years to alter or remove both 
geographic and activities restrictions. In the case of geographic constraints, 
Congress has dismantled to a substantial degree the federal laws preventing 
nationwide expansion by banks. The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and 
Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 (the "Riegle-Neal Act")l0 amended 
provisions of the McFadden Actll preventing interstate branching and 
eliminated the Douglas AmendmentI2 to the Bank Holding Company Act 
preventing interstate banking through a holding company structure. As a 
result of this new regulatory regime, interstate bank mergers are becoming 
commonplace. It is likely that the trend towards nationwide banking will 
continue in the future. 13 
1994, at 2-21. Prior to recent mergers between several large U.S. banks, another 
often-cited statistic was the decline in the number of U.S. banks ranked in the top 
tier of banks internationally. See The Euromoney Five Hundred, EUROMONEY, Jun. 
1991, at 70. 
S See ROBERT E. L1TAN, WHAT SHOULD BANKS DO? 61-63 (1987) (discussing 
benefits of enhanced competition if legal restrictions on financial product line 
expansion were dropped). See also Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E. Strahan, The 
Political Economy of Deregulation: Evidence from the Relaxation of Bank 
Branching Restrictions in the United States, Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
Research Paper, 1, 15-17, 23, 25 Jun. (1997); Jith Jayaratne & Philip E. Strahan, 
The Benefits of Branching Deregulation, FED. REs. BD. N.Y. ECONOMIC POL'y 
REV., Dec. 1997, at l3 (discussing benefits of enhanced competition if geographic 
restraints were dropped). 
9 See L1TAN, supra note 8, at 74-89 (discussing such benefits flowing from 
removing financial product line restrictions). 

10 See Pub. L. No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (1994) (codified in scattered sections 

of 12 U.S.C.). 

11 See 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1999). 
12 The Douglas Amendment was codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1999) (repealed 
1994). 
13 Interstate bank mergers announced since passage of the Riegle-Neal Act include 
the Nationsbank-Bank of America merger and the First Chicago-Bane One merger. 
See Mergers and Acquisitions: Bank America, Nationsbank Plan Merger; Banc 
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In the case of activities restrictions, Congress enacted financial 
~ 	 modernization legislation at the end of 1999 that substantially liberalized the 
area. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act ("Gramm-Leach-Bliley"),14 which 
became law on November 12, 1999, grants banks the authority to engage in a 
wide variety of financial activities, including securities and insurance 
, underwriting, that were previously prohibited or available only to a limited 
extent through the regulatory approval process. Although styled as banking 
reform legislation, the new law will have a wide-ranging impact on the 
financial services industry generally. A wave of merger activity will likely 
occur in this industry as a result of the legislation because many of the legal 
restrictions on bank affiliations with other financial service providers have 
been removed. An end result of the new legislation will be the creation of 
financial service conglomerates offering a combination of banking, 
securities, and insurance products under one roof.ls 
Although bills proposing similar reforms had been introduced on a 
number of occasions over a twenty year period prior to enactment of 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley, Congress failed to enact reforms earlier for a variety 
of reasons, including lobby pressure from other financial service providers 
fearful of increased competition from banks with expanded powers and 
disagreements among members of Congress and regulators on fundamental 
issues of bank regulation. 16 In the face of Congressional inaction, banks 




14 See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, 1061h Cong., }'I Sess. The provisions 

dealing with the establishment and regulation of a new type of holding company to 

engage in the expanded activities become effective on March 12,2000. See id at § 

161. Separate effective dates are specified for other provisions. 

15 Senate Banking Committee, Press Release, Oct. 22, 1999, available at 

<http://www.senate.gov!-banking!preI99!1022fsm.htm> (visited Oct. 24, 1999) 

[hereinafter Senate Press Release]. 

16 Some of the legislation that was introduced includes: Financial Institutions 

98th 	 98thDeregulation Act, 8. 1609, Congo (1983); H.R. 3537, Congo (1983); 
... Financial Services Competitive Equity Act, S.2851, 98th Congo (1984); Deposit 
Insurance Reform and Competitive Enhancement Act, S. 2592, 99th Congo (1986); 
• 	 Financial Services Competitive Enhancement Act, S. 2592, 99f Congo (1986); 
• 	 Financial Modernization Act of 1987, 8.1886, 100th Congo (1987); Financial 
Services Competition Act of 1997, H.R. 428, 105th Congo (1997); Financial Services 
Act of 1998, H.R. 10, 105th Congo (1998); Financial Services Act of 1999, H.R. 10, 
106th Congo (1999); and Financial Services Modernization Act, S. 900, 106th Congo 
(1999). 
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seeking expanded powers turned to their federal banking regulators and 
received permission to engage in a wide variety of securities, insurance and 
other financial activities, either directly or through affiliates. 17 This was 
achieved through the regulatory approval process applicable to the 
commencement of a new activity by a bank or any subsidiary or affiliate. In 
the years immediately prior to the passage of Gramm-Leach-B1i1ey, the 
federal banking regulators acted to further accelerate and deepen the process 
of deregulation of activities restrictions. These actions included (I) 
liberalization of Federal Reserve Board ("Board") rules governing operation 
of Section 20 securities underwriting affiliates of banks and expansion of the 
right to engage in other nonbanking activities by bank holding company 
affiliates, and (2) revision of Comptroller of the Currency's ("Comptroller" 
or "OCC") rules governing corporate activities of national banks to allow 
operating subsidiaries of such banks to engage in new activities that are not 
currently permissible for national banks themselves, including revenue bond 
underwriting. 
Deregulating activities restrictions in this way has been criticized on 
a number of grounds. First, the process is cumbersome, consuming both vast 
amounts oftime and money, and the resulting approval can be relied on only 
by the applicant and not by others engaging in the same activity. Second, in 
the opinion of some commentators, decisions about fundamental changes in 
bank policy should be made by Congress, not by banking regulators. One of 
the forces driving reform legislation proposals was concern about the policy 
implications of so-called piecemeal deregulation of activities restrictions 
without Congressional input.18 
The gradual erosion of activities restrictions through the regulatory 
approval process, combined with increasing pressure for legislative reform, 
made it inevitable that activities restrictions would give way. While the 
battle over expanded financial activities has been largely fought and won by 
the banks, commercial activities still remain off limits for banks in the new 
legislation, and it is unlikely that the wall between banking and commerce 
will be dismantled at any time in the near future. 19 
.. 
17 See MICHAEL P. MALLOY, BANK REGULATION, at 166-176, 186-190 (1999). 
18 See Financial Modernization: Hearings on H.R. 10 Before the Senate Banking 
•
I>Comm., lOSIh Congo (1998) (opening statement of Chairman Alfonse D'Amato). 
19 See Financial Services Modernization: Hearings on H.R. 10 Before the Senate 
Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 1061h Congo (1999) (testimony of 
Donna Tanoue, Chairman of the FDIC). See also Financial Services Modernization: 
Hearings on H.R. 10 Before the House Comm. On Banking and Financial Services, 
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By the time Gramm-Leach-Bliley came before Congress, the focus 
of the debate had shifted from whether deregulation of activities restrictions 
should occur at all to the precise set of conditions under which it should take 
place. One of the most controversial issues in the Congressional debates 
over Gramm-Leach-Bliley was the appropriate site for conducting new 
financial activities within the corporate structure of a bank. In the United 
States, most commentators on the corporate structure issue take the position 
that such activities should not be conducted within banks themselves, but 
rather in separately-incorporated entities.2o Prior to the passage of Gramm­
Leach-Bliley, the two structures available under U.S. banking law and 
regulatory practice were the bank holding company affiliate and the bank 
operating subsidiary. While the holding company affiliate had been used for 
some time for nonbanking financial activities, including underwriting and 
dealing in securities a bank could not underwrite and deal in directly ("bank 
ineligible securities"), the use of the bank operating subsidiary for such 
activities was a new phenomenon, made possible by recent amendments to 
oce regulations affecting the corporate activities of national banks. 
Two viewpoints emerged in the corporate structure debate. One 
view was that new activities must be conducted exclusively through a 
holding company affiliate in order to insulate the bank from risks associated 
with such activities and to prevent such activities from being subsidized by 
federal government programs aimed at protecting depositors of commercial 
banks. The Board and some securities and insurance industry lobbyists took 
106th Congo (1999) (testimony of Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Board of 
Governors, Federal Reserve System) [hereafter Greenspan 1999 testimony]. 
20 The universal banking model adopted in some countries, including Germany, in 
which banking and non banking financial activities carrying a high degree of risk are 
combined in one entity, has not been considered as viable in the U.S. The reasons 
for this include 1) fear that banks in diversified organizations would be exposed to 
greater risk of failure, putting bank deposits at risk, 2) the desire to prevent banks 
from using federally insured deposits to fund non banking activities, to the 
competitive disadvantage of financial service providers operating without a federal 
.. government subsidy, and 3) the belief that separate corporations would facilitate 
regulation and supervision of activities. See LITAN, supra note 8, at 145. Banking
.. modernization proposals of the past two decades have invariably suggested 
permitting expanded financial activities only through separate nonbank subsidiaries 
of a parent holding company. For example, the Treasury Department under the 
Reagan administration proposed financial modernization legislation that adopted this 
model. See Financial Institutions Deregulation Act, S. REP. NO. 98-1609, CONGo 
REc. 18647 (1983). 
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this position. The other view was that banks should also be allowed to locate 
the new activities in an operating subsidiary. The Department of the 
Treasury ("Treasury Department" or "Treasury"), the OCC, and the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"), as well as many bankers and 
economists, supported this view. Gramm-Leach-Bliley adopted a 
compromise position on the issue. The primary vehicle for new financial 
activities will be the bank holding company affiliate. However, bank 
operating subsidiaries also may be used by national banks for a more limited 
range of new activities and subject to certain restrictions and conditions not 
applicable in the case of the holding company affiliate. 
While the new legislation resolved the corporate structure debate, 
there are still many unanswered questions regarding the policy basis for and 
the implications of the compromise. For instance, exactly what is at stake in 
the debate has never been fuJly elaborated. Most discussions of the issue 
have taken place in two fora: 1) research and policy position papers issued 
by the federal bank regulatory agencies, and 2) Congressional testimony and 
other public statements by high-ranking officials of such agencies. In 
addition, a few studies were published very recently by economists and legal 
academics.21 These discussions have focused primarily on the public policy 
rationales for banking regulation, which will be discussed in Section II of 
this article. Another theme runs through the debate, however, namely the 
question of which federal banking agency would emerge as the winner in 
what some viewed as a regulatory turf war. It was suggested that this debate 
related to whether the Board or the OCC would have greater regulatory 
authority over new financial activities, with the regulators being accused of 
seeking an expansion of authority for its own sake and not for any reason 
related to protecting the public interest.22 If exclusive use of a bank holding 
company affiliate was required by Congress, the Board would continue to 
exercise significant regulatory power because it regulates bank holding 
companies. On the other hand, if banks were permitted to use a bank 
21 See Bernard Shull & Lawrence J. White, The Right Corporate Structure for 

Expanded Bank Activities, 115 BANKING LJ. 5 (1998); Joi1o dos Santos, Securities 

Activities in Banking Conglomerates: Should Their Location Be Regulated? (Federal .. 

Reserve Bank ofCleveland Working Paper 9704, 1997); Bevis Longstreth & Ivan E. 

Mattei, Organizational Freedom for Banks: The Case in Support, 97 COLUM. L. 

REv. 1895 (1997); Patricia A. McCoy, Financial Modernization and Banking 

Structure, in BANKING LAW MANUAL at § 8.02 (2000). 

22 See Carter H. Golembe, Banking Agency Turf War: It's Not Like Wendy's and 

McDonald's, 17 No. 10 BANKING POL'y REp. 1 (1998); Longstreth & Mattei, supra 

note 21, at 1920-21. 

2000] STRUcrURING THE FINANCIAL SERVICE CONGLOMERATES 337 
operating subsidiary, it is possible that the operating subsidiary would 
become the preferred vehicle, with the OCC as the regulator of national 
banks and their operating subsidiaries gaining increased regulatory authority 
at the expense of the Board.23 According to Board Chairman Alan 
Greenspan, the issue "appears to be very small" but it will determine "the 
financial regulatory structure of the United States for the next generation."24 
Chairman Greenspan has expressed worry publicly, as has former Secretary 
of the Treasury Robert E. Rubin, about how the resolution of this issue will 
affect each regulator's ability to influence the future of banking and 
economic policy in this country.25 
Although the regulatory turf war angle may have some explanatory 
force, the author has chosen not to focus on it in this article, preferring to 
assume the statements of the participants in the debate were made in good 
faith and to take at face value the terms of the debate as it has been framed in 
public fora. This article will examine the corporate structure issue through 
the lens of the traditional public policy concerns justifying banking 
regulation. 
23 Chairman Greenspan pointed out in his Congressional testimony on April 28, 
1999 that "[t]hose activities, when performed in bank subsidiaries and financed with 
bank equity capital would increase the potential profit to the overall banking 
organization. It would also inevitably induce the gravitation to subsidiaries of 
banks, not only of the new powers authorized by H.R. 10, but all of those powers 
currently financed in holding company affiliates at higher costs of capital than those 
available to the bank." Greenspan 1999 testimony, supra note 19. 
24 David Wessel & Jacob M. Schlesinger, Fed Chief is Worried by Developing 
Nation Debt, WALL ST. J., May 8, 1998, at A2. 
25 Chairman Greenspan noted that Congress "purposefully appointed 
responsibility for this nation's financial institutions among the elected executive 
branch and independent regulatory agencies," and changing this system "would be 
contrary to the deliberate steps that Congress has taken to ensure a proper balance in 
the regulation of this nation's dual banking system." Greenspan 1999 testimony, 
supra note 19. Former Treasury Secretary Rubin noted in Congressional testimony 
on May 6, 1999 that "one of an elected Administration's critical responsibilities is 
the formation of economic policy, and an important component of that policy is 
banking policy. In order for the elected Administration to have an effective role in 
banking policy it must have a strong connection with the banking system, that 
connection would be weakened if new financial activities were off limits to acc 
supervision." Financial Services Act of 1999: Hearings on HR. 10 Before The 
Comm. on Commerce, Finance and Hazardous Materials, 106th Congo (1999) 
(testimony ofRobert E. Rubin, Secretary of the Treasury). 
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To rephrase the terms of the debate in a slightly different way, the 
issue is whether there is a compelling governmental interest in limiting new 
financial activities for national banks to a particular corporate structure, as 
opposed to permitting banks to choose their own corporate structure. The 
resolution of this debate in Gramm-Leach-Bliley will have an impact not 
only on the financial services industry, but on other constituencies as well, 
including bank customers and taxpayers.26 It is therefore appropriate to 
analyze the debate in terms of the public policy rationales that underlie 
banking regulation in order to determine whether one choice is preferable to 
the other. The author will attempt to answer three questions. First, is there 
any public policy reason to eliminate use of either the operating subsidiary or 
holding company affiliate as a vehicle for new financial activities? Second, 
is there any public policy reason to prefer one structure over another? Third, 
if there is no compelling governmental interest in eliminating one structure 
or preferring one over the other, should banks be free to choose the corporate 
structure they use for their operations? 
This article will be structured as follows. In order to provide an 
analytical framework for discussion of the corporate structure debate, Part II 
will review the public policy rationales traditionally advanced to support 
activities restrictions applicable to national banks and their affiliates, as welI 
as some additional policy rationales advanced in connection with the debate. 
Part II will also examine the origin of the debate, which is traceable to 
regulatory changes immediately preceding the passage of Gramm-Leach­
Bliley that expanded the authority of national banks to conduct new financial 
activities through both operating subsidiaries and holding company affiliates. 
Part III will review the corporate structure debate in the context of passage 
of Gramm-Leach-Bliley, including the compromise position reached in this 
legislation. The major viewpoints in the corporate structure debate will be 
considered. Part IV will evaluate the debate over choice of corporate 
structure for new financial activities from the perspective of the public policy 
rationales for bank regulation. Part V sets forth the author's conclusions. 
The author concludes that dictating the structure that banks must use 
for conducting new financial activities is unwarranted from the perspective 
26 For example, if banks are permitted to choose their corporate structure based on 
cost considerations, customers will benefit from lower-priced products. If greatly 
increased risks to banks will be the result of product line deregulation, taxpayers 
may pay the price of resolving bank insolvencies if federal deposit insurance funds 
are insufficient, as they did in the case of the savings and loan insolvency crisis of 
the 1980's. 
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of preserving bank safety and soundness, and avoiding conflicts of interest, 
the policy rationales traditionally advanced for restricting the activities of 
banks. This conclusion is based on an analysis of both the theoretical risks 
that may be associated with conducting new financial activities, as well as 
the limited available empirical evidence regarding conduct of new financial 
activities by banks and their affiliates. In fact, mandating use of a holding 
company affiliate might actually undermine bank safety and soundness 
because it is arguable that banks would be deprived of certain benefits, such 
as increased efficiency, cost-savings, and increased income, associated with 
use of an operating subsidiary. Such analysis also does not suggest that one 
form is to be preferred over another. The current debate has failed to 
adequately take account of corporate separateness and the use of firewaHs as 
factors that can insulate banks from the additional risks associated with new 
financial activities. 
The author also considers the debate from the perspective of a policy 
rationale not traditionally raised to justify activities restrictions but that has 
been often discussed in the corporate structure debate, namely preventing the 
spread of the federal government subsidy intended to support commercial 
banking activities and protect depositors, which consists of deposit insurance 
from the FDIC, access to the discount window at the Board, and access to 
the payment system at the Board (the "federal safety net subsidy") into new 
areas that the U.S. Congress never intended should be covered by such 
subsidy. This policy rationale has been advanced to support exclusive use of 
the holding company affiliate structure. The author concludes that the 
theoretical arguments and available empirical evidence regarding the 
existence of such a subsidy and whether the holding company affiliate is 
better at containing the spread of such subsidy to new activities are 
inconclusive at best. Therefore, such policy rationale does not support 
mandated or even preferential use of the holding company affiliate structure. 
Finally, the author considers the policy argument that use of a 
holding company affiliate should be required in order to preserve the bank 
regulatory functions of the Board, which regulates both bank holding 
companies and their nonbank affiliates, but not national bank operating 
subsidiaries. Although this argument was touched on in Congressional 
hearings on financial modernization legislation and in other public 
statements of members of the Board, it has not been at the center of the 
corporate structure debate and has not been mentioned by most 
commentators on the topic. Because it has not been the subject of public 
debate, the argument is difficult to evaluate even-handedly. It appears, 
however, to relate to the ability of the Board to effectively function as a 
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lender of last resort and to deal effectively with problems of systemic risk. 
This is a public policy issue of crucial significance and cannot be ignored. 
However, since neither the parameters of the problem nor possible solutions 
in this context have been publicly debated, it is not an appropriate policy 
basis for preferring use of the holding company affiliate. 
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley compromise, which draws a distinction 
between use of the bank holding company affiliate and the bank operating 
subsidiary as vehicles for new financial activities, is not justified on public 
policy grounds. While the compromise offers something to both sides in the 
debate, it does not put to rest the policy concerns of either side. As such, 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley represents a missed opportunity to clarify what is at 
stake and has resulted instead in a further obfuscation of the issues. 
II. 	 ORIGINS OF THE CORPORATE STRUCTURE DEBATE: 
APPROVAL BY FEDERAL BANKING REGULATORS OF 
NEW FINANCIAL ACTIVITIES BY BANK AFFILIATES 
A. 	 Policy Rationales for Activities Restrictions: A Framework 
for Analysis of the Corporate Structure Debate 
Unlike most other businesses in the United States, national banks 
and their affiliates historically have not been free to engage in any activity 
they may choose. Rather, their activities have been limited to those 
permitted by statute or approved by a federal banking regulator under certain 
circumstances. The starting point for identifying the permissible activities 
of national banks is Section 24 (Seventh) of the National Bank Act,27 which 
authorizes banks to engage in the "business of banking" and activities 
incidental thereto. In addition to this provision, which is general in nature, 
there are other sections of the National Bank Act and other federal banking 
laws that expressly empower or expressly prohibit national banks from 
engaging in certain lines of business. Examples of express powers that 
existed prior to Gramm-Leach-Bliley include the authorization in Section 92 
of the National Bank Act to act as insurance agents or brokers only in towns 
with less than 5000 inhabitants;28 the grant of authority in Section 92a of the 
National Bank Act to exercise trust powers to the extent that such activity 
does not contravene state law;29 and the ability to make loans secured by real 
27 See 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (1999). 
28 See 12 U.S.C. § 92 (1999). 
29 See 12 U.S.C. § 92a (1999). 
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estate granted by Section 371(a) of the Federal Reserve Act.30 The most 
prominent examples of express prohibitions that existed prior to Gramm­
Leach-Bliley include the Glass-Steagall Act ("Glass-Steagall"), which 
effectively barred national banks from engaging in many securities 
underwriting and dealing activities and limited the extent to which bank 
affiliates may engage in such activities, among other things,31 and the strict 
limits imposed in Section 29 of the National Bank Act on the ability of 
national banks to buy, own, and sell real estate, effectively barring national 
banks from engaging in real estate development activities except 
development of bank premises.32 The activities of bank affiliates, including 
national bank affiliates, are also restricted by federal law. The most notable 
example prior to Gramm-Leach-Bliley was Section 1843(c)(8) of the Bank 
Holding Company Act,33 which limits the activities of non-bank affiliates in 
a holding company structure to those deemed "closely related to banking." 
Viewed collectively, these statutory provisions severely limit the ability of 
national banks and their affiliates to engage in nonbanking financial 
activities and bar such banks from engaging in commercial activities. 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley removed or amended some of those restrictions but did 
not completely deregulate the area of activities restrictions for national banks 
and their affiliates. 
The reasons for the high level of regulation of bank activities are 
complex and not completely understood. The same can be said of other 
areas of U.S. banking regulation as well. The public policy reasons 
supporting banking regulation are sometimes difficult to discern and there is 
much disagreement in the literature about what these are, both in general and 
in the case of specific legislation. In general, however, it appears that the 
primary economic reason for banking regulation is that banking is prone to 
30 See 12 U.S.C. § 371a (1999). 
31 The Glass-Steagall Act, part of the Banking Act of 1933, contained four 
sections limiting the securities activities of banks and bank affiliates. Gramm-Leach­
Bliley repealed two of these provisions, §§ 20 and 32. Section 16 prohibits 
underwriting, selling and dealing in securities subject to certain exceptions. See 12 
U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (I999). Section 21 prohibits taking deposits and engaging in 

commercial banking by investment banks. See 12 U.S.C. § 378(a)(l) (1999). Section 

20 prohibited affiliations between banks and firms engaged principally in the 

underwriting of stocks or other securities. See 12 U.S.C. § 377 (repealed 1999). 

Section 32 prohibited individuals involved in investment banking serving as officers, 

directors or employees ofbanks. See 12 U.S.C. § 78 (repealed 1994). 

32 See 12 U.S.C. § 29 (1999). 

33 See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8)(1999). 
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market failure; Le., a tendency toward inherent instability and economic 
concentration, which is more costly to society than the costs of regulating the 
banking system.34 The market imperfections inherent in banking are 
believed to be attributable to two factors. One factor is the existence of 
economies of scale35 which, if substantial, could lead to concentration, 
reduction in competition, and aggregation of capital in the hands of a few. 
The other factor is the inherent instability attributable to the mismatch in the 
asset and liability sides of commercial bank balance sheets.36 Although 
many bank depositors are entitled to withdraw their funds on demand, most 
bank assets are not liquid. The result is that banks are susceptible to the risk 
of insolvency if many depositors attempt to withdraw their funds 
simultaneously in a bank run.37 The fear is that runs on individual banks can 
lead to widespread financial panic, which will affect the entire banking 
system and ultimately, lead to a contraction of economic activity.38 
U.S. banking regulation is not the product of economic 
considerations alone. In addition, political and social concerns about the 
activities of banks and their effect on society have also held sway. For 
example, the traditional preference in U.S. banking law for small, local 
institutions is attributable to the agrarian beginnings of the U.S. economy 
and the chronic scarcity of capital available to the agricultural sector. Fear 
that money center banks would drain money out of the countryside and into 
industrial concerns led to efforts by agrarian interests to limit consolidation 
in the banking industry, which was the prevailing trend until quite recently.39 
Several public policy rationales have emerged from these concerns. 
The most significant are preserving the safety and soundness of the banking 
and monetary system, ensuring the fair and impartial allocation of credit, and 
34 See S. KERRY COOPER & DONALD R. FRASER, THE FINANCIAL MARKETPLACE 
284 (1993). 
35 If operating economies of scale exist, total costs increase less than 
proportionately to output, leading to a decrease in average unit costs as output 
increases. 
36 See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Deposit Insurance, The Implicit 
Regulatory Contract, and the Mismatch in the Term Structure ofBanks' Assets and 
Liabilities, 12 YALE J. ON REG. I, at 2 (1995). 
37 Due to fractional reserve banking, banks are required to maintain only a small 
fraction of their assets in cash or near-cash items. 
38 See COOPER & FRASER, supra note 34, at 288. 
39 See DWIGHT B. CRANE ET AL., THE EFFECTS OF BANKING DEREGULATION 17­
20 (1983). 
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limiting the size of banks.40 All three of these rationales have been used to 
.. justify limiting banks to the traditional core banking activities of issuing 
notes, accepting deposits, and extending loans. 
By far the most frequently encountered rationale is safety and 
soundness, which underlies a very large part of banking regulation. The 
purpose of safety and soundness regulation is not to prevent individual banks 
from failing,4I but rather to avoid the destabilizing effect on the economy 
that is linked to financial panics triggered by bank failures. Federal deposit 
insurance42 has had a stabilizing effect on the banking system, for it lessens 
the likelihood that depositors will attempt to convert their deposits into 
currency in a financial panic.43 However, it has not eliminated the need for 
safety and soundness regulation entirely because of the adverse 
consequences that flow from bank failures and this policy continues to be a 
major focus of banking regulation. 
A second rationale for banking regulation-ensuring the impartial 
allocation of credit-has emerged from the significant rote that banks playas 
sources of capital in our society.44 Underlying this policy concern is the 
40 See LiTAN, supra note 8, at 11-12 (1987). 
41 This would have the effect of protecting incumbent management and 
shareholders, who are arguably responsible for the poor condition of the bank. See 
SPONG, supra note 3, at 11. 
42 Federal deposit insurance was introduced in the Banking Act of 1933, and the 
FDIC was formed to administer the program and regulate state nonmember banks 
that had such insurance. See 12 U.S.C. §24 et seq (1999). 
43 A distinction is drawn in the economic literature between bank runs and bank 
panics. A bank run occurs when depositors of a particular institution attempt to 
liquidate their deposits in response to concerns about the stability of that bank, but 
then redeposit those funds elsewhere. There is not necessarily a destabilizing effect 
on the financial system because bank reserves remain constant. A bank panic occurs 
when depositors attempt to convert their deposits into currency. This has the net 
effect of reducing reserves for the entire banking system and causing a contraction 
of economic activity. The causal relationship between bank panics and economic 
downturns is unclear but the two phenomena have often occurred in tandem. See 
Ellis Tallman, Some Unanswered Questions About Bank Panics, FED. REs. BANK OF 
ATLANTA, ECON. REv., Nov.lDec. 1988, at 2-17. Although financial panics 
occurred in the last 1800s and early 1900s, the advent of federal deposit insurance 
has eliminated bank panics, although bank runs still occur. See COOPER & FRASER, 
supra note 34, at 288. 
44 Commercial banks serve as financial intermediaries in funneling funds from 
savers to those who need capital. See MARCIA STIGUM, THE MONEY MARKET, 13­
16 (3rd ed. 1990). 
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belief that banks should allocate capital based on strictly neutral economic 
criteria in order to maximize economic efficiency and ensure that all 
qualified parties have equal access to credit. One type of regulation that is 
the product of this policy concern is strict regulation of conflict of interest 
transactions involving extensions ofcredit to insiders and affiliates. 
A third rationale is limitations on concentration in the banking 
industry. The concern underlying this policy is clearly linked to the 
economic rationale for banking regulation discussed above, as well as 
political and social concerns about the dangers of a very few institutions 
having control over vast aggregations of capital. 
These public policy rationales are useful tools in explaining banking 
regulation in general terms, but they are sometimes difficult to apply in 
particular cases. The reasons that certain laws were adopted in the first place 
may be shrouded by the mists of time, if in fact there were clearly 
discernible reasons to begin with. Some regulation can best be explained as 
the product of historical accident and political compromise, rather than 
rational policy choices. A case in point is Glass-Steagall, which was long 
understood to be the product of concerns about the impact on commercial 
banks of the activities of their securities affiliates.4s Such activities were 
believed to be a precipitating factor in the stock market crash that led to the 
Great Depression and to the banking crisis that preceded passage of the 
Banking Act of 1933:46 According to the Supreme Court, speaking in one of 
the earliest cases involving a challenge to the restrictions imposed by Glass­
Steagall, the policy basis for the legislation was a determination by Congress 
that "policies of competition, convenience, or expertise which might 
otherwise support the entry of commercial banks into the investment banking 
business were outweighed by the hazards, and financial dangers, that arise 
when commercial banks engage in the activities proscribed by the Act."47 
These included not only "the obvious danger that a bank might invest its own 
assets in frozen or otherwise imprudent stock or security investments," but 
also the more "subtle hazards" associated with entry into the securities 
business by a bank affiliate.48 The Court was referring to conflict of interest 
transactions which a bank might be compelled to enter into to assist its 
securities affiliate and which would impair a bank's ability to function as an 
4S See Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617,629-630 (1971). 

46 See Pub. L. No. 106-55,48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified in scattered Sections of 

12 U.S.C. Chapters 2,3, and 6). 

47 See leI v. Camp, 401 U.S., at 630. 

48 See id. 
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impartial source of credit, including unsound loans by the bank to the 
affiliate, customers of the affiliate or the company whose stock was 
underwritten by the affiliate.49 
This long.standing view of the policy basis for Glass-Steagall has 
been challenged by recent scholarship. Some scholars have questioned the 
traditional view that the activities of securities affiliates, in combination with 
conflict of interest transactions entered into by banks as a consequence or 
such affiliations, were the cause of the banking crisis of the 1930's. 50 Other 
scholars have offered alternative explanations of the legislation, claiming 
that it represents the triumph of Senator Glass' strong belief that commercial 
banks should return to their core business of making working capital loans, 51 
or that it attests to the lobbying strength of the investment banking industry, 
which supported Glass-Steagall in order to limit competition in the 
underwriting business from commercial banks.52 A number of scholars have 
questioned whether legislation passed during the Depression still adequately 
serves the public,53 arguing that changed economic conditions should result 
in a reordering of the policy behind banking regulation and corresponding 
changes in the law.54 This wide-spread questioning of the continuing 
viability of Glass-Steagall led to calls for its repeal. One of the major 
accomplishments of Gramm-Leach-Bliley is that it repealed Glass-Steagall 
in part. 
The corporate structure debate has taken place largely in the context 
of Congressional consideration of Gramm-Leach-Bliley and predecessor 
financial modernization bills, which proposed to amend or repeal not only 
Glass-Steagall and the National Bank Act relating to activities restrictions. 
It was largely conceded in such debates that the new securities and insurance 
49 See id. at 631. 

50 See GEORGE J. BENSTON, THE SEPARATION OF COMMERCIAL AND INVESTMENT 

BANKING, at 20-121 (1990). 

51 See Daniel C. Langevoort, Statutory Obsolescence and the Judicial Process: 

The Revisionist Role o/the Courts in Federal Banking Regulation, 85 MICH. L. REv. 

672,693-694 (1987). 
52 See Jonathan R. Macey, Special Interest Groups Legislation and the Judicial 
Function: The Dilemma o/Glass-Steagall, 33 EMORY L.J. 1, at 15-20 (1984). 
53 See LITAN & RAUCH, supra note 2, at 33-59. 
54 See LITAN & RAUCH, supra note 2, at 10 (arguing that fmancial market 
regulation should emerge from the shadow of the Depression, with its emphasis on 
market segmentation and failure containment and start to focus on encouraging 
competition and failure containment). 
346 ANNUAL REVIEW OF BANKING LAW VOL. 19: 329 
activities requiring a bank to take risk as a principal, and not merely as an 
agent, should not be conducted within the bank itself but rather in a 
separately incorporated entity. The open question, which occupied countless 
hours of debate in front of various Congressional committees, concerned 
where such separate entity may be located within the corporate structure of 
the bank. Prior to passage of Gramm-Leach-B1iley, the two choices 
available under U.S. banking law and regulatory agency practice were the 
bank holding company affiliate and the bank operating subsidiary.55 The 
origin of the debate over corporate structure can be traced to actions taken by 
federal banking regulators making such choices available for new activities. 
The traditional choice has been the bank holding company affiliate. Bank 
holding company affiliates have long been thought to be able to engage in 
nonbanking financial activities that are beyond the pale for banks to engage 
in directly. This conclusion is based upon a comparison of the wording of 
12 U.S.C. Section 24 (Seventh), governing the powers of national banks, 
with the wording of 12 U.S.C. Section 1843(c)(8), governing the nonbanking 
activities of bank holding company affiliates. Section 24 (Seventh) permits 
banks to engage in "the business of banking," while Section 1843(c)(8) 
permits bank holding company affiliates to engage in activities that are 
"closely related to banking." This difference in wording appears to permit a 
broader range of activities for bank holding company affiliates than for 
national banks. 56 The Board approved various non banking activities to be 
conducted in such affiliates on the authority of Section 1843( c )(8) by 
regulation and by order.57 The Board argued in congressional hearings on 
financial modernization legislation that the only appropriate vehicle for new 
activities was the bank holding company affiliate and contended that the 
bank operating subsidiary should not be used for this purpose. 
In contrast to the bank holding company affiliate, which is well­
established as a vehicle for nonbanking activities, the bank operating 
subsidiary is a relatively new arrival on the scene. The OCC took the 
position in its rulemakings and orders that such subsidiaries could be used 
for nonbanking financial activities that national banks may not engage in 
55 Recently, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency has permitted use of 

limited liability companies by national banks to structure non-banking activities in a 

joint venture format. See Russell J. Bruemmer, LLes: A Vehicle for Joint Venturing 

Non-Banking Activities, 15 No.7 BANKING POL'y REp. 1 (1996). 





57 See MALLOY, supra note 17, at 186-190. 
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directly, such as underwriting bank ineligible securities, and has argued this 
view in Congressional testimony. The Treasury Department and FDIC also 
supported this view in Congressional hearings. 
The debate over appropriate corporate structure has largely centered 
on the power to engage in securities underwriting, and accordingly that will 
be the focus of this article. Further, the article will focus on national banks, 
although the Gramm-Leach-Bliley compromise on the corporate structure 
issue will impact other types of banks as well. It is recent actions taken by 
the acc to expand the powers of national bank operating subsidiaries that 
led to the debate. The acc and the Board have divergent views in the 
debate and it seems appropriate that the focus should be where their 
regulatory authority overlaps, namely in regulating banking organizations 
that contain national banks. 
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley compromise on corporate structure for 
new financial activities for banks presents an opportunity to assess which 
policy considerations are driving the form that banking legislation takes, and 
whether appropriate policy choices are being made. The confusion about the 
policy foundations of banking law discussed above is not just a matter of 
historic interest, but is still evident today. Very often in recent 
Congressional debates about financial modernization, there has been 
disagreement about what the guiding principles should be. At times, the 
same public policy rationale has been used to justify widely disparate 
positions. This can be interpreted in several ways. It may mean that the 
policy rationale is not well-understood. It can also mean that the problem 
being addressed by the proposed legislation is so complex that it is unclear 
how public policy analysis should apply to it. Finally, it can mean that 
something else is being beneath the guise of public policy. Sometimes, one 
is left with the uncomfortable feeling that the public interest will not be well­
served by the choices that are being made in the process of legislative 
reform. 
The policies that have been most frequently mentioned in the 
corporate structure debate include two of the traditional rationales mentioned 
above, namely safety and soundness and ensuring the impartial allocation of 
credit by avoiding conflict of interest transactions. Both of these rationales 
will be discussed in Part IV. The third traditional rationale mentioned above, 
avoiding excessive concentrations of economic power, has not been a 
specific focus of the debate. It should be noted, however, that community 
groups testifying in front of Congress about financial modernization have 
expressed their concern about the formation of large financial 
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conglomerates.58 Two additional rationales relevant to the debate will also 
be discussed in Part IV, namely limiting the spread of the federal safety net 
subsidy and maintaining the regulatory authority of the Board in order to 
preserve its ability to act as lender of last resort and deal with systemic risk. 
The first of these arguments, limiting spread of the federal safety net 
subsidy, has emerged as the primary argument for exclusive use of the 
holding company affiliate. The policy basis for the argument seems to 
consist of two components. One is that taxpayers bear the cost of the federal 
safety net subsidy and should not be required to pay for risk associated with 
new activities of banks that go beyond what the federal deposit insurance 
scheme was intended to protect, namely small depositors' funds. The other 
is that permitting the spread of the subsidy to new activities will distort 
competition in the marketplace by giving an advantage to commercial banks 
at the expense of other financial institutions offering near equivalents of 
bank services. 
The other argument relating to preserving the regulatory authority of 
the Federal Reserve has not been previously discussed in the literature on the 
corporate structure debate. It is an argument in favor of use of the holding 
company affiliate, if not in all cases, at least in the case of very large banks 
whose failure might pose risks to the financial system as a whole. For the 
most part, these are banks that are already within a holding company 
structure. The exact parameters of this policy argument are difficult to 
define, because the argument has been only hinted at in Congressional 
debate and has never been fully explored in a public forum. However, this 
policy is of such critical importance that it cannot be ignored in the corporate 
structure debate. 
The next section of this Part II will explore the origins of the 
corporate structure debate in actions by federal banking regulators permitting 
new financial activities, including underwriting bank ineligible securities, by 
national bank affiliates. Gramm-Leach-Bliley changed the landscape of 
activities restrictions to a significant degree and foreclosed the need for the 
regulatory approval process through which deregulation in activities 
restrictions had been largely achieved. While such developments are now 
primarily of historical interest due to Gramm-Leach-B1iley, reviewing such . 
58 See Finance Services Restructuring: Hearings on the Financial Services Act of • 
1998 Before the Comm. on Banking, House, and Urban Affairs, 105th Congo (1998) 
(testimony of Ralph Nader) (testimony of Allen 1. Fishbein, General Counsel of The 
Ctr. For Community Change and Dir. of the Center's Neighborhood Revitalization 
Project). 
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regulatory developments is nevertheless crucial for understanding how the 
.. issue arose and for shedding light on the policy issues underlying the debate . 
The focus will be on the most recent developments that gave rise to the 
corporate structure debate in Congress. 
B. 	 Deregulation of Activities Restrictions Applicable to 
National Banks and their Affiliates through Action by 
Federal Banking Regulators 
In the years immediately preceding Gramm-Leach-Bliley, there was 
a gradual increase in the permissible activities of national banks and their 
affiliates under existing law and without any statutory amendments that 
expressly authorized new activities or removed existing prohibitions. This 
was achieved through an expansive reading of the statutory restrictions on 
bank activities by federal banking regulators charged with approving new 
lines of business for banks and their affiliates. Most noteworthy are the 
developments with respect to the interpretation of national bank powers 
under Section 24 (Seventh) of the National Bank Act by the acc,59 
59 The language of Section 24 (Seventh) is vague and has been interpreted in a 
variety of ways by courts and commentators, with considerable disagreement over 
what activities are covered. See Edward L. Symons, Jr., The Business ofBanking in 
Historical Perspective, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 676, 678-684 (1983) (analysis of 
narrow and broad views of bank powers); see also Ralph F. Huck, What is the 
Banking Business?, Bus. LAW. (January 1966) 537-554, at 537-539 (criticism of 
narrow 	view); Richard Beatty, What Are the Legal Limits to the Expansion of 
National Bank Services?, 86 BANKING LJ. 3, 19 (1969) (description of broad view); 
Harfield, Sermon on Genesis 17:20; Exodus 1:10 (A Proposal for Testing the 
Propriety of Expanding Bank Services, 85 BANKING L.J. 565, 567 (1968) (arguing 
for broad view). Prior to the decision in Nations Bank of North Carolina, N.A. v. 
Variable Annuity Life Ins. ("V ALIC"), 513 U.S. 251 (1995), there was no definitive 
interpretation of the meaning of Section 24 (Seventh) by the Supreme Court. Other 
federal courts read the language fairly restrictively, often in a way that seemed 
consistent with the narrow view of national bank powers. See Arnold Tours Inc. v. 
Camp, 474 F.2d 427 (1st Cir. 1972). The legal landscape changed radically with the 
decision in V ALIC, in which the Supreme Court stated that the business of banking 
for national banks is not restricted to the five specifically enumerated powers, but 
includes other activities that the Comptroller deems to be part of the business of 
banking, within reasonable bounds. See 513 U.S. 251, 258, fn. 2. The acc seized 
upon the language in V ALIC as an affirmation of its authority to determine the 
boundaries of permissible powers for national banks. It can be inferred from recent 
acc activity, including rulemakings and rulings on applications to engage in new 
activities, that the acc will be aggressive in exercising its discretion to widen the 
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including the power to own and conduct nonbanking activities in operating 
subsidiaries, and the interpretation of Section 20 of Glass-Steagall and 
Section lS43(c)(S) of the Bank Holding Company Act by the Board.6o 
Deregulation through the regulatory approval process was 
controversial. On numerous occasions, approval by a federal bank regulator 
of a bank's application to engage in a new activity, directly or through a 
subsidiary or an affiliate, was challenged by competitors in litigation in the 
federal courts. Many of these regulatory approvals were upheld by federal 
courts, including the Supreme Court.61 In addition to litigation challenges 
scope of permissible activities. Recent developments with respect to operating 
subsidiaries are discussed infra. In addition, the chief counsel of the OCC has 
published her views on the outer limits of national bank powers and incidental 
activities, which is based on an analysis of VALle and other court cases on national 
bank powers. See Julie L. Williams & Mark P. Jacobsen, The Business ofBanking: 
Looking to the Future, 50 Bus. LAW. 783, 785 (1995); see also Julie L. Williams & 
James E. F. Gillespie, Jr., The Business ofBanking: Looking to the Future - Part II, 
52 Bus. LAW. 1279, 1285 (1997). These tests have now become the standard used 
by the Comptroller in its corporate decisions on new activities. See Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency, Interpretive Letter #743 (October 17, 1996)(found at 
1996 WL 636764). 
60 These developments will be discussed infra in Section II.B.I. 
61 The development in the case of securities activities has been dramatic. The first 
significant decision in ICI v. Camp, supra note 45, was a defeat for the Comptroller 
with the Supreme Court overturning an approval allowing a national bank to offer 
shares of a common investment fund to the public on the grounds that the proposed 
activity violated Sections 16 and 21 of Glass-Steagall. After Camp, however, the 
Supreme Court and the federal appellate courts have affirmed regulatory 
authorization of banks andior their affiliates and subsidiaries to engage in various 
securities activities including, among other things: acting as investment advisers to 
closed-end investment companies, Board of Governors v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 
U.S. 46 (1981); retail securities brokerage activities, Securities Indus. Ass'n. v. 
Board of Governors, 468 U.S. 207 (1984); commercial paper placement, Securities 
Indus. Ass'n. v. Board of Governors, 468 U.S. 137 (1984), Securities Indus. Ass'n. 
v. Board of Governors, 807 F.2d 1052 (D.C.Cir. 1986) (on remand from U.s. 
Supreme Court); providing automatic stock purchase services, New York Stock 
Exch., Inc v. Smith, 404 F. Supp. 1091 (D.D.C. 1975), vacated (sub nom. New York 
Exch., Inc. v. Bloom), 562 F.2d 736 (D.C.Cir. 1977); providing securities brokerage 
services and investment advice in combination, Securities Indus. Ass'n. v. Board of 
Governors, 821 F.2d 810 (D.C.Cir. 1987); underwriting and dealing in certain bank 
eligible securities, including mortgage-backed securities, government-issued 
securities, and municipal revenue bonds, 73 F.R.B. 473 (1987), affd (sub nom. 
Securities Indus. Ass'n. v. Board of Governors), 839 F.2d 47 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
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by competitors, some U.S. Congressmen charged that the process of 
deregulation through the regulatory process was flawed, claiming that it was 
a "piecemeal" approach in which regulatory "loopholes" were exploited.62 
They asserted that action needed to be taken by Congress in order for the 
deregulation of activities restrictions to be legitimate.63 Such statements 
implied that the process was inefficient, corrupt and possibly even dangerous 
for the banking system. Such criticisms overlooked two important aspects. 
First, the federal regulators' approvals were based upon interpretations of 
statutory language, which were upheld as reasonable by federal courts in 
most cases. Second, federal banking regulators acted with due regard for 
considerations of prudential regulation, including safety and soundness and 
avoiding the possibility of conflict of interest transactions, by imposing 
special conditions on such approvals. The deregulation of activities 
restrictions through the regulatory approval process prior to Gramm-Leach­
Bliley will be discussed in detail below. 
1. 	 Bank Holding Company Affiliates 
a. 	 Use of Holding Company Affiliates for Nonbanking 
Activities 
Prior to Gramm-Leach-Bliley, the holding company affiliate was the 
traditional vehicle for expansion by banks into non banking financial 
activities that were impermissible for a bank to engage in directly, including 
underwriting bank ineligible securities. This section will focus on the state 
of the law prior to passage of Gramm-Leach-Bliley and will not describe 
486 U.S. 1059 (1988); underwriting and dealing in commercial paper, Securities 
Indus. Ass'n. v. Board of Governors, 847 F.2d 890 (D.C.Cir. 1988); and selling 
mortgage passthrough certificates, Securities Indus. Ass'n. v. Clarke, 885 F.2d 1034 
(2d Cir. 1989). 
62 Representative Marge Roukema, a member of the House Banking Committee, 
wanted to hold Congressional hearings on the approval by the OCC of revenue bond 
underwriting through a national bank operating subsidiary, calling the action 
"piecemeal" and likely to interfere with Congress' ability to "pass financial reform 
legislation." See Carter H. Golembe, How Important is Congress in the Drive to 
Modernize Banking, 17 No.3 BANKING POL'y REp. 1 (1996). 
63 Representative Roukema suggested the House Banking Committee urge the 
bank regulatory agencies to take no action on banking modernization because "they 
have got to understand that we ultimately will be writing this legislation." Jaret 
Seiberg, House Vote on Reform Not Likely Until Spring, AM. BANKER, Nov. 2, 
1997, at 1. 
352 ANNUAL REVIEW OF BANKING LAW VOL. 19: 329 
changes brought about by the new legislation. However. it must be noted 
that Gramm-Leach-Bliley provides for the establishment of a new type of 
bank holding company called a financial holding company that may engage 
in a wide range of financial activities previously unavailable or available 
only to a limited extent through the regulatory approval process. Although 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley does not eliminate the traditional bank holding 
company. most banks will likely choose to become financial holding 
companies in order to engage in expanded financial activities if they can 
meet the conditions set forth in the statute. Therefore. the regulatory 
approval process described in this Section is primarily of historical interest. 
Although Section 1843 of the Bank Holding Company Act generally 
prohibits banks in a holding company structure from being affiliated with 
nonbank subsidiaries.64 pursuant to Section 1843(c)(8), the Board. by order 
or regulation. after notice and opportunity for public comment. may permit a 
holding company to own shares of a company engaged in activities 
determined to be "closely related to banking."65 In addition, the proposed 
activity must meet a second test, namely whether the public benefits of such 
new activity will outweigh any potential adverse effects.66 Pursuant to this 
grant of authority. the Board permitted bank holding company subsidiaries 
to engage in some limited forms of nonbanking activities pursuant to 
individual orders and through regulation. namely the so-called "laundry 
liSt"67 in Board Regulation Y, which governs the operation of bank holding 
64 Bank holding companies are prohibited from owning or controlling, directly or 
indirectly, the voting shares of any company that is not a bank, as defined in the 
statute. See 12 U.S.C. § IS43(a) (1999). • 
65 The statute states that the activity must be found "to be so closely related to 
banking or managing or controlling banks as to be a proper incident thereto." See 
12 U.S.C. § IS43(c)(S) (1999). 
66 See id. This test was added by the 1970 amendments to the Bank Holding 
Company Act and require the Board to determine whether the performance of 
non banking activities by an affiliate of a bank holding company can reasonably be 
expected to produce benefits to the public such as greater convenience, increased 
competition, or gains in efficiency. that outweigh possible adverse effects, such as 
undue concentration of resources, decreased or unfair competition, conflicts of 
interest, or unsound banking practices. 
67 12 C.F.R. § 225.2S. According to the Board, the "laundry list" is intended to 
serve the purpose of providing a convenient and detailed list of most of the activities 
that the Board has found to be closely related to banking and therefore permissible 
for bank holding companies. 62 Fed. Reg. 9290, 9301-9302 (1997). 
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companies.68 The "laundry list" is expansive in its scope, especially after 
amendments that were made in 1997 as part of a comprehensive revision of 
Regulation y'69 Bank holding company affiliates were permitted to engage 
in a wide variety of nonbanking activities by virtue of this authority,70 
68 See 12 C.F.R. Part 225 (1999). 
69 See Federal Reserve System, Final Rule, Bank Holding Companies and Change 
in Bank Control (Regulation Y) (February 28, 1997), 62 Fed. Reg. 9290 (1997). 
The changes were the product of a comprehensive review of Regulation Y 
mandated by the Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act 
of 1994, see 12 U.S.C. § 4803 (1999), in order to improve efficiency, reduce 
unnecessary costs, and eliminate unwarranted constraints on credit availability. See 
61 Fed. Reg. 47242 (1996). The most significant amendments to Regulation Y fall 
into one of four categories. First, changes to application and notice procedures for 
both bank and nonbank acquisitions were made. Among other things, the new rules 
permit a streamlined review process for bank and non-bank acquisitions meeting 
certain qualifying criteria, eliminate the prior notice and approval requirements of 
the Bank Holding Company Act for bank holding companies meeting certain 
qualifying criteria to engage de novo in any nonbanking activity approved by the 
Board by regulation, and establish a streamlined review process for engaging de 
novo in nonbanking activities previously approved by the Board by order. See 62 
Fed. Reg. 9290, 9290-9293 (1997). See 12 C.F.R. Part 225 (1999). Second, the 
scope of permissible nonbanking activities was broadened. See 62 Fed. Reg. 9290, 
9301 (1997), 12 C.F.R. § 225.22 (1999). Third, many regulatory restrictions on 
nonbanking activities were eliminated. See 62 Fed. Reg. 9290, 9302 (1997). Fourth, 
tying restrictions applicable to bank holding companies and their bank and nonbank 
affiliates were removed or liberalized. See 62 Fed. Reg. 9290, 9312 (1997); 12 
C.F.R. § 225.7 (1999). Miscellaneous changes to reduce the regulatory burden of 
complying with Regulation Y were made. See 62 Fed. Reg. 9290, 9316-18 (1997). 
70 Among the permissible non banking activities that were added to the laundry 
"list" of activities deemed closely related to banking are riskless principal 
transactions, private placement services, foreign exchange trading for a bank holding 
company's own account, dealing and related activities in gold, silver, platinum and 
palladium, employee benefits consulting, career counseling services, asset 
management, servicing and collection activities, acquiring and resolving debt in 
default, printing and selling checks and providing real estate settlement services. 
See 62 Fed. Reg. 9290, 9302 (1997); 12 C.F.R. § 225.28 (1999). In addition, the 
scope of permissible derivatives and foreign exchange activities has been broadened 
to give bank holding companies the same ability to conduct these activities as banks 
and certain restrictions applicable to bank holding companies that were not 
applicable to banks are also removed. See 62 Fed. Reg. 9290, 9302 (1997). 12 
C.F.R. § 225.28(b)(8)(ii) (1999). The revisions also removed a significant number 
of restrictions contained in Regulation Y that were considered outmoded, had been 
354 ANNUAL REVIEW OF BANKING LAW VOL. 19: 329 
including securities and insurance activities that require the affiliate to act in 
an agency capacity.?l Safety and soundness concerns for banks arising as a 
result of being affiliated with a company engaged in nonbanking activities 
are addressed in Sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act, which 
prohibits certain transactions, including lending and purchases and sales of 
assets, between banks and affiliates.72 These firewalls are intended to 
insulate banks from the risks associated with conflict of interest transactions, 
that might flow from such affiliations. 
The 1997 Regulation Y amendments indicated that the Board was 
prepared to deregulate activities restrictions applicable to bank holding 
companies on an ongoing basis. Several principles guided the Board's 
reform of nonbanking activities restrictions, most importantly the idea that 
bank holding companies should be permitted to conduct nonbanking 
activities to the fullest extent permissible under the Bank Holding Company 
Act and that Regulation Y should be flexible enough to allow for 
development within the banking industry of permissible activities without 
creating unnecessary additional filing burdens.73 The Board indicated that it 
would be proactive in authorizing new activities, especially as new activities 
are permitted for banks or as new financial services are developed, 
reiterating its view that under the Bank Holding Company Act, bank holding 
companies are authorized to conduct activities beyond the scope of activities 
that insured banks may conduct.74 The Board also conducted a 
comprehensive revision of the restrictions that govern the conduct of 
permissible nonbanking activities. A guiding principle in this regard was 
superseded by Board order or did not apply to insured depository institutions 
conducting the same activity. Examples of such restrictions include those relating to 
investment advisory activities of bank holding companies with respect to mutual 
funds and other investment companies, data processing and management consulting 
activities, and acquisitions of assets used in lending related activities in the ordinary 
course of business. See 62 Fed. Reg. 9290, 9302-9305 (1997). 
71 Examples are insurance agency for credit insurance, see 12 C.F.R. § 
225.28(b)(l1)(l999), and securities brokerage and investment advisory services, see 
12 C.F.R § 225.28(b)(7)(1999). 
72 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 371c, 371c-l (1999). 
73 See 61 Fed. Reg. 47242, 47243 (1996). 
74 See id. The Board indicated in the release accompanying the final rule that it 
would consider amending the laundry list as new activities are authorized for banks, 
as experience with a narrowly defined activities indicated that the activity could be 
more broadly defined or as developments occurred in technology or the marketplace 
for financial products and services. See 62 Fed. Reg. 9290, 9303 (1997). 
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that a bank holding company should not be subject to supervisory 
restrictions on conducting an activity that would not apply to an insured 
depository institution conducting the same activity. Another principle was 
that supervisory principles should be governed by market developments and 
the Board's experience and should be uniformly applied to insured 
depository institutions and their affiliates on an interagency basis.7s 
Although the changes to Regulation Y liberalizing nonbanking 
activities restrictions were substantial, certain areas of activities restrictions 
were not touched. The 1997 Regulation Y amendments failed to permit sales 
of annuities and nationwide sales of insurance from small towns under 5000, 
pursuant to 12 U.s.C. § 92, which had been previously authorized by the 
acc for national banks,76 failed to treat municipal bonds as bank eligible 
securities that could be underwritten in a Section 4( c )(8) subsidiary not 
subject to gross revenue limitations rather than a Section 20 subsidiary, 
failed to permit mutual fund underwriting and distribution through Section 
20 subsidiaries or Section 4(c)(8) subsidiaries subject to gross revenue 
limitations but with revenue based upon fee income rather than gross sales, 
and failed to consider best efforts underwriting as an eligible activity 
permissible for a Section 4(c)(8) subsidiary,?7 
b. 	 Expansion of Permitted Securities Activities Througb 
Use of Section 20 Subsidiaries. 
Perhaps the most dramatic use of Board authority to expand bank 
powers pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) was the issuance of so-called 
Section 20 orders to various bank holding companies. Prior to Gramm­
Leach-Bliley, Glass-Steagall prohibited national banks from underwriting or 
dealing in all securities, with limited exceptions, most notably U.S. 
government securities.78 The limited category of securities which national 
banks could underwrite and deal in without restriction are referred to as bank 
ineligible securities.79 In contrast, bank ineligible securities are those 
securities that a national bank would not be permitted to underwrite or deal 
7S See 61 Fed. Reg. 47242, 47243 (1996). 

76 See Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996). See 

VALlC, supra note 59. 

77 See Melanie L. Fein, Fed's Proposed Overhaul ofRegulation Y Goes Far, But 

Could Be Bolder, 15 BANKING POL'y REp. 4, 6-7 (1996). 

78 See 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (1999). 

79 The permissible securities activities of national banks are governed by 

regulations set forth at 12 C.F.R. Part l. 
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in.8o Even though, prior to Gramm-Leach-Bliley, Section 20 of Glass­
Steagall prohibited affiliations of member banks of the Federal Reserve • 
System8l with corporations "engaged principally" in the securities business, 
the Board orders permitted the bank holding company applicants to engage 
in limited securities underwriting and dealing activities in bank ineligible 
securities through nonbank subsidiaries. The Board determined that this • 
activity was permissible under Section 1843(c)(8) of the BHeA because it 
was closely related to banking.82 
The Board issued its first Section 20 order in 1987, when it approved 
applications by three bank holding companies to underwrite and deal in 
commercial paper, municipal revenue bonds, mortgage-backed securities, 
and consumer-receivable-related securities (tier-one securities).83 In 1989, 
the Board allowed five bank holding companies to underwrite and deal in all 
debt and equity securities (tier-two securities).84 Subsequently, other bank 
holding companies were granted authority to engage in underwriting and 
dealing in bank ineligible securities through Section 20 subsidiaries on the 
same terms as in the 1987 and 1989 orders. As of the end of 1996, forty-one 
Section 20 subsidiaries were authorized to engage in underwriting and 
dealing activities with respect to bank ineligible securities.8s Fifteen of the 
Section 20 subsidiaries had authority to underwrite and deal in tier-one 
80 See 61 Fed. Reg. 68750 (1996). 
81 See 12 U.S.C. § 377 (repealed 1999). 
82 See 1987 Order, infra note 83, at 487. 
83 See Citicorp, J.P. Morgan & Co., and Bankers Trust New York Corp., 73 Fed. 
Res. Bulletin 473 (1987) [hereinafter 1987 Order], afJ'd, Securities Industry Ass'n v. 
Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 839 F.2d 47 (2d Cir.1988), cert. denied, 

486 U.S. 1059 (l988)(Citicorp); see a/so Chemical New York Corp., Chase 

Manhattan Corp., Bankers Trust New York Corp., Citicorp, Manufacturers Hanover 

Corp., and Security Pacific Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 731 (1987) (approving 

underwriting and dealing in consumer-receivable-related securities, after having 

deferred decision for 60 days in its 1987 Order). 

84 See J.P. Morgan & Co., The Chase Manhattan Corp., Bankers Trust New York 

Corp., Citicorp, and Security Pacific Corp., 75 Fed. Res. Bull. 192 (1989) 

[hereinafter 1989 Order], afJ'd, Securities Industries Ass'n v. Board of Governors of 

Fed. Reserve Sys., 900 F.2d 360 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 

8S Revenue Limit on Bank Ineligible Activities of Subsidiaries of Bank Holding , 

Companies Engaged in Underwriting and Dealing in Securities. See 61 Fed. Reg. 

68750, 68751 (1996). More recent data is available in Section 20 Securities 





2000] STRUCTURlNG THE FINANCIAL SERVICE CONGLOMERATES 357 
securities pursuant to the terms of the 1987 Order, Twenty-three Section 20 
subsidiaries had authority to underwrite and deal in all tier-two securities and 
three had authority to underwrite and deal in all debt securities, pursuant to 
the terms of the 1989 Order. 
The 1987 and 1989 Orders were based on an interpretation by the 
Board of the phrase "engaged principally" in Section 20 of Glass-Steagall to 
mean "substantial" or "primary."86 According to the Board, a holding 
company affiliate of a bank could engage in a limited amount of securities 
underwriting and dealing activity without being deemed to be "engaged 
principally" in such activity for purposes of Section 20 of the Glass-Steagall 
Act,87 The Board devised a revenue test to determine whether a company is 
"engaged principally" in underwriting and dealing for purposes of Section 
20. The revenue test provided that a Section 20 subsidiary may not derive 
more than a fixed percent of its total revenue from underwriting and dealing 
in bank ineligible securities.88 This fixed percent was originally set at 5%89 
but has recently been raised to 25%, as described below. 
In addition to these limitations, the Board imposed various 
conditions or firewalls intended to guard against conflict of interest 
transactions that might affect the safety and soundness of affiliated banks. 
Twenty-eight firewalls were imposed in the original Section 20 orders, 
which can be grouped into categories by common subject matter.90 The most 
86 61 Fed. Reg. 68750, 68751 (1996). An alternative meaning of principal, 
namely "chief," "main," or "largest," which would have permitted up to 50 percent 
of the Section 20 subsidiary's business to be derived from securities underwriting 
and dealing was rejected by the Board, 1987 Order, supra note 83, at 477-78, 482­
83. 
87 ld 
88 The Board arrived at this revenue test through a series of interpretive steps, in a 
series of orders, See Bankers Trust New York Corporation, 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 138 
(1987); 1987 Order, supra note 83; Modifications to Section 20 Orders, 75 Fed, Res. 
Bull. 751 (1989); Order Approving Modifications to the Section 20 Orders, 79 Fed. 
Res. Bull. 226 (1993). 
89 See 1987 Order, supra note 83, at 485. 
90 The categories included the following: 1) capital adequacy conditions, 2) 
prohibitions and other limitations on credit extensions by a bank to customers of an 
affiliated Section 20 subsidiary, 3) prohibition on director and officer interlocks 
between banks and an affiliated Section 20 subsidiary, 4) required customer 
disclosure by an underwriting subsidiary describing the difference between the bank 
and such bank affiliate, 5) restrictions on marketing on behalf of a Section 20 
subsidiary, 6) requirement that investment advice given by a bank regarding bank 
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important limitations were those relating to capital adequacy, limitations on 
credit extensions by a bank to customers of a Section 20 subsidiary, and 
limitations on credit extensions by a bank to customers of a Section 20 
subsidiary. As discussed below, the Board has recently removed these 
firewalls and replaced them with a greatly simplified set of operating 
standards. 
c. Recent Changes to Section 20 Subsidiary Restrictions. 
In 1996 and 1997, the Board made two important revisions to the 
conditions imposed in previous Board orders permitting limited securities 
activities through Section 20 subsidiaries. First, the Board raised the limit on 
income from bank ineligible securities from 10% to 25%.91 Second, the 
Board modified the firewalls imposed in prior Section 20 orders, replacing 
them with a series of eight operating standards.92 These changes signaled an 
even greater willingness on the part of the Board to deregulate the conditions 
ineligible securities underwritten by a Section 20 affiliate be accompanied by 
disclosures about the affiliate's role, 7) limit on extension of credit and purchase of 
assets involving a Section 20 subsidiary, 8) limitations on disclosure of customer 
information between a bank and a Section 20 subsidiary, 9) requirement of reports; 
10) requirement that securities activities be conducted only by the subsidiary for 
which approval has been sought and prohibition on corporate reorganizations 
without board consent, 11) prohibition on reciprocity arrangements between bank 
holding companies intended to evade the firewall and limitations on discriminatory 
arrangements in which Section 20 subsidiaries are favored over competitors, and 12) 
requirement of a supervisory review by the Board prior to commencement of 
approved securities activities. 62 Fed. Reg. 45295, 45297-45306 (1997). 62 Fed. 
Reg. 2622 (1997). 
91 See Federal Reserve System, Notice, Revenue Limit on Bank-Ineligible 
Activities of Subsidiaries of Bank Holding Companies Engaged in Underwriting and 
Dealing in Securities (1996),61 Fed. Reg. 68750 [hereinafter Section 20 Notice]. 
The change, announced December 20, 1996, became effective March 6, 1997. 
Section 20 subsidiaries would therefore be allowed to employ the 25% limit for the 
first quarter of 1997. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
Announcements, Increase in the Amount of Revenue that Section 20 Subsidiaries 
May Derive from Underwriting and Dealing in Securities (1997), 83 Fed. Res. Bull. 
(1997). 
92 See Federal Reserve System, Final Conditions to Board Orders, Bank Holding 
Companies and Change in Bank Control (Regulation V); Amendments to 
Restrictions in the Board's Section 20 Orders, 62 Fed. Reg. 4529 (1997); Proposed 
Rules, Proposed Conditions to Board Orders, 62 Fed. Reg. 2622 (1997). 
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under which bank affiliates were permitted to underwrite and deal in bank 
ineligible securities. 
i. Increase in Revenue Limit 
The Board made the change because it had supervised Section 20 
subsidiaries over a nine year period without significant problems and it 
recognized that developments in the securities markets had occurred since 
the revenue limitation was adopted in 1987.93 As a consequence, the Board 
decided that a Section 20 subsidiary would not be engaged principally in 
such activities so long as ineligible revenue did not exceed 25% of total 
revenue.94 The impact of this change was felt immediately with the 
announcement of several acquisitions involving major financial services 
93 See Section 20 Notice, supra note 91, at 68751. 61 Fed. Reg. 68750, 68751 
(1996). The Board believed that the prior limit of 10% had unduly restricted the 
underwriting and dealing activity of Section 20 subsidiaries to a level that fell short 
of being "engaged principally" for purposes ofSection 20, noting that changes in the 
product mix that Section 20 subsidiaries are permitted to offer and developments in 
the securities markets had affected the relationship between revenue and securities 
activity since the original Section 20 orders in 1987. Id The Board further explained 
its rationale by citing evidence that revenues of Section 20 subsidiaries related to 
ineligible securities underwriting had increased without a corresponding increase in 
the number or size of transactions, due to greater revenues generated in connection 
with corporate debt activities The Board noted that the reason for higher revenues 
on tier-two securities activities was related to higher risk but also to factors such as 
financial innovation in structuring transactions, ability to foresee shifting public 
needs gained from an experienced sales force, research on the issuer that is credited 
by the market, the ability to use marketing expertise to avoid losses, and accuracy in 
pricing. Id at 68753. It also noted that revenues related to eligible securities 
activities had decreased without a corresponding decrease in level of activity, due to 
lower commissions as a result of increased competition. Id. 
94 The Board noted that it had not revised its legal interpretation of the term 
"engaged principally" to mean "substantial" or "primary", rather than "chief', 
"main" or largest." Id The Board also rejected the notion that the revenue limit 
should not be raised because of the fact that several Section 20 subsidiaries were 
among the largest underwriters in the U.S. or because banks would be permitted to 
affiliate with the largest investment banks in the U.S. According to the Board, such 
arguments were an attempt to reintroduce a market share limitation on securities 
activities by Section 20 subsidiaries, an approach that was explicitly rejected by the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals in a challenge to the original Board Section 20 
order in 1987. Securities Industry Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 839 F.2d 47,68 (2d 
Crr. 1987), cert denied, 486 U.S. 1059 (l988). 
360 ANNUAL REVIEW OF BANKING LAW VOL. 19: 329 
finns, which were made possible only because of the change in the revenue 
limit.95 This development suggests that the Board's revision to the revenue • 
limit was not merely a response to market change, but also a facilitator of it. 
ii. Revision ofFirewalls 
The Board also substantially revised the limitations that had been • 
imposed on operation of Section 20 subsidiaries pursuant to Board orders.96 
The bulk of these limitations, or firewalls, were adopted in the 1987 Order.97 
Other firewalls were added in the 1989 Order.98 The purpose of these 
restrictions was to prevent the risks associated with securities underwriting 
and dealing from being passed from a Section 20 subsidiary to an affiliated 
insured bank, and "to mitigate the potential for conflicts of interest, unfair 
competition, and other adverse effects that may arise from the affiliation of 
commercial and investment banks."99 
The Board noted it initially had imposed a "very conservative 
regime" for firewalls due to the historical context in which such orders were 
issued. Due to the long-standing separation between commercial and 
investment banking effected by Glass-Steagall, the Board had little 
experience supervising investment banks and was concerned about the 
unknown risks that might be presented if affiliations between commercial 
and investment banks were allowed. Such affiliations were thOUght by many 
95 In April 1997, Bankers Trust New York Corp. announced plans to acquire the 

securities fmn of Alex Brown Inc. of Baltimore, a deal made possible because of the 

Board's move to raise the Section 20 revenue cap to 25%. See Niles S. Campbell, 

Roukema Objects to Bank's Request to Underwrite Municipal Revenue Bonds, BNA 

Banking Daily (Apr. 17, 1997). Other acquisitions included First Union of Wheat 

First Butcher Singer Securities, BankAmerica of Robertson, Stephens & Co., CIBC 

of Oppenheimer, and SBC Warburg of Dillon, Reed & Company. See John W. 

Milligan, Bankers Who Would Be Brokers, U.S. BANKER, October 1997, at 26. 

96 Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control (Regulation Y); 

Amendments to Restrictions in the Board's Section 20 Orders. See 62 Fed. Reg. 45, 

295 (1997) [hereinafter Section 20 Firewall Amendments]. The changes were the 

product of a comprehensive review of Regulation Y mandated by the Riegle . 

Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994, 12 U.S.C. § 

4803 (1999), in order to improve efficiency, reduce unnecessary costs, and 





97 See 62 Fed. Reg. 29545, 45296 (1997). 

98 See id. 

99 Jd. 
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commentators at the time to have caused losses in the banking industry 
• 	 before 1933, but recent research on this topic indicated this belief was 
largely inaccurate,lOO The Board was uncertain about whether functional 
regulation by the Securities and Exchange Commission of the broker-dealer 
function of Section 20 subsidiaries would afford adequate protection)Ol 
. 	 Finally, statutory changes enacted since 1987 either duplicated some of the 
firewalls or otherwise addressed the risks that the firewalls were formulated 
to protect against.102 When it adopted the firewalls in its Section 20 
orders, the Board indicated that its concern about affiliations between 
holding company subsidiaries and insured banks might abate with time and 
that it would continue to review such restrictions as its experience in 
supervising Section 20 subsidiaries expanded,l03 After conducting a 
comprehensive review of the firewalls, the Board concluded that many of 
them could be eliminated entirely and the rest could be incorporated in a 
smaller number of operating standards.1 04 The Board noted that, in its 
experience, the risks of securities underwriting and dealing had proven to be 
manageable in a bank holding company framework, and that both bank 
100 See 62 Fed. Reg. 2622 (1997). 

tOI See id. at 2623. 

102 See id. The Board pointed to enactment of Section 23B of the Federal Reserve 

Act, which duplicated or overlapped many of the firewalls, enactment of risk-based 
capital standards, and adoption of the Interagency Statement on Retail Sales of 
Nondeposit Investment Products. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency and Office of Thrift Supervision; Interagency Statement on Retail Sales of 
Nondeposit Investment Products (February 15, 1994), 1994 WL 836461 [hereinafter 
Retail Sales Statement]. The four federal bank and thrift regulatory agencies have 
issued a joint statement on retail sales of nondeposit investment products because the 
agencies believed that retail customers must be fully informed about the risks 
associated with mutual fund or other nondeposit investment products. Depository 
institutions selling such products must now inform customers that the products: I) 
are not FDIC-insured; 2) are not deposits or other obligations of the institution and 
are not guaranteed by the institution, and 3) involve investment risks. The Statement 
also outlines the steps banks and thrifts should take to minimize customer confusion. 
According to the Board, this Statement is the primary means to avoid misleading 
retail banking customers about the nature of the products they are purchasing. See 
62 Fed. Reg. 2622, 2623 (1997). 

103 See 62 Fed. Reg. 2622, 2623 (1997), 

104 Technically, the Board rescinded the firewalls in the 1987 and 1989 Orders and 

any other orders incorporating those conditions, See 62 Fed. Reg. 45295, 45306 
(1997). 
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holding companies and banks had undertaken and managed activities posing 
similar risks for which no firewalls were used. lOS Most of the affiliation 
risks between commercial and investment banking were in the Board's 
opinion adequately addressed by general bank and bank holding company 
laws and regulations, as well as by securities laws and regulations of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, National Association of Securities 
Dealers, and securities exchanges applicable to every broker-dealer, 
including Section 20 subsidiaries. 106 Those risks not adequately addressed 
by existing laws and regulations, such as the risk that a customer might be 
confused about whether a product was offered by an insured bank or an 
uninsured affi liate, were covered by the new operating standards. I 07 
To replace the firewalls that were rescinded, the Board established 
eight operating standards, covering the following areas: capital,108 internal 
controls,109 interlock restriction,lIo customer disclosure, III intra-day credit 
lOS See 62 Fed. Reg. 2622, 2623 (1997). 
106 See 62 Fed. Reg. 45295, 45297 (1997). 
107 See id. 
108 See 12 C.F.R. § 225.200(b)(I) (1999). A bank holding company shall maintain 
either adequate or strong capital depending on whether its Section 20 subsidiary is 
underwriting tier-one or tier-two securities. A bank affiliate of a Section 20 must 
remain well-capitalized or the Board may impose additional conditions. Special 
capital rules apply to foreign banks. 
109 See 12 C.F.R. § 225.200(b)(2) (1999). A bank holding company or foreign 
bank operating a Section 20 subsidiary must cause its bank subsidiaries, branches 
and agencies to adopt policies and procedures including risk exposure limits to 
govern participating in transactions involving the securities subsidiary. 
110 See 12 C.F.R. § 225.200(b)(3) (1999). Directors, officers or employees of a 
bank or thrift subsidiary of a bank holding company (or a bank or thrift subsidiary or 
branch or agency of a foreign bank) shall not serve as a majority of the board of 
directors or the chief executive officer of an affiliated Section 20 subsidiary. 
Directors, officers or employees of a Section 20 subsidiary shall not serve as a 
majority of the board of directors or the chief executive officer of an affiliated bank 
or thrift subsidiary or branch or agency. 
III See 12 C.F.R. § 225 .200(b)( 4) (1999). A Section 20 subsidiary shall give its 
retail customers the disclosures required by the Retail Sales Statement. See supra 
note 102. Before expressing an opinion on a bank ineligible security being 
underwritten or dealt in by an affiliated Section 20 subsidiary, directors, officers 
and employees ofa bank, thrift, branch or agency must disclose the affiliate's role. 
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extensions,112 restrictions on funding purchases of securities during 
underwriting period,1I3 reporting requirements,114 and foreign bank 
compliance. I IS The most important changes addressed the firewalls 
regarding funding of a Section 20 subsidiary by an affiliated bank, credit 
enhancements provided by a bank to issuers of securities underwritten by a 
Section 20 affiliate, and loans provided by a bank to customers purchasing 
products of Section 20 affiliates. These changes were thought to allow 
Section 20 subsidiaries to operate more readily in conjunction with an 
affiliated bank, thereby maximizing synergies, enhancing services, and 
possibly reducing costs.1l6 In addition, the Board stated that a Section 20 
subsidiary like any other subsidiary of a bank holding company must be 
operated prudently. Prudent operation was deemed to include observing 
corporate formalities, such as maintaining separate corporate and accounting 
records, and instituting appropriate risk management, such as independent 
trading and exposure limits consistent with parent company guidelines. 117 
Both the increase in the revenue limit and the lowering of the 
firewalls applicable to Section 20 subsidiaries signaled the Board's attempt 
to strike a balance between the concerns of regulators, including safety and 
soundness and consumer protection, and the interests of bankers in 
remaining competitive in the marketplace. 1I8 The changes also indicated 
1I2 See 12 C.F.R. § 225.200{b){5) (1999). Intra-day credit extensions to a Section 

20 subsidiary by an affiliated, bank, thrift, branch or agency must be on market 

terms consistent with Section 23B of the Federal Reverse Act. 

113 See 12 C.F.R. § 225.200(b)(6) (1999). Banks, thrifts, branches and agencies 

may not extend credit to a customer secured by or to fund the purchase of a bank 

ineligible security currently or within the last 30 days underwritten by a Section 20 

affiliate, except under limited circumstances. 

114 See 12 C.F.R. § 225.200{b)(7) (1999). Certain reports filed with securities 

regulators must be filed with the Board along with Board forms required to monitor 

compliance with the operating standards and Section 20 ofGlass-Steagall. 

liS See 12 C.F.R. § 22S.200(b)(8) (1999). Foreign banks must ensure that certain 

transactions between their branches and agencies and Section 20 subsidiaries are on 

terms consistent with Sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act. 

116 See 62 Fed. Reg. 2622, 2623 (1997). 

117 See 62 Fed. Reg. 45295, 45306 (1997). 

118 The Board releases accompanying the proposed and final rule amending the 

firewalls set forth in the Section 20 orders recognized the importance of economic 

efficiency factors. In connection with the proposed rule, the Board stated that it 

believed the proposed modifications would "allow section 20 subsidiaries to operate 

more efficiently and serve their customers more effectively. These modifications 
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what the future trend of Board actions would be. First, securities activities 
were considered safe enough to be conducted in a non-bank affiliate of an 
insured bank without the need for an elaborate system of controls. Second, 
the existing legal framework, most notably Sections 23A and 23B of the 
Federal Reserve Act and securities laws and regulations applicable to broker­
dealer firms, was deemed sufficient to satisfy safety and soundness concerns. 
Third, corporate separateness and the insulation that this affords banks from 
safety and soundness problems were viewed favorably. The revisions also 
indicated that the Board would be responsive to market developments. By 
the time Gramm-Leach-Bliley was passed, the Board had become 
increasingly proactive in deregulating activities restrictions. 
2. 	 National Bank Operating Subsidiaries 
a. 	 The New Part 5 Rules on Corporate Activities of 
National Banks 
The operating subsidiary option for new financial activities was 
made possible due to 1996 amendments to acc regulations governing the 
corporate activities of national banks and their operating subsidiaries 
contained in Part 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations. 1l9 The most 
would allow section 20 subsidiaries to operate more readily in conjunction with an 
affiliated bank, thereby maximizing synergies, enhancing services, and possibly 
reducing costs." 62 Fed. Reg. 2622 (Summary). In connection with the final rule, 
the Board stated that "the narrower set of restrictions will be fully consistent with 
safety and soundness and should improve operating efficiencies at section 20 
subsidiaries and increase options for their customers." 62 Fed. Reg. 45295 
(Summary). The Board was acting in response to a Congressional mandate under 
the Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994 to 
streamline its regulations to improve efficiency, reduce unnecessary costs, and 
eliminate unwarranted constraints on credit availability, 62 Fed. Reg. 45295,45296 
(1997). 
119 12 C.F.R. Part 5 (1999). The changes became effective on December 31,1996. 
The amendments adopted a risk-based approach so corporate applications and 
corporate activities of national banks and their operating subsidiaries, with different 
application procedures mandated depending on the type of proposed activity and the 
financial and operational strength of the bank. See OCC, Rules, Policies and 
Procedures for Corporate Activities, Final Rule, 61 Fed. Reg. 60342 (1996). The 
Part 5 changes were adopted as part of the OCC's ongoing regulatory review 
program to reduce unnecessary burdens and costs for national banks. See OCC 
Bulletin, Rules, Policies, and Procedures for Corporate Activities; Final Rules, OCC 
96-71, December 17,1996. 
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controversial change was adoption of a provision allowing operating 
• 	 subsidiaries to conduct activities that would be impermissible for a national 
bank upon application to the OCC and approval on a case by case basis 
("Operating Subsidiary Rule").120 The rule did not specify the types of 
activities that might be approved, although it did require such activities to be 
. 	 "part of or incidental to the business of banking or otherwise authorized by 
statute or otherwise authorized by statute."121 Former Comptroller Eugene 
Ludwig, who was at the helm at the time, declined to speculate publicly 
about the kinds of activities that the OCC might approve under the Operating 
Subsidiary Rule, commenting only that the OCC had no commitment to 
approving a particular activity, but would evaluate any applications on a 
case-by-case basis following a comprehensive review of supervisory, policy 
and legal concerns. 122 Commentators speculated that underwriting bank 
ineJigibJe securities might be approved in this way, thereby offering banks an 
alternative to the use of a holding company affiliate, i.e., a Section 20 
subsidiary, for securities activities prohibited to banks under Glass­
Steagall. 123 In fact, the OCC had approved several applications by national 
banks to conduct municipal revenue bond underwriting through subsidiaries 
under the Operating Subsidiary Rule by the time Gramm-Leach-Bliley was 
120 See 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(f) (1999). For a discussion of these changes, see Joseph J. 
Norton, The Glass-Steagall Act and Related Bank Legislative Refolll1 in the United 
States: Non-Legislative Bank Regulation and Modernization - The Recent 
Comptroller of the Currency "Op-Sub" Regulation, 14 BANKING & FIN. L. REv. 1 
(1998); James R. Smoot, Bank Operating Subsidiaries: Free At Last or More of the 
Same? 46 DEPAUL L. REv. 651 (1997); McCoy, supra note 20, at § 8.06. Note, 
National Bank Operating Subsidiaries: How Far Has the OCC Opened the Door to 
Nonbanking Activities? 2 N.C. BANKING INST. (1998); Note, The New American 
Universal Bank, ] 10 HARV. L. REv. 1310 (1997). 
121 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(d)(1) (1999). Under the Part 5 regulations, a national bank is 
authorized to establish or acquire an operating subsidiary to conduct, or may 
conduct in an existing operating subsidiary, activities that are part of or incidental to 
the business of banking, as detelll1ined by the Comptroller pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 
24 (Seventh) (1998), and other activities pelll1issible for national banks or their 
subsidiaries under other statutory authority. See 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(d)(1) (1999). 
122 See Ludwig Defends oee Authority to Act on Op Sub Proposal, 14 No.5 
BANKING POL'y REp. 2 (1995) [hereinafter Ludwig]. 
123 See id. (noting that Ludwig has stated that Glass-Steagall clearly authorizes 
national banks to establish Section 20 subsidiaries and that the OCC is expected to 
allow operating subsidiaries to conduct virtually every activity that is pelll1issible for 
a bank holding company). See also Ludwig Adopts Two-Year-Old Op Sub Proposal, 
15 No. 23 BANKING POL'y REp. 2 (1996). 
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adopted. This section will describe the state of the law prior to passage of 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley. However, it should be noted that Gramm-Leach­
Bliley provides for the establishment of financial subsidiaries by national 
banks that may engage in underwriting bank ineligible securities, among 
other things. Therefore, the regulatory approval process under the Operating 
Subsidiary Rule described in this section is primarily of historical interest. 
Applications under the Operating Subsidiary Rule differed from 
other applications under the Part 5 rules in two significant respects. Banks 
were subject to a higher level of scrutiny by the OCC during the approval 
process than would be the case if they sought to conduct banking activities in 
such subsidiary and were required to comply with special regulatory 
safeguards. In general, a national bank seeking to acquire or establish, or 
commence new activities in, an operating subsidiary is required to submit an 
application and obtain prior OCC approval.124 The OCC reviews the 
application to determine whether the proposed activity is legally permissible 
for an operating subsidiary, to ensure that the proposal is consistent with safe 
and sound banking practices and OCC policy, and does not endanger the 
safety or soundness of the parent national bank.l 25 
Different application procedures apply under the Part 5 rules 
depending on the novelty, complexity, and risk of the proposed activity and 
the financial and operational capacities of the parent bank. 126 Applications 
under the Operating Subsidiary Rule fell into the application category with 
the most heightened level of scrutiny, requiring an extensive review process, 
including public notice and comment on the application.127 
Numerous safeguards became applicable automatically to applicant 
banks and operating subsidiaries for approvals under the Operating 
124 See 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(b) (1999). 

125 See 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(e)(1)(iii) (1999). 

126 There are three categories of application procedures established. The first 

category required after the fact notice to be given in order to engage in banking­

related activities that the OCC has previously approved for operating subsidiaries on 

a case by case basis and which are listed in the regulation. 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(e)(2)(i), 

(ii) (1999). The second category provided for an expedited review process in order 

to engage in activities that the OCC has previously approved on a case by case basis 

but that are more complex and may require more specialized expertise than those 

activities falling in the notice category, and therefore warrant prior OCC review. 12 

C.F.R. § 5.34(e)(3) (1999). A third category applied to approvals under the 

Operating Subsidiary Rule. 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(f) (1999). 

127 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(f) (1999). 
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Subsidiary Rule. 128 There were two categories of safeguards: 129 1) those 
intended to ensure the subsidiary's independent legal status (corporate 
requirement safeguards),130 and 2) those intended to protect the safety and 
soundness of the parent bank when the subsidiary is engaged in principal 
activities (supervisory requirement safeguards ).131 
In addition to these built-in safeguards, the aee was permitted to 
impose additional conditions on a case-by-case basis as deemed appropriate 
depending on the particular bank or activity involved. 132 The purpose of this 
128 61 Fed. Reg. 60342, 60351 (1996). 
129 See id. at 60354. 
130 The corporate requirement safeguards applicable to the operating subsidiary 
included physical separation from the parent bank and compensation by the 
subsidiary of subsidiary employees; holding out as a separate entity from the parent 
bank in written material and in direct contact with customers; use of a different name 
than the parent bank; adequate capitalization based on industry norms to support its 
activities and to cover expenses and losses; maintenance of separate accounting and 
corporate records; conduct of its operations pursuant to independent policies and 
procedures intended to inform customers of separate status; arm's length terms in 
service contracts with the parent bank; observance of corporate formalities; board 
member banking expertise and independence from parent bank for at least one-third 
of the subsidiary's board; internal controls at both the subsidiary and parent bank 
level to manage the financial and operational risks associated with the subsidiary. 12 
C.F.R. § 5.34(t)(2) (1999). The purpose of the corporate requirement safeguards 
was to reduce the risk that the parent bank will be held liable for losses of its 
subsidiary through attempts to pierce the corporate veil of limited liability. 61 Fed. 
Reg. 60342, 60354 (referring to prior OCC practice requiring such corporate 
separateness for operating subsidiaries engaged in derivatives activities and to FDIC 
proposed rules for real estate subsidiaries of insured state banks). See FDIC, 
Proposed Rules, 12 C.F.R. § 362, Activities and Investments ofinsured State Banks, 
621 Fed. Reg. 43486, 43491 (proposed Aug. 23, 1996). 
131 The supervisory requirement safeguards included reduction of the bank's capital 
and total assets by an amount equal to the bank's equity investment in the subsidiary 
and non-consolidation of the subsidiary's assets and liabilities with those of the 
bank; application of Sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act (12 U.S.C. §§ 
371 c, 371 c-I) to transactions between the bank and the subsidiary and OCC 
enforcement of such standards; and status of the parent bank as an eligible bank both 
prior to and after commencement of the activity. The purpose of the supervisory 
requirement safeguards was to contain risk, reduce potential conflicts of interest, 
ensure the safe and sound operation of the parent bank, and, in the case of the arm's 
length standards, eliminate the possibility of a subsidy flowing from the bank to its 
subsidiary. 61 Fed. Reg. 60342, 60354 (1996). 
132 See id. at 60351. 
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approach was to ensure that the OCC would be able to fulfill its obligation to 
identify, manage, and control risk. 133 
b. The Controversy Over the Operating Subsidiary Rule 
The Operating Subsidiary Rule was extremely controversial, 
eliciting the greatest number of comments in response to publication of the 
proposed changes to the Part 5 rules. 134 There were two aspects to the 
controversy, one involving the legal authority for permitting an operating 
subsidiary of a national bank greater powers than the bank itself and the 
second amounting to a political controversy over whether operating 
subsidiaries of national banks should be permitted to engage in the same 
lines of business as holding company affiliates. 
i. The Legal Authority Issue 
Adoption of the new Part 5 regulations, including Section 5.34(£), 
was supported by a legal opinion prepared by the chief legal counsel of the 
OCC.135 Given the traditional view of bank operating subsidiaries, writing 
such a legal opinion was a difficult task. The legal arguments advanced to 
support the OCC's position were weak in some key areas and the opinion 
failed completely to address certain prickly legal issues. One was left with 
the impression that the acc was on shaky legal ground. The line of 
argument in the opinion consisted of two main points. First, national banks 
had the legal right to own subsidiaries through which they could conduct 
their business. Second, an operating subsidiary could be permitted to 
engage in banking activities or activities incidental thereto that would be 
prohibited to the parent bank if the rationale for the prohibition does not 
apply to the subsidiary and a Congressional purpose would not be frustrated. 
The legal opinion suffered from two major defects. One was that the 
first strand of the argument was based on implied banking powers and not on 
the specific grant of authority in a statute. With respect to the second strand 
133 See id. 
134 See 61 Fed. Reg. 60342, 60350 (1996). The OCC noted that commenters 
opposing such rules included several trade associations that generally questioned 
bank entry into certain lines of business. 
135 See Memorandum dated November 18, 1996 of Julie L. Williams, Chief 
Counsel, to Eugene A. Ludwig, Comptroller of the Currency, RE: Legal Authority 
for Revised Operating Subsidiary Regulation (visited April 11, 1999) 
<http://www.occ.treas.gov/interp/part5.htm> [hereinafter OCC Legal 
Memorandum]. 
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of the argument, the opinion failed to advance convincing legal arguments 
for why a structure long regarded by the acc itself as nothing more than a 
"department" of a bank should be permitted to engage in novel activities that 
the bank itself cannot engage in as a matter of law. 
The acc's counsel made several points to support the contention 
that banks have the legal authority to own shares of operating subsidiaries 
through which they conduct their business. The legal authority of national 
banks to own subsidiaries and to conduct business through them is based on 
the general authority given national banks in 12 U.S.C. Section 24 (Seventh) 
to exercise "all such incidental powers as shall be necessary" to engage in 
the business of banking.136 According to the acc counsel's 
interpretation,137 activities that are either part of or incidental to the business 
of banking fall into one of two broad categories: I) those that involve 
"banking" activities or activities "incidental" to the delivery of banking 
products or services,138 and 2) those that are incidental to conducting a 
banking business even though they are not banking activities or incidental to 
the delivery of a banking product or service.139 The power of a national 
bank to own a subsidiary and to conduct business through such an entity falls 
within the authority of this second category. The acc counsel conceded 
that owning subsidiary companies is not part of the business of banking, but 
then argued it is a lawful activity for a bank because it constitutes part of 
what the bank must do to remain in business. 140 This is a weak argument 
because it is not something that banks are required to do in order to stay in 
136 See 12 U.S.C. §24 (Seventh) (1999). The term "necessary" has been construed 





137 See OCC Legal Memorandum, supra note 135, at 2-3. 

138 An example was the OCC's determination that the automobile leasing activities 

of a national bank were permissible because they were similar to secured lending, 

which is expressly permitted by 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh). This determination was 

upheld in M&M Leasing Corp. v. Seattle First Nat 'I Bank, 563 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir. 

1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 956 (1978). 
139 An example is the authority of a national bank to borrow, which is not 
enumerated in Section 24 (Seventh) but has been upheld by the federal courts as a 
permissible activity on the grounds that it is an incident to the conduct of a banking 
business. See Wyman v. Wallace, 201 U.S. 230 (1905); Aldrich v. Chemical Nat'! 
Bank, 176 U.S. 618 (1900); Auten v. U.S. Nat'l Bank, 174 U.S. 125 (1899). 
140 See OCC Legal Memorandum, supra note 135, at 3. The OCC counsel would 
draw the line regarding the types ofactivities a subsidiary may engage in at activities 
that are part of or incidental to the conduct of the banking business. 
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business. It is possible to conduct a banking business without the use of 
operating subsidiaries. A better argument is that the practice of bank 
ownership of operating subsidiaries is now well-established and that, in the 
absence of a Congressional or regulatory prohibition on further use of such 
subsidiaries, banks should be allowed to take advantage of the ordinary 
incidents ofthe corporate form, namely operating through a subsidiary. 
In addition, the acc counsel stated that amendments to Section 24 
(Seventh) effected by the McFadden Act of 1927 and the Banking Act of 
1933 did not limit the power of national banks to own shares of subsidiary 
corporations, as some commentators have argued, but rather were directed 
only at limiting involvement in investment banking activities. 141 In fact, she 
argued, these amendments, in seeking to regulate national bank involvement 
in securities activities, served to confirm that banks had the authority to own 
stock. 142 Another argument advanced by the acc counsel was that since 
1933, Congress, the courts, and the acc have consistently recognized that 
national banks can conduct their business either directly or through operating 
subsidiaries. 143 
The acc counsel failed to address the existence of the Bank Service 
Company Act ("BSCA"),144 in which Congress granted banks the authority 
to own subsidiaries l45 that may engage in a wide range of nonbanking 
activities. 146 There are several types of bank service companies authorized 
by the BSCA. ane type may engage in clerical, bookkeeping, accounting, 
and statistical functions performed for a depository institution. 147 A second 
type of service company may, upon application to the relevant federal 
banking regulator, conduct other activities, except for deposit-taking, that are 
permitted to national or state banks that own such companies. 148 A third 
type may engage in any activity that the Board has determined to be 
permissible for a bank holding company, other than deposit taking,l49 The 
existence of this legislation undermines the acc counsel's argument for 
141 See id. at 3-9. 

142 See id. at 9-11. 

143 See id. at 11-14. 

144 See 12 U.S.C. § 1861 et seq. (1999). 

145 See 12 U.S.C. § 1862 (1999). The BSCA contains limitations on the amount of 

the investment an insured bank may make in such a subsidiary. 

146 See MALLOY, BANK REGULATION, supra note 17, at 163-166. 

147 See 12 U.S.C. § 1863 (I 999). 

148 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1864, 1865 (1999). 

149 See 12 U.S.c. §§ 1864(f), 1865(b) (1999). 
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authority of national banks to own operating subsidiaries based on implied 
power. It suggests that if Congress were able to take action to explicitly 
permit bank service companies by statute, it could have done the same thing 
with respect to operating subsidiaries. In view of the BSCA, the absence of 
such statutory authority for operating subsidiaries may indicate that banks do 
not in fact have implied power to own shares of operating subsidiaries. 
Another issue that is raised by the existence of the BSCA relates to the 
restriction on powers to those permitted to the bank shareholders of the 
subsidiaries. It seems unlikely that Congress would have intended that the 
implied powers of an operating subsidiary could extend beyond those 
permissible for their parent banks when the activities of a bank service 
company are explicitly limited to the powers exercisable by the parent 
bank(s). The acc counsel's opinion did not even raise, much less answer 
this question. 
The second part of the legal authority argument was directed toward 
addressing when an operating subsidiary could engage in banking or 
incidental-to-banking activities that its parent bank could not engage in. The 
acc counsel's opinion took the position that the operating subsidiary could 
be deemed to have broader powers than the national bank when the rationale 
for the prohibition does not apply to the subsidiary, and conduct by the 
subsidiary of such activity would not frustrate a Congressional purpose or 
prevent its parent from conducting the activity. In addressing the issue, the 
OCC would do so on a case-by-case basis and would consider the following 
factors with respect to a particular activity: 1) the form and specificity of the 
restriction applicable to the parent bank; 2) why the restriction applied to the 
parent bank; and 3) whether it would frustrate the purpose underlying the 
restriction on the parent bank to permit a subsidiary of the bank to engage in 
the particular activity.I 50 In addition, the acc announced that it would also 
consider the safety and soundness implications of the activity, other 
regulatory safeguards applying to the subsidiary or the activity itself, 
conditions imposed by the acc in conjunction with application approval, 
and any additional undertakings by the bank or its operating subsidiary to 
address these factors. 151 
The legal basis for acc approval of broader activities for operating 
subsidiaries of national banks than for national banks themselves was weak 
on its face. First, there was no reference to express statutory authorization 
ISO See DCC, Rules, Policies, and Procedures for Corporate Activities, 61 Fed. 
Reg. 60,341, 60,352 (1996). 
lSI See id. 
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for operating subsidiaries to engage in lines of business other than those 
permitted to national banks. Second, the oee seemed to be relying in part 
on its own interpretation of operating subsidiary powers to justify its 
position, stating that the basis for such broader powers for operating 
subsidiaries was the fact that the oee, other Federal banking regulators and 
the courts had determined that limitations applicable to a national bank do 
not necessarily apply to its affiliates, including its operating subsidiaries. 
With respect to oee practice, the agency traditionally has taken the position 
that federal banking laws applicable to a national bank should also be 
applied to the operations of a subsidiary, but it has made exceptions allowing 
operating subsidiaries to engage in broader activities. This happened on only 
a few occasions, however, in which the oee granted permission for 
operating subsidiaries to act as a general partner in a partnership and other 
business ventures,152 even though the Supreme Court has held that it is ultra 
vires for a national bank to act in such capacity due to the risk of unlimited 
liability that a general partner assumes. 153 In these instances, the oee 
recognized that the separate incorporation of the operating subsidiary should 
protect the national bank from the risk of unlimited liability flowing through 
to it. 154 In some cases, the oee required that the bank take additional steps 
to protect itself, such as ensuring that the subsidiary is adequately 
capitalized, insulating the bank from the partnership in various ways 
intended to maintain separation of the two entities, and limiting 
commitments by the bank and its affiliates to the partnership. 
In light of the expansive scope of the Operating Subsidiary Rule, the 
oee had the burden of explaining away its earlier, more restrictive attitude 
towards bank operating subsidiaries. 155 The oee did not formally authorize 
use of bank operating subsidiaries until 1966 and for many years took the 
position that such subsidiaries were "separately incorporated departments" of 
152 Examples of such acc approvals include OCC Interpretive Letter No. 289 
(May 15, 1984) (bank operating subsidiary may act as a general partner with another 
bank to establish an automated teller machine network) and OCC Interpretive Letter 
No. 423 (April 11, 1988) (bank operating subsidiary may become the managing 
general partner of a Delaware limited partnership engaged in real estate mortgage 
loan investments). 
153 See Merchants Nat'} Bank v. Wehrmann, 202 U.S. 295,301 (1906). The bank 
had taken the partnership interest as security for a debt and afterwards become 
owner of such interest in satisfaction of the debt. 
154 See OCC Interpretive Letter No. 289, supra note 152. 
155 See Acquisition of Controlling Stock Interest in Subsidiary Operations 




2000] STRUCTURING THE FINANCIAL SERVICE CONGLOMERATES 
the bank. The implication was that such subsidiaries had the same powers, 
but not greater powers than the bank itself.156 The OCC counsel took the 
position that this was not a binding legal characterization of the outer limits 
of operating subsidiary activities, but rather an indication of what the OCC 
was prepared to allow at that point in time. 157 The OCC decided to take a 
more liberal view of permissible activities for operating subsidiaries in the 
Operating Subsidiary Rule than its earlier stated position indicated it would, 
but without any express or implied statutory basis for doing so. The 
argument seemed to be that the OCC may determine in its discretion the 
limits of bank operating subsidiary powers based on its own determination 
that a statutory prohibition applicable to the parent bank should not apply to 
the bank's subsidiary on policy grounds. This is a very aggressive use of 
administrative agency discretion in the absence of an express or implied 
statutory basis for subsidiary powers that are greater than those of the parent. 
If this is indeed the argument, it seems to offend commonly understood 
notions of the role of administrative agencies in interpreting statutes. 
As additional support for her position, the OCC legal counsel cited 
both OCC and federal court precedent permitting geographic expansion in 
the case of an operating subsidiary that would be prohibited for the national 
bank. 158 This precedent seems inapposite to the question at hand for it 
concerns geographic restrictions and not activities restrictions, which are 
governed by a different regulatory scheme and driven by different policy 
considerations. Finally, the OCC cited decisions of the Supreme Court and 
several federal courts upholding Board orders or regulations approving 
securities-related activities of holding company affiliates that a bank itself 
could not conduct. 159 Again, the precedent cited does not directly support 
the OCC's position, because the power of a nonbank subsidiary of a holding 
company to engage in broader activities than a bank subsidiary itself may 
conduct is supported by Section 4(c)(8) of the Bank Holding Company Act. 
There was no such express statutory authority in the case of bank operating 
subsidiaries prior to passage of Gramm-Leach-Bliley. 
156 See The OCC described the operating subsidiary as "a corporation the function 

or functions of which are limited to one or several of the functions or activities that a 

national bank is authorized to carry on." Id. at 11,460. 

157 See OCC Legal Memorandum, supra note 135, at 18. 

158 See id. at 17-18. 

159 See id. at 16. 
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ii. The Political Controversy 
The Operating Subsidiary Rule raised the possibility that operating 
subsidiaries of national banks would be pennitted to conduct the same types 
of activities as affiliates of bank holding companies, including Section 20 
securities subsidiaries. 160 In the case of the NationsBank application under 
the Operating Subsidiary Rule relating to real estate development activities, 
which is discussed below, the possibility was raised that operating 
subsidiaries might even be allowed to engage in a wider range of activities 
than holding company affiliates. This provoked the Board to publicly 
criticize the Operating Subsidiary Rule.I 61 In addition, the Board filed 
comments in opposition in response to Federal Register notices on the first 
two applications under the Operating Subsidiary Rule filed by Zions Bank 
and NationsBank, which are discussed below. 162 These comments, viewed 
as a whole, indicated that there was more at stake in the debate over the 
Operating Subsidiary Rule than questions regarding the legal basis for the 
160 See Ludwig, supra note 122 
161 Chainnan Alan Greenspan noted in Congressional testimony that "[t]he bank 
subsidiary may be a marginally more efficient way of delivering [expanded 
financial] services, but we believe it cannot avoid being a funnel for transferring the 
sovereign credit subsidy directly from the bank to finance the new powers, thereby 
imparting a subsidized competitive advantage to the subsidiary of the bank." 
Hearings on Financiai Restructuring Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions 
and Consumer Credit of the House Comm. on Banking and Financial Services, 
105th Congo (1997). He also stated that the operating subsidiary rule, coupled with 
provisions of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 
1994, makes it inherently more cumbersome for state banks to participate in 
interstate branching and threatens the dual banking system and the viability of state 
banks. He said he feared the advantages enjoyed by national banks might coax many 
state banks into switching charters. See id. The objections raised by the Federal 
Reserve will be further discussed infra in Part III. 
162 The comments of the Board on the Zions Bank application underscored the 
Board's fundamental opposition to the operating subsidiary as a vehicle for 
expansion of banking activities. Letter dated May 19, 1997 of the Board, to Eugene 
A. Ludwig, Comptroller of the Currency (on file with the author). The Board 
expressed serious doubts that Congress created a statutory scheme that would allow 
express prohibitions on the activities of national banks to be overridden by 
administrative interpretation and thought the OCC should deny any application to 
allow a national bank to engage through a subsidiary in an activity that is not 
pennissible for a national bank to conduct directly. 
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new rules or even safety and soundness considerations.163 The Board's 
remarks raised fundamental policy questions regarding the proper allocation 
of regulatory authority within the federal government. Some commentators 
suggested that because an operating subsidiary could conceivably conduct 
any activity that is financial in nature under the Operating Subsidiary Rule, 
the Board feared that the operating subsidiary might replace the bank 
holding company, which is regulated by the Board, as the preferred vehicle 
for expansion of activities by bank affiliates, which in tum would adversely 
affect the Board's preeminent role in banking regulation.l64 
c. OCC Approvals Under the Operating Subsidiary Rule 
As had been predicted by commentators even before the Operating 
Subsidiary Rule was adopted, the OCC granted approvals permitting national 
bank operating subsidiaries to underwrite and deal in bank ineligible 
securities soon after the rule became effective. An application to engage in 
real estate development and real estate lease financing was filed but was not 
acted upon.l65 
i. Revenue Bond Underwriting and Dealing 
The first application approved under the Operating Subsidiary Rule 
was submitted by Zions First National Bank of Salt Lake City, Utah, 
("Zions").166 The application sought authority for Zions Investment 
163 Chainnan Alan Greenspan has stated in Congressional testimony that safety and 
soundness issues are not raised by use of the operating subsidiary. See Financial 
Services Restructuring: Hearings Before the House ofRepresentatives Committee on 
Banking and Financial Services, 105th Congo (1997) (statement of Chainnan 
Greenspan) (stating in relevant part as follows: " ... my concerns are not safety and 
soundness. It is the issue of creating subsidies for individual institutions which their 
competitors do not have. It is a level playing field issue.") 
164 See Fed Opposes Zions Op-sub Proposals on Revenue Bonds. 16 BANKING 
POL'y REp. 2 (1997). 
165 This infonnation is based on a search of the OCC Website (visited Apr. 11, 
1999) <http://www.occ.treas.gov> and was confinned in a telephone conversation 
with a staff attorney of the OCC Securities and Corporate Practices Division on Apr. 
5, 1999. 
166 See Letter dated April 8, 1997 of W. David Hemingway, Executive Vice 
President, Zions First National Bank to Ellen Shepherd, Acting Licensing Manager, 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Western District, available in (visited 
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Securities Inc. ("Zions Investment"), a wholly-owned subsidiary of Zions, to 
underwrite, deal in, and invest in securities of states and their political 
subdivisions, including both general obligation bonds and revenue bonds 
considered bank ineligible securities under Section 16 of Glass-Steagall. 
The Zions Application undertook that Zions Investment would not be 
engaged principally in underwriting and dealing activities and stated that its 
revenue to be derived from such activity would be limited to 25% of its total 
revenues. 167 The OCC approved the application after having concluded that 
the proposed activities were legally authorized and consistent with safe and 
sound banking practices. 168 
a. Legal Authorization 
The basis for the Comptroller's decision was a determination that 
underwriting and dealing in revenue bonds was permissible for subsidiaries 
of national banks because such activities are authorized under Section 24 
(Seventh) of the National Bank Act and as proposed to be conducted would 
be allowed under Section 20 of Glass-Steagall.169 Some ofthe arguments in 
the Zions Approval closely resemble those advanced by the Board in its 
Section 20 orders, and in fact these are the strongest arguments made. Other 
Apr. 10, 1999) <http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/regsizionsapp.pdf> and 
<http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/regs/zionsmem.pdf> [hereinafter Zions Application]. 
167 Zions Investment was already engaged in the business of providing brokerage 
and investment advisory services relating to securities and investment products, 
including corporate equity securities, U.S. government securities, annuities and other 
securities, was registered as a broker-dealer with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, and was a member of the National Association of Securities Dealers. 
Zions had engaged for many years in underwriting and dealing in general obligation 
securities, certain revenue bonds considered eligible for banks to underwrite and 
deal in, such as bonds for housing, university or dormitory purposes (bank eligible 
securities), and U.S. government and agency securities. Zions planned to act as 
clearing agent for, and as broker and investment adviser regarding, securities 
underwritten by Zions Investment after making full disclosure to customers. See 
Zions Application, supra note 166, at 3-4. 
168 Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Conditional Approval #262, 
Application by Zions First National Bank, Salt Lake City, Utah, to Commerce New 
Activities in an Operating Subsidiary (Engage in Underwriting, Dealing in, and 
Investing in Securities of States and Their Political Subdivisions) (December 11, 




169 See id. at 5-6. 
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arguments parallel those made in the oee counsel's opinion supporting the 
Operating Subsidiary Rule and suffer from the same defects discussed 
earlier. First, the power to underwrite and deal in debt securities like 
the municipal revenue bonds in question was an enumerated power under 
Section 24 (Seventh), 170 or in the alternative, such activity constituted part of 
the general business of banking because ofthe financial nature of the activity 
and the relationship to other traditional banking functions. 171 This closely 
resembles the Board's argument in the Section 20 orders that underwriting 
and dealing in bank ineligible securities was appropriate for a holding 
company affiliate under Section 1843(c)(8) because it was "closely related to 
banking." 172 
Second, national banks are empowered to own operating subsidiaries 
as an incident to their banking activities. This argument was made in the 
legal opinion supporting the Operating Subsidiary Rule and did not improve 
with age. 
Third, a national bank operating subsidiary may engage in securities 
underwriting and dealing activities on the authority of Section 20 of Glass­
Steagall. That section, which prohibited national banks from affiliations 
with corporations "engaged principally" in securities underwriting or 
dealing, was interpreted by the Board in the Section 20 orders to permit non­
bank affiliates of banks in a holding company structure to engage in 
underwriting and dealing in bank ineligible securities on a limited basis on 
the theory that such an affiliate would not be deemed to be engaged 
principally in the activities prohibited by Section 20. This interpretation has 
been upheld by the federal courts. ) 73 The oee took up this line of reasoning 
in the Zions Approval and refined it further. In the oee's view, an 
operating subsidiary of a national bank may be deemed to be an affiliate for 
)70 See id at 9. 
17) See id. at 9-14. The acc argued that such underwriting and dealing was a 
functional equivalent of other activities conducted by national banks as a financial 
intermediary and is similar to securities activities of nationa1 banks involving bank 
eligible activities on the authority of Section 16 of Glass-Steagall; such activity 
would produce benefits to local governments and taxpayers and increase bank 
revenues; and the risks in underwriting and dealing with revenue bonds is no greater 
than associated with underwriting and dealing in bank eligible securities and 
investing in revenue bonds. See id. 
172 See id. 
)73 See supra Section II.B.I. 
378 ANNUAL REVIEW OF BANKING LAW VOL. 19: 329 
purposes of Section 20.174 Therefore, an operating subsidiary should be able 
to underwrite and deal in securities of the type not permitted for its parent, as 
long as it is not "engaged principally" in such activities. 175 Employing the 
Board's recent reinterpretation of the expression "engaged principally," this 
meant that an operating subsidiary like Zions Investment that would limit the 
revenue derived from underwriting and dealing in bank ineligible revenue 
bonds to no more than 25% of total revenues would not be deemed to violate 
Section 20 ofGlass-Steagall. 
Fourth, national banks are authorized to own operating subsidiaries 
engaged in activities not permissible for the bank to engage in directly,176 
This argument was made in the legal opinion supporting the Operating 
Subsidiary Rule and was not refined further. It was perhaps the weakest link 
in the chain of argument in the Zions Approval. l77 
b. Consistency with Safe and Sound Banking Practice 
This portion of the Comptroller's decision was based on its 
conclusion that the proposed activities would be conducted in a manner that 
would present limited risk to the bank and its operating subsidiary and would 
be conducted in a safe and sound manner,178 First, the proposed activities 
represented only an incremental expansion of the municipal securities 
activities already conducted by national banks generally and by Zions in 
174 See 12 U.S.C. § 221.a(b)(I).(1998). This interpretation is based upon the 
applicable definition of affiliate, which includes "a corporation . . . of which a 
member bank directly or indirectly owns or controls a majority of the voting shares 
or more than 50% of the number of shares voted for the election of directors ... " 
[d. Since operating subsidiary is defined in 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(d)(2) to include entities 
in which the parent bank "owns more than 50% of the voting (or similar type of 
controlling) interest of the subsidiary; or the parent bank otherwise controls the 
subsidiary and no other party controls more than 50% of the voting (or similar type 
of controlling) interest of the subsidiary . . . ," the OCC argued that, applying the 
literal language of the statute, an operating subsidiary is an "affiliate" for purposes 
of Section 20 of Glass-Steagall. 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(d)(2)(1999), Zions Approval, 
supra note 168, at 19. 
175 See id. at 19. 
176 See id. at 20. 
177 See id. at 20-23. 
178 See id. at 24. 
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particular.179 Second, the OCC emphasized the corporate separateness of the 
operating subsidiary, noting that any potential risk associated with the new 
activities would not negatively affect the bank, because it would be insulated 
both structuraJly and operationally from the operating subsidiary as a result 
of the corporate separateness requirements of the Operating Subsidiary 
Rule. 180 Third, the OCC relied on the comprehensive supervision and 
functional regulation by securities regulatory authorities and the role of the 
OCC in ensuring that the bank comply with safety and soundness regulations 
and conditions imposed under the Operating Subsidiary Rule and the 
conditional approval. lSI Fourth, the OCC cited the safety and soundness 
conditions and safeguards on the bank and the operating subsidiary pursuant 
to the Operating Subsidiary Rule, which were intended to contain risk, 
reduce potential conflicts of interest, and ensure the safe and sound operation 
of both entities, and the additional conditions applicable under the 
conditional approval. 182 Several of these conditions were patterned after the 
new operating standards fashioned by the Board for Section 20 subsidiaries 
and were tailored to address the risks of affiliation with an insured bank that 
are not adequately dealt with through banking laws. IS3 
179 The fact that Zions was a primary dealer in government securities was viewed as 
a factor mitigating risk. The acc was persuaded by conversations with other 
regulators, namely the National Association of Securities Dealers, Regulation, Inc., 
the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Board and the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York regarding their supervision of Section 20 subsidiaries that there were 
no unique compliance or supervisory problems relating to underwriting and dealing 
in revenue bonds through such subsidiaries. The acc cited the statement of a 
former chairman of the FDIC that there have not been many problems associated 
with bona fide securities subsidiaries of insured nonmember state banks under FDIC 
supervision. See id 
ISO See id at 25-26. 
181 See id. at 26-27. 
182 See id. at 27-28. These conditions included internal controls of the bank 
governing participation in transactions underwritten or arranged by the subsidiary, 
compliance of intra-day credit extensions by the bank to the subsidiary with the 
terms of Section 23B of the Federal Reserve Act, a prohibition on bank lending to 
customers for the purpose of buying securities underwritten by the subsidiary during 
the underwriting period, the requirement of disclosures mandated under the Retail 
Sales Statement (see supra note 102) to avoid customer confusion, and a prohibition 
on bank employee recommendations of securities underwritten by the subsidiary 
without disclosure of the subsidiary's underwriter status. 
183 See 62 Fed. Reg. 45295, 45296 (1997); 12 C.F.R. § 225.200 (1999). 
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In addition to the Zions Approval, the OCC approved other 
applications under the Operating Subsidiary Rule to engage in revenue bond 
underwriting and dealing.184 The activities to be undertaken were the same 
as those approved in the Zions Approval, and the banks and their operating 
subsidiaries were subject to the same conditions.185 In these approvals, the 
OCC adopted virtually identical standards as the Board adopted in its Section 
20 orders for securities underwriting by bank affiliates. Both regulators 
adopted a policy of permitting limited underwriting and dealing in bank 
ineligible securities. Both used a 25% revenue test as the qualifying standard 
and required that the bank affiliate comply with regulatory firewalls. Many 
of the safeguards adopted in the OCC approvals are identical to the operating 
standards adopted by the Board to replace the firewalls previously applicable 
to Section 20 subsidiaries. One could conclude that the OCC followed the 
lead of the Board in order to foreclose the argument that use of an operating 
subsidiary raised safety and soundness concerns or the potential for conflict 
of interest transactions that might be damaging to banks. 
ii. Real Estate Development 
NationsBank of Charlotte, North Carolina filed an application under 
the Operating Subsidiary Rule seeking authority to conduct real estate 
development activities.l 86 The NationsBank proposal was more 
184 See OCC Corporate Decision 98-48 (Oct. 20, \998) (National Bank of 
Commerce of Memphis, Tennessee); OCC Conditional Approval No. 297 (Dec. 9, 
1998) (OMB Bank of Kansas City, Missouri; and OCC Conditional Approval No. 
309 (Apr. 12, 1999) (First Tennessee). 
185 See id. 
186 Letter of Richard K. Kim, Assistant General Counsel, NationsBank Corporation 
to Mr. Steven 1. Weiss, Deputy Comptroller, Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency, (March 26, 1997) available in (visited Apr. 10, 1999) 
<http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/regsltryonap.pdf> [hereinafter N ationsBank 
Application]. The real estate development subsidiary, Tryon Development Partners, 
was to be organized as a corporation or other form of limited liability company with 
NationsBank as the sole shareholder. It planned to develop real estate in locations 
that NationsBank already occupied for bank premises. Its immediate plan was to 
build residential condominium units adjacent to an office building that had been 
owned by the bank for 25 years and was the site of a bank branch. The bank also 
anticipated that the operating subsidiary would engage in the future in further real 
estate development in the areas adjacent to or near the bank premises but planned to 
request prior approval from the OCC before commencing such activities. See id. at 
1-2. 
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controversial than the Zions Application because national banks are 
effectively precluded from real estate development activities due to the 
general prohibition on ownership of real estate contained in Section 29 of 
the National Bank Act. 187 In addition, real estate development activities are 
not permissible for bank holding company affiliates pursuant to Board 
Regulation y'188 Although this application was filed prior to the Zions 
Application, it was not acted upon, no doubt due to its controversial nature. 
III. 	 THE CORPORATE STRUCTURE ISSUE IN THE GRAMM­
LEACH-BLILEY ACT 
A. 	 The Compromise Position of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 
and Its Legislative History 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley was signed into law by President Clinton on 
November 12,1999, after having passed the Senate and House on November 
4, 1999.189 It expanded the universe of financial activities permissible to 
banks and their affiliates by partially repealing Glass-Steagall and amending 
the Bank Holding Company Act. Gramm-Leach-Bliley reflects a 
compromise on the corporate structure issue that is somewhere between the 
two polar viewpoints in the debate. Before detailing the outcome, the 
187 12 U.S.C. § 29 prohibits banks from acquiring or holding real estate unless such 
real estate is used in the transaction of its business or was taken as security in 
connection with debt owed to the bank. See 12 U.S.C. §29 (1999). 
188 See 12 C.F.R. Part 225 (1999). 
189 Separate financial modernization bills were passed by each house of Congress 
within the first six months of the opening of the 106th Congress. The Senate passed 
S. 900, the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, by a vote of 54-44 on 
May 6, 1999 and the House of Representatives passed H.R. 10, the Financial 
Services Act of 1999, by a vote of 343-86 on July 1, 1999. The bills were referred 
to a conference committee, which began meeting on August 3, 1999 and concluded 
its work on October 12, 1999. A conference report dated November 1, 1999 was 
signed by the majority of the conferees on November 2, 1999. On November 4, 
1999, Gramm-Leach-Bliley passed the Senate by a vote of 90-8 and the House by a 
vote of362-57. Senate Banking Committee Press Release, November 5, 1999, Time 
Line of Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, available in (visited Jan. 25, 2000) 
<http://www.senate.gov/~bankinglpreI9911105tme.htm> . The conference report is 
available in (visited Nov. 29, 1999) 
http://www.senate.gov/~bankingiconf/somfinaI.htm. The text of Gramm-Leach­
Biliey is available in (visited Nov. 29, 1999) http://www.gov/-banking/conf/. 
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legislative history will be discussed in order to better understand the 
compromise that was reached. 
Early versions of financial modernization legislation introduced in 
Congress over the past two decades proposed liberalizing bank activities 
restrictions but required new financial activities to be conducted exclusively 
through a holding company affiliate, essentially adopting the position of the 
Board. The operating subsidiary option was included in later bills in large 
part due to Treasury Department efforts. The Treasury Department's 
proposal on the corporate structure issue, detailed in a report on financial 
modernization legislation prepared for Congress on behalf of the Clinton 
administration in 1997 ("Treasury Department Modernization Proposal"), 
would have permitted operating subsidiaries of national banks to engage in 
the same activities as bank holding company affiliates subject to the same 
affiliate transaction rules. 190 Throughout the debate over financial 
modernization legislation in both the 105th and 106th Congresses, the 
Clinton administration remained steadfast in its view that financial 
modernization required equivalent treatment of bank operating subsidiaries 
and bank holding company affiliates and threatened to veto legislation that 
did not meet this standard.191 
190 Department of the Treasury, News Release, Treasury Provides Blueprint for 
Financial Modernization (May 21, 1997), available in 1997 WL 272500. Financial 
Services Restructuring, Hearings on Financial Modernization Before the House 
Committee on Banking and Financial Services, 105th Congo (1997) (testimony of 
Robert E. Rubin, Secretary at the Treasury) (testimony of Jerry Hawke, Treasury 
Under Secretary For Domestic Finance). First, bank holding companies meeting 
certain criteria and subject to certain safeguards would be permitted to engage in the 
full range of financial activities, including securities brokerage, underwriting, and 
dealing; insurance brokerage and underwriting; mutual fund sponsorship; investment 
advisory services; and merchant banking. Second, national banks would be 
permitted to conduct any financial activity through subsidiaries, other than real 
estate development. National banks would be permitted to engage directly in any 
activity previously approved for national banks or federally chartered thrifts, except 
for real estate development. National banks would also be permitted to act as 
general agents for the sale of insurance, would be prohibited from engaging in any 
insurance underwriting activity other than what was then currently permissible (e.g. 
underwriting of credit-related insurance), and would be permitted to underwrite and 
deal in municipal revenue bonds in addition to other securities activities currently 
permissible for such banks. 
191 Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, HR. 10 The Financial Services Act of 1999, 
Working Summary No.2, at 3 (April 28, 1999) [hereinafter Gibson, Dunn & 
Crutcher 1999]. 
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Gramm-Leach-Bliley had its origins in comprehensive bank reform 
legislation introduced in the losth Congress as H.R. 10, the Financial 
Services Act of 1998 ("1998 Version of H.R. 10").192 Although that bill 
envisioned sweeping changes in federal law that would permit affiliations 
between banks and other financial service firms,193 the bill restricted bank 
operating subsidiaries' activities to those that could be conducted by the 
bank itself. 194 It therefore fell short of the treatment of operating 
subsidiaries advocated in the Treasury Department Modernization Proposal. 
Although H.R. 10 passed the full House and was approved with amendments 
by the Senate Banking Committee,195 it failed to be considered by the full 
Senate due to disagreements over several key issues, including the status of 
operating subsidiaries, which triggered the threat of a presidential veto. 196 
Financial modernization legislation was reintroduced in the House at 
the beginning of the 106th Congress as H.R.1 0, the Financial Services Act of 
1999.197 Congressman James Leach, Chairman of the House Banking 
Committee, indicated that the purpose behind the legislation was "to level 
the competitive playing field within the financial services industry, to 
increase competition so that costs of services will go down for customers and 
to boost the international competitive position of American firms."198 He 
192 See H.R. Rep. No. 531 (I998), available in 1998 WL 239626 (reprinting the 

text of H.R. 10 that was referred out of the House Rules Committee and passed the 

House on May 13, 1998 by a vote of214-213). 

193 The 1998 Version ofH.R. 10 contemplated the repeal of Sections 20 and 32 of 

Glass-Steagall, among other changes. See id. 

194 SeeH.R. 10, 105th Cong. §121 (1998). 

195 An amended version of H.R. 10 passed the Senate Banking Committee by a 

vote of 16-2 on September 11, 1998. 

196 See 15 Bank Policy Rep. Veto Threat Stalls Financial Modernization 

Legislation (Oct. 13, 1998). Another cause was the threat by Senator Phil Gramm 

CR-Texas) to filibuster over a perceived increase in bank responsibilities under the 

Community Reinvestment Act. See id. The chair of the House Banking and 

Financial Services Committee, James A. Leach, introduced a revised version ofH.R. 

10 entitled H.R. 4870 at the end of the session as a bridge to the 106th Congress. See 

Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, H.R. 10 - The Financial Services Act of1998. at 1 (Dec. 

21, 1998) (on file with the author). 

197 See H.R. 10, 106th Congo (1999) introduced January 6, 1999 by Rep. Leach. 
198 Modernization Bill. CONGRESSIONAL PRESS RELEASES (Jan. 6, 1999). 
Congressman Leach also stated that "an important by-product of this legislation will 
be to provide consumers and smaller businesses in more rural states with access to a 
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also stated that financial services modernization would be a top priority of 
the House Banking Committee in the 106th Congress,199 reflecting a 
growing consensus that reform of activities restrictions was urgently needed 
in order for U.S. financial firms to be able to innovate and to compete 
globally. 200 
As reintroduced, H.R. 10 contained provisions granting expansive 
powers for affiliates of bank holding companies, but restricting operating 
subsidiaries of national banks to financial agency activities.201 As in the 
case of the 1998 Version ofH.R. 10, the Clinton administration threatened to 
veto the bill if it contained such limitations on operating subsidiaries.202 
After referral to the House Banking and Commerce Committees, the bill was 
amended to include provisions on operating subsidiaries, among other 
wider variety of financial products by empowering local institutions to offer a full 
range of products and services." Id 
199 See House of Representatives, Committee on Banking and Financial Services, 
Press Release (Jan. 6, 1999), available in (visited May 7, 1999) 
<http://www.house.gov/bankingI16991pr.htm> . 
200 Members of banking industry groups and executives of financial services finns 
made this point on a number of occasions in commenting on the proposed 
legislation. For example, the chief legislative council of the American Bankers 
Association noted that American banks dominate globally but if laws are not 
changed, "U.S. financial institutions will be placed at a growing disadvantage." 
Investment Banks See the Future in Full-Service Arena. NATIONAL POST, Jan. 10, 
1999, at CIO. Merrill Lynch Chainnan David H. Komansky noted that "we're now 
the only developed country in the world that hasn't lifted the barriers separating 
commercial banking, securities and insurance. Decisions made in Washington in the 
weeks and months ahead will playa key role in detennining America's position in 
this new global financial marketplace." Merrill Lynch Chairman Calls for Financial 
Services Regulatory Reform. U.S. NEWSWIRE, Jan. 15, 1999. The Council of 
Economic Advisers reported to the President in 1983 that Glass-Steagall "now 
makes no important contribution to the protection of the public against bank failures 
or undue concentrations of economic power. EcON. REp. OF THE PRESIDENT, 1983 
ANN. REp. OF COUNCIL OF EcON. ADVISORS, H.R., DOC No. 98-2, AT 122 (1983). 
Chainnan Greenspan, testifying in front of the Senate Banking Committee on H.R. 
lOin 1998, stated that refonn legislation was necessary to ensure the continued 
competitiveness of U.S. fmancial institutions and to enable such institutions to 
continue to innovate, operate efficiently and provide the best possible services to 
consumers. Hearings on HR. 10 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing 
and Urban Affairs, 105th Congo (1998). (testimony of Alan Greenspan). 
20 I See January 6, 1999 Press Release, supra note 199. 
202 See Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher - 1999, supra note 191, at 47. 
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changes,203 and was eventually passed by the full House ("1999 Version of 
H.R. 10").204 The 1999 Version of H.R. 10 permitted the establishment of a 
new type of banking holding company called a "financial holding company," 
which would be allowed to engage in new financial activities,205 and also 
permitted national banks to engage in certain of those activities through use 
of operating subsidiaries called "financial subsidiaries."206 Permitted 
financial activities for financial holding companies were those set forth in the 
bill and those determined by the Board, in consultation with the Secretary of 
the Treasury, to be financial in nature, incidental thereto, or complementary 
to authorized activities.207 Permitted financial activities for financial 
subsidiaries were those authorized for financial holding companies and those 
determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Board, 
to be financial in nature or incidental thereto.208 Financial activities that 
were expressly permitted included securities and insurance underwriting and 
merchant banking activities.209 However, certain activities were expressly 
prohibited for operating subsidiaries, namely insurance underwriting (other 
than credit insurance), issuing annuities, engaging in real estate investment 
or development, and investing in insurance companies.210 Operating 
subsidiaries were prohibited from engaging in other activities that exceeded 
national bank powers, except to the extent expressly provided by other 
federal statutes, including the BSCA and Sections 25 and 25A of the Federal 
Reserve Act relating to the establishment of Edge Act subsidiaries.211 In 
203 The House Banking Committee reported an amended version of H.R. lOon 
March 23, 1999, which reflected a compromise reached with the ranking Democrat 
on the House Banking Committee, Representative John LaFalce, by including a 
broader operating subsidiary provision. House of Representatives, Committee on 
Banking and Financial Services, Press Release, March II, 1999 available in (visited 
May 7, 1999) <http://www.house.govlbanking/1699Ipr.htm>. The House 
Commerce Committee reported an amended version of the bill on June 15, 1999. 




204 See H.R. 10, version dated July 12, 1999, available in (visited Oct. II, 1999) 

<http://www .house.gov/banking/hrashp. pdf>. 

205 See H.R. 10, 106th Congo §103(a) (1999). 

206 See H.R. 10, 106th Congo §121(a) (1999). 

207 See H.R. 10, 106th Congo §103(a)(1999). 

208 See H.R. 10, 106th Congo §121(a) (1999). 

209 See H.R. 10, 106th Congo §103(a)(1999). 

210 See H.R. 10, 106th Congo §121(a) (1999). 

211 See id. 
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order to become a financial holding company, all subsidiary depository 
institutions were required to be well-capitalized, well-managed, have a 
Community Reinvestment Act rating of satisfactory or better, and the 
holding company must have filed a declaration with the Board.212 In order 
for a national bank to establish a financial subsidiary, the bank and all its 
depository institution affiliates were required to be well-capitalized, well­
managed, and have a Community Reinvestment Act rating of satisfactory or 
better, and the bank must have received the approval of the Comptroller.213 
Only smaller national banks were allowed to establish financial subsidiaries 
outside of a holding company framework. A national bank with assets of 
$10 billion or more was permitted to establish a financial subsidiary only if 
such bank were owned by a bank holding company.214 Firewalls intended to 
promote safety and soundness considerations were made applicable to banks 
and their financial subsidiaries and also to transactions between financial 
subsidiaries and other affiliates.2lS These included: limitations on the equity 
investment of a bank in a financial subsidiary,216 maintenance of procedures 
for identifying and managing financial and operational risks posed by the 
financial subsidiary, maintenance of separate corporate status for the 
financial subsidiary, and application of Section 23B of the Federal Reserve 
Act to transactions between a financial subsidiary and a bank.217 
Financial modernization legislation was introduced in the Senate at 
the beginning of the 106th Congress as S.900, the Financial Services 
Modernization Act of 1999.218 After referral out of the Senate Banking 
212 See H.R. 10, 106th Congo §103(a) (1999). 

213 See H.R. 10, 106th Congo §12l(a) (1999). 

214 See id. 

215 SeeH.R. 10, 106th Cong. §122 (l999). 

216 Such limitations included deducting equity investments in financial subsidiaries 

from the assets and tangible equity of the bank, prohibiting the consolidation of 

assets and liabilities of the financial subsidiary on the financial statements of the 

bank, limiting the amount of any equity investment in a financial subsidiary to the 

amount the bank could payout as a dividend, without the prior approval of the 

relevant federal banking regulator, and treating retained earnings of the subsidiary as 





217 SeeH.R.IO, 106lh Cong. §122 (b)(1999). 

218 See S. 900, 106lh Congo (1999) introduced April 28, 1999 by Sen. Gramm. 
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Committee,219 the bill was passed by the full Senate, prior to passage of H.R. 
10 by the House ("1999 Senate BiII").220 The 1999 Senate Bill did not 
provide for the establishment of financial holding companies, but instead 
utilized the existing bank holding company structure. Bank holding 
companies were permitted to participate in a wide array of expanded 
activities determined to be financial in nature, as set forth in the bill or as 
determined by the Board in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, 
or incidental thereto, including securities and insurance underwriting and 
merchant banking.221 The operating subsidiary option was permitted under 
the 1999 Senate Bill, but to a far more limited extent than under the 1999 
Version ofH.R. 10. A national bank with $1 billion or less in assets that was 
not a subsidiary of a bank holding company could engage in new activities 
permitted for bank holding companies in the bill, excluding real estate 
development and investment,222 through operating subsidiaries.223 However, 
larger national banks were required to conduct such new activities in a 
holding company affiliate.224 National banks and their insured depository 
institution affiliates were required to be well-capitalized and well-managed, 
and OCC approval was needed.225 Firewalls comparable to those used in 
the 1999 Version ofH.R. 10 were also required.226 
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley compromise on the corporate structure 
issue includes some elements found in both the 1999 Senate Bill and the 
1999 Version of H.R. 10, but adds new features as a result of negotiations in 
the Financial Services Conference Committee ("Conference Committee"). 
Both the Treasury Department and the Board were actively involved in 
working out a compromise in the Conference Committee in order to ensure 
its passage by Congress and approval by the executive branch.227 
219 The Senate Banking Committee referred the bill out on March 4, 1999. See 

Senate Banking Committee Press Release, Mar. 4, 1999 available in (visited May 7, 

1999) <http://www.senate.gov/-bankinglpreI99/0304fsm.htm> . 





221 See S. 900, 106th Congo §102(a) (1999). 

222 SeeS. 900, 106th Cong.§121(a)(1999). 

223 See S. 900, 106th Congo §122(a) (1999). 

224 See id. 

225 See S. 900, 1061h Congo § 121(a) (1999). 

226 See S. 900, 106th Congo § 122(a) (1999). 

227 House Banking Committee Democrats Press Release, October 12, 1999, 

Statement of John 1. Lafalce and Paul S. Sarbanes (criticizing the partisan nature of 
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The primary vehicle for new financial activities is a new type of 
bank holding company called a "financial holding company," which may be • 
established under Section 4(k) of the Bank Holding Company Act to engage, 
directly or through affiliates, in activities deemed financial in nature, 
incidental activities and complementary activities that do not pose substantial 
safety or soundness risks for banks or the financial system.228 Activities that • 
are financial in nature under the statute include both financial activities that 
bank holding companies and their affiliate already engage in, but also new 
powers that banks have long sought, including securities and insurance 
underwriting, merchant banking, and insurance company portfolio 
investment activities.229 The Board is authorized to make determinations, in 
consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, that other activities are 
financial in nature or incidental thereto.23o In order to engage in these 
activities, the bank holding company must meet the requirements that each 
of its depository institution subsidiaries is well-capitalized, well-managed, 
and has received a Community Reinvestment Act rating of satisfactory or 
better, subject to an exclusion for newly acquired insured bank 
subsidiaries.231 The bank holding company must also file with the Board a 




228 See Gramm-Leach-Bliley, § l03(a) (new 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(l». 

229 See id. (new 12 U.S.C. § I 843(k)(4». The list of activities includes: (1) lending, 

exchanging, transferring, investing for others, or safeguarding money or securities; 

(2) insuring, guaranteeing, or indemnifying against loss, harm, damage, illness, 
disability, or death, or providing and issuing annuities, and acting as principal, agent, 
or broker for purposes of such insurance, in any state; (3) providing financial, 
investment, or economic advisory services, including advising an investment 
company; (4) issuing or selling instruments representing interests in pools of assets 
permissible for a bank to hold directly; (5) underwriting, dealing in, or making a 
market in securities; (6) engaging in all activities the Board determined were closely 
related to banking or managing or controlling banks as of November 12, 1999; (7) 
engaging in any activity that bank holding companies were permitted to engage in 
outside of the United States or that were usual in connection with the transaction of 
banking abroad as of November 11, 1999; (8) making portfolio investments in 
connection with certain underwriting and merchant banking activities; and (9) 
making portfolio investments in the ordinary course of business as an insurance 
underwriter. 
230 Such determinations may be made by regulation or order. See id. (new 12 
U.S.C. § 1843(k)(l), (2». 
231 Gramm-Leach-Bliley, § 103(a) (new Section 12 U.S.C. § 1843(1»; Section 
103(b) (amended Section 12 U.S.C. § 2903). 
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declaration of election to be a financial holding company, along with a 
certification that the requirements of the statute have been met.232 
National banks are permitted to control or hold an interest in 
"financial subsidiaries,"233 which may engage in financial or incidental 
activities permitted for financial holding companies pursuant to new Section 
4(k) of the Bank Holding Company Act, except for insurance underwriting, 
merchant banking, insurance company portfolio investments, real estate 
development and real estate investment, and activities that national banks are 
permitted to engage in directly.234 The Secretary of the Treasury, acting in 
consultation with the Board, has the authority to designate additional 
activities as financial or incidental to financial activities.235 Certain 
conditions must be satisfied, including the following: (1) the national bank 
and each depository institution affiliate must be well-capitalized, well­
managed,236 and have received Community Reinvestment Act ratings of 
satisfactory in their latest examinations;237 (2) the total assets of all such 
financial subsidiaries do not exceed the lesser of 45% of the consolidated 
total assets of the parent bank or $50,000,000;238 (3)(a) the national bank 
must either be small; or (b) if the national bank is one of the fifty largest 
insured banks, its capital structure includes at least one issue of outstanding 
unsecured long-term debt rated within the three highest investment grade 
rating categories of a nationally recognized rating organization; or (c) if the 
232 See Gramm-Leach-BliIey, § 103(a) (new 12 U.S.C. § 1843(1». 

233 See Gramm-Leach-Bliley, § 121(a) (new 12 U.S.c. § 5136A(a)(2». National 

bank ownership of operating subsidiaries approved by the DCC prior to enactment 

of Gramm-Leach-Bliley are grandfathered. See id. (12 U.s.C. § 5 I 36A(e». 

234 See Gramm-Leach-Bliley, § 121(a) (new 12 U.S.c. § 5 I 36A(a)(2)(B». The 

Board and the Secretary of the Treasury are authorized to consider dropping the ban 

or merchant banking activities five years after date of enactment of Gramm-Leach­

Bliley. See id. § 122. It should be noted that national banks themselves are given 

certain expanded powers, including the right to underwrite municipal revenue bonds. 

Gramm-Leach-Bliley, § 151 (amending 12 U.S.c. § 24 (Seventh». In addition, 

insurance activities of national banks were addressed. Insurance activities as 





235 See Gramm-Leach-Bliley, § 121(a) (new 12 U.s.C. § 5 I 36A(b». 

236 See id. (new 12 U.S.c. § 5136A(a)(2)(C». 

237 See Gramm-Leach-Bliley, § 103(a) (new 12 U.S.C. § 1843(1)(2», § 103(b) (new 

12 U.S.C. § 2903(c)(l», § 121 (a)(2) (new 12 U.S.c. § 5 I 36A(a)(7), (g)(5)-(f)(6». 

238 See Gramm-Leach-Bliley, Section 121(a) (new 12 U.S.C. § 5136A(a)(2)(D); 

(a)(3». This requirement is subject to indexing. See id. 
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national bank is one of the second fifty largest insured banks, it meets the 
capital structure requirement applicable to the fifty largest insured banks or 
such other comparable criteria established by the Board of the Secretary of 
the Treasury;239 and (4) the national bank has received the approval of the 
OCC.240 
Safeguards addressing safety and soundness and conflict of interest 
problems are put into place. A national bank must deduct the amount of its 
outstanding equity investment, including retained earnings in a financial 
subsidiary, from its assets and tangible equity, and may not consolidate its 
assets and liabilities with those of the financial subsidiary.241 A national 
bank with a financial subsidiary must have procedures for identifying and 
managing risks within the financial subsidiary and for maintaining the 
separate corporate identity and limited liability of the financial subsidiary 
that adequately protect the bank.242 The provisions of Sections 23A and 23B 
of the Federal Reserve Act are extended to financial subsidiaries.243 Those 
statutory firewalls will continue to apply to financial holding companies and 
their affiliates, as they do with respect to other bank holding companies. 
While the Gramm-Leach-Bliley compromise permits use of an 
operating subsidiary by a national bank for new financial activities, national 
banks have less flexibility in using such subsidiaries than if a holding 
company affiliate were used. This is due to the more limited universe of new 
financial activities that may be conducted, the aggregate size limitations for 
financial activities conducted through operating subsidiaries, and the capital 
structure requirement applicable to large banks. A positive aspect of the 
compromise is that use of a bank operating subsidiary to conduct such new 
activities has now been put on a firm legal footing, unlike the case with 
approvals under the OCC's Operating Subsidiary Rule. 
239 See id (new 12 U.S.C. § 5136A(a)(2)(E». This requirement does not apply in 

the case of ownership or control of financial subsidiaries engaged in financial 





240 See id (new 12 U.S.C. § 5136A(l)(F». 

241 See id (new 12 U.S.C. § 5136A(c». 

242 See id (new 12 U.S.C. § 5136A(d». 

243 See Gramm-Leach-Bliley, § 121(b) (amending 12 U.S.C. § 37lc). 
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B. 	 Viewpoints in the Corporate Structure Debate 
The corporate structure debate has polarized federal banking 
regulators, other financial service industry regulators, and the financial 
services industry itself. The Board was the leading advocate for the holding 
company affiliate structure. The Securities and Exchange Commission, the 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners, and various securities 
industry and insurance industry lobbyists also favored this structure. The 
primary advocate of the operating subsidiary model was the Treasury 
Department. The OCC, the FDIC, and the Office of Thrift Supervision 
supported this view, along with some leading economists and legal 
experts244 and some banking industry lobbyists. This Section will assess the 
most important arguments advanced on both sides. 
1. 	 Arguments in Favor of Exclusive Use of Holding 
Company Affiliates 
The Board has taken the position that new activities should only be 
permitted in holding company affiliates and that the use of operating 
subsidiaries should not be permitted. Requiring new affiliations to take 
place within a holding company structure serves two functions. First, it best 
protects the federal deposit insurance funds by limiting the additional risks 
permitted to insured depository institutions and therefore serves a safety and 
soundness preserving function. Second, it limits the spread of the federal 
safety net and its related subsidy and moral hazard problems to entities or 
244 One noteworthy example is the Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee 
("SFRC"), an independent group of lawyers and economists active in the field of 
finance, which frequently comments on emerging problems and policy responses in 
the financial service industry. SFRC has consistently taken the position in its policy 
statements that there should be no difference in treatment between bank operating 
subsidiaries and holding company affiliates. See SFRC Statement No. 153 (Dec.7, 
1998) (visited Oct. 13, 1999) <http:www.aei.org/shdw> (stating in relevant part as 
follows: " ... despite the Fed's arguments to the contrary, there is no prudential 
reason to prefer that new nonbanking financial activities be conducted in the 
subsidiaries of holding companies rather than the separately capitalized subsidiaries 
of banks. Moreover, the Committee has pointed out that the risk of extending the 
federal safety net is the same for separately capitalized subsidiaries of banks as for 
subsidiaries of holding companies. Accordingly, the Committee does not believe 
that either of the Fed's arguments for placing new financial activities solely in the 
subsidiaries of holding companies are valid.") See also SFRC Statement No. 118, 
136 and 155. 
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activities beyond the insured depository institutions it was originally 
intended to support. 245 This second argument has two corollaries. First, the 
public should not be paying for these new activities, but rather they should 
be offered at market rates. Second, extending the banking safety net to 
non banking financial activities would put non-bank competitors, namely 
securities and insurance firms, at a competitive disadvantage. A third 
argument is that permitting use of bank operating subsidiaries would cause 
banks to cease use of holding company affiliates, which are subject to 
regulation by the Board, as vehicles for new financial activities, and to use 
such subsidiaries, which are subject to OCC regulation, as an alternative. 
This in tum would undercut the Board's role as preeminent bank 
regulator.246 
a. Risk to Bank Safety and Soundness 
This prong of the Board's argument has not been well-developed 
conceptually either in Congressional testimony on financial modernization 
legislation, other public statements by members of the Board of Governors 
or in Board publications. In testimony offered at the beginning of the I06th 
Congress, this argument was only mentioned in passing and did not number 
among the primary arguments advanced by the Board for its position.247 In 
earlier Congressional testimony, Chairman Greenspan stated that, while the 
new activities being considered were not unusually risky, such activities did 
245 See Financial Services Modernization: Hearings on H.R. 10 Before the Senate 
Comm. Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, lOSth Congo (1998) (Testimony of 
Alan Greenspan, Chainnan, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System) 
[hereinafter Greenspan 1998 testimony]. Greenspan offered substantially identical 
testimony on this issue before this and other Congressional committees on numerous 
occasions during the IOSth and I06th Congresses. 
246 See id 
247 See Greenspan 1999 testimony, supra note 19. The arguments in favor of the 
holding company affiliate were as follows: I) such structure will inhibit the 
widespread employment of federal subsidies over a wide range of activities, which 
would place banking organizations at an unfair competitive advantage over 
comparable insurance and securities finns operating independently or as bank 
holding company subsidiaries, 2) such subsidies would distort capital markets and 
the efficient allocation of both financial and real resources that are central to 
American prosperity, 3) new fmancial activities by banks should be financed by the 
market place and not by the sovereign credit of the U.S., and 4) the extension of the 
bank examination model of regulation to new nonbanking financial activities should 
be avoided. 
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present additional risk and that any losses would have to be absorbed.248 
This thought is not developed further in Greenspan's testimony, but the 
logical implication is that because the operating subsidiary is owned by a 
national bank, the bank would have to absorb any losses in the subsidiary. If 
the bank were rendered insolvent through such a strategy, the federal deposit 
insurance funds might be drawn upon because national banks are insured by 
the FDIC. Other safety and soundness arguments used by the Board have 
been rather vague also, including references to the "greater distance" 
between a bank and a holding company affiliate and expressions of doubt 
that the corporate separateness doctrine applies to bank operating 
subsidiaries in the same way that it applies to affiliates in a bank holding 
company structure.249 In one instance testifying in front of Congress, 
Chairman Greenspan went so far as to say that safety and soundness issues 
were not raised by use of the operating subsidiary.250 
Instead of advancing arguments to show that the holding company 
affiliate is a superior structure based on safety and soundness considerations, 
the Board's rebutted arguments made by the Department of the Treasury in 
support of the safety and soundness of the operating subsidiary structure. 
The most prominent examples are: 1) criticizing the Treasury's proposal for 
capping potential losses in the operating subsidiary in order to minimize the 
exposure of the safety net by requiring the bank to deduct its investment in 
its operating subsidiary from its regulatory capital while remaining well­
capitalized and by preventing a bank from paying off the debts of its failed 
subsidiary,251 2) arguing that, even if statutory barriers were created to limit 
248 See Greenspan 1998 testimony, supra note 245. 
249 See id. 
250 See Greenspan 1999 testimony, supra note 19. 
251 Chainnan Greenspan objected that such deduction is in conflict with GAAP 
Such proposed deduction also runs counter to the way that banks manage their 
subsidiaries, the way regulators have supervised subsidiaries and the way financial 
markets are likely to perceive the bank as a whole. Historically, both bank 
management and bank supervisors have regarded operating subsidiaries to be an 
integral part of the bank and have treated them as departments of the banks whose 
operations could have a significant impact on the bank's risk profile. Bank 
managers have sought to support their subsidiaries in the past and supervisors have 
carefully examined the operations of material subsidiaries in view of the difficulty in 
insulating the parent bank from problems in its subsidiaries. In addition, the 
financial markets will not view the subsidiary as truly separate and insulated from 
the bank. He stated that the requirement that bank dividend payments to a holdip.g 
company must be deducted from bank capital, thereby constraining bank 
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the impact of subsidiary losses on the parent, there still might be an erosion 
of market confidence in the bank's management and health, which would 
affect bank stability, which depends on reputation and standing in the 
financial markets, 3) dismissing the Treasury's argument that operating 
subsidiaries are desirable because they offer operational flexibility to bank 
management,252 and 4) ignoring evidence that Edge Act subsidiaries of U.S. 
banks have conducted nonbanking financial activities off-shore without 
problems.253 
b. 	 Spread of the Federal Safety Net Subsidy and the 
Attendant Mora) Hazard Problem 
The federal safety net refers to federal deposit insurance, access to 
the discount window, and to the Federal Reserve clearing system. The 
subsidy arises as the capital markets perceive banks as a safer risk than 
commercial companies, and therefore banks can finance their activities more 
cheaply, i.e. they have a lower cost of funds as a direct result of the federal 
safety net. The moral hazard problem arises because the safety net may lead 
to excessive risk-taking by banks and reduced market discipline. This will 
then lead to the need for more bank supervision to counteract the resulting 
moral hazard. If the federal subsidy created by the safety net is then 
extended to operating subsidiaries engaging in a broader range of activities 
than banks themselves are allowed to engage in, the moral hazard problem 
would be exacerbated and there would be even a greater need for a 
compensating increase in bank supervision.254 
subsidization of holding company affiliate activities, is a more effective constraint 
than relying on the deduction from bank regulatory capital for equity investments in 
an operating subsidiary engaging in new activities, which is in conflict with GAAP. 
See Greenspan 1998 testimony, supra note 245. 
252 Chairman Greenspan argued that use of an operating subsidiary will always be 
more profitable because of the federal safety net subsidy and therefore, there is no 
real choice involved and bank management will always select the operating 
subsidiary. See Greenspan 1998 testimony, supra note 245. 
253 Chairman Greenspan did not respond directly to this argument. He stated that 
the reason to permit Edges to engage in greater securities activities off-shore was to 
allow U.S. banks to be competitive abroad. He also stated that considerations of 
competitive equity in the U.S. argue against using a universal bank approach in the 
U.S. because securities and insurance firms would be placed at a competitive 

disadvantage. See Greenspan 1998 testimony, supra note 245. 

254 Remarks by Federal Reserve Board Governor Laurence H. Meyer at the 1999 F. 

Hodge O'Neal Corporate & Securities law Symposium, Washington University 
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As stated above, this argument has two corollaries. With respect to 
the first corollary, the Board has taken the position that using operating 
subsidiaries for new activities would be a "funnel for transferring the 
sovereign credit subsidy directly from the bank to finance any new principal 
activities authorized by Congress or acc regulatory actions."255 Use ofthe 
sovereign credit affects allocation of credit and real resources in our 
financial system and issues of risk and degree of supervision are implicated. 
Therefore, decisions about use of the sovereign credit should be made by 
Congress after full consideration of the implications of such an extension on 
the competitive balance and systemic risks of the financial system. With 
respect to the second corollary, the Board has made the argument that 
operating subsidiaries will operate at a competitive advantage compared to 
so-called "independent" firms. Considerations of competitive equity demand 
a "level playing field" in the financial services industry and "full, open and 
fair competition."256 This seems an odd comment from a banking regulator, 
for it goes beyond the traditional concerns of such regulators, such as safety 
and soundness. Assuming Greenspan was looking forward to the Board's 
new role as "umbrella regulator" of banking conglomerates under Gramm­
Leah-Bliley with responsibility for overseeing their financial stability, the 
remark becomes more comprehensible.257 
c. Need to Preserve Board Role as Bank Regulator 
This argument has not been well-developed by the Board, although it 
has been raised on numerous occasions in front of Congressional committees 
holding hearings on financial modernization legislation. The Board has long 
maintained that it must maintain its role as a bank regulator, in addition to its 
central banking functions.258 This argument is linked to the previous 
argument regarding the spread of the federal safety net subsidy. It is argued 
that such subsidy has resulted in lower costs of capital for banks than for 
their affiliates and therefore, will lead banks to locate their new activities in 




255 See Greenspan 1998 testimony, supra note 245. 

256 See id Both the securities and the insurance industries support the holding 

company structure as a way to ensure fair competition. See Mark M. Dumler & 

Edward E. Sharkey, 70-fear-Old Walls Almost Came Tumbling Down, NATIONAL L. 

J., Nov. 2, 1998, at B7. 

257 See Gramm-Leach-Bliley, § III (amending 12 U.S.C. § 1844(c)). 

258 See Greenspan 1999 Testimony, supra note 19; Greenspan 1998 Testimony, 

supra note 245. 
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subsidiaries, which are subject to OCC regulation and not Board 
regulation.259 
2. Arguments in Favor of Operating Subsidiary Alternative 
Former Treasury Secretary Robert E. Rubin stated in Congressional 
hearings on H.R. 10 that the proposed legislation was extremely significant 
because it would become the constitution for the financial system for the 
twenty-first century.260 According to Rubin, such legislation must meet five 
principles, namely, protect the safety and soundness of the financial system, 
provide adequate consumer protection, reduce costs and improve access for 
consumers, businesses, and communities, promote innovation and 
competitiveness of the financial services industry; and permit financial 
services firms to choose the corporate structure that makes the most business 
sense. 261 Rubin noted that good financial modernization legislation would 
cause the evolution of the industry to occur in a more coherent and orderly 
way. However, he also noted that the U.s. financial services industry is 
currently strong and competitive abroad and would continue to be so even in 
the absence of modernization legislation. Therefore, it was necessary to 
"get the solution right." He stated that the Clinton administration had been a 
consistent proponent of financial modernization legislation that best serves 
the interests of consumers, businesses and communities but opposed, along 
with all major organizations of banking institutions, the version of H.R. 10 
passed by the House in 1998, because it did not meet this standard. One of 
the chief objections of the Administration to the bill as passed by the House 
was that it would force banks to conduct new financial activities in bank 
holding company affiliates and would prohibit using subsidiaries of banks, 
thereby limiting the ability of participants to make their own decisions about 
lowering costs, improving services and providing benefits to consumers.262 
259 See Independent Ins. Agents of America, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, 890 F.2d 1275, 1284 (2d Cir. 1989); Citicorp v. Bd. of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 936 F.2d 66, 75 (2d Cir. 1991). 
260 See Financial Services Modernization: Hearings on HR. 10 Before the Senate 
Comm. On Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 1051h Congo (1998) (testimony of 
Robert E. Rubin, Secretary of the Treasury) [hereinafter Rubin 1998 testimony]. 
261 See Advance Text of the Testimony to be Delivered by Treasury Secretary 
Robert E. Rubin to the Senate Banking Committee, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, Jun. 
17,1998. 
262 Rubin 1998 testimony, supra note 260. The other objections of the 
Administration that Rubin mentioned were the following: 1) the bill discriminated 
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In addition to the Treasury Department, two of the three federal 
banking regulators supported use of the operating subsidiary as an 
alternative structure to the bank holding company affiliate. Representatives 
of each of these entities testified extensively in front of various 
Congressional committees during the lOSth Congress and again in the I06th 
Congress. 
a. 	 Use of Operating Subsidiaries for New Activities Would 
Strengthen Banks 
Rather than causing safety and soundness problems for banks, use of 
operating subsidiaries to conduct new activities is a prudent form of risk 
diversification that would benefit banks.263 This would occur for two 
reasons. First, banks conducting new activities in operating subsidiaries 
would receive additional income in the form of dividends from such 
subsidiaries and their financial position would be strengthened as a result. In 
comparison, use of a holding company affiliate would lead to income from 
the new activities being passed to the holding company, not the bank. 
Second, fees and other income from subsidiaries enable banks to offset the 
effects of cyclical downturns in other economic sectors, diminishing the 
volatility of bank earnings and making the system as a whole less risky. 
b. 	 Use of Operating Subsidiaries for New Activities Would 
Strengthen the Federal Deposit Insurance System 
Rather than destabilizing the federal deposit insurance system, the 
system would be strengthened. This would occur because the additional 
against banks and in favor of insurance companies (referring to the provision that 
would remove judicial deference to the OCC when considering questions involving 
insurance) and this would impede competition and innovation and fail to serve the 
interests of consumers; 2) the bill expanded the Federal Home Loan Bank System 
without resolving the system's fundamental problems; 3) the bill would cause assets 
to be shifted out of national banks and into holding company affiliates, thereby 
reducing resources covered by the Community Reinvestment Act, which would 
reduce the amount of capital available for urban economic revitalization and 
financing for affordable housing and small businesses. See id. 
263 See Rubin 1998 testimony, supra note 260, see also Financial Services 
Modernization: Hearings on HR. 10 Before the Senate Comm. On Banking, 
Housing and Urban Affairs, 105th Congo (1998) (testimony of Julie Williams, Acting 
Comptroller of the Currency) [hereinafter Williams 1998 testimony]. 
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earnings from new activities in bank subsidiaries lowers the probability of 
bank failure. If a holding company affiliate were used, any earnings from the 
new activities would flow through to the holding company, not the affiliated 
insured bank. The FDIC has consistently taken the position that, for this 
reason alone, allowing banks to conduct new activities in subsidiaries is at 
least as safe and sound, and probably more so, than conducting these 
activities in holding company affiliates.264 In addition, the value of the 
bank's investment in the subsidiary is fully available to cover the costs of 
failure resolution by the FDIC.265 This would not be true necessarily if new 
activities were conducted within a holding company affiliate. The ability of a 
Federal banking agency to require a holding company to support a troubled 
subsidiary is uncertain.266 The corrective action provisions of the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Act of 1991 specifically limit the ability of a Federal 
banking agency to require a parent bank holding company to contribute 
funds to an undercapitalized bank through a capital restoration plan to the 
lesser of 5% of the bank's assets or the amount necessary to bring the 
institution up to the adequately capitalized level.267 The Federal Reserve 
Board's source of strength doctrine has never been fully litigated and bank 
holding companies have sometimes refused to meet regulators' demands to 
downstream funds into a troubled bank.268 The operating subsidiary is a 
superior vehicle for this reason also. 
264 See Financial Services Modernization: Hearings on HR. 10 Before the 

Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Securities and Government-Sponsored Entities of 

the House Comm. On Banking and Financial Services, 105th Congo (1997) 





265 See Williams 1998 testimony, supra note 263; see also Rubin 1998 testimony, 

supra note 260. 

266 See Williams 1998 testimony, supra note 263. 

267 See 12 U.S.C. § 1831(e)(2)(E) (1999). In addition, a holding company may 
decline to supply capital if it is resigned to closure of the bank subsidiary. See 12 
U.S.C. § 18310(t) (1999). 12 C.F.R. §§6.5(i)(2), 208.44(i)(2), 325.104(h)(2), 
565.5(i)(2) (1999). 

268 In McCorp Fin., Inc. v. Board ofGovernors, 900 F.2d 852, 857 (5th Cir. 1990), 

rev'd on other grounds, 502 U.S. 32 (1991), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
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c. 	 Safety and Soundness Safeguards Will Prevent Risks Caused 
by Use of an Operating Subsidiary 
The new activities that would be permitted under proposed financial 
modernization legislation would not be unduly risky.269 However, to the 
extent that additional risks would be posed by a bank subsidiary engaging in 
new activities, the bank would be insulated from losses associated with such 
additional risks by principles of corporate separateness and by adoption of 
appropriate safeguards that would mitigate such risks. Therefore, use of an 
operating subsidiary would pose no greater risk to bank safety and soundness 
than use of a holding company structure.270 
Corporate separateness protects the bank because the subsidiary 
would be separately incorporated and maintained and operated as a separate 
entity. Under the principle of limited liability in state corporation law in the 
U.S., a shareholder is not liable for losses or liabilities of a corporation 
beyond the amount of the shareholder's investment. In some cases, however, 
courts have pierced the veil of limited liability and held shareholders 
responsible for the losses and liabilities of a corporation. As long as the 
separate existence of the subsidiary is maintained, this should not occur. It 
is no more likely that a court would pierce the limited liability shield of the 
operating subsidiary and reach the assets of the bank than it would if a 
holding company affiliate is used. In fact, there is empirical evidence that 
courts are more likely to pierce the veil in the case of affiliates than they are 
in the case of subsidiaries.271 
Another device to insulate the bank from losses in an operating 
subsidiaries would be through the use of firewalls. The safeguards, which 
Treasury and the acc proposed be included in any new legislation, include 
the following: 1) banks are required to be both well-capitalized and well­
managed, subject to sanctions if they are not, 2) all of the bank's equity 
investment in the subsidiary must be deducted from the bank's capital and 
the bank must remain well-capitalized after the deduction, 3) the bank may 
not make an equity investment in a subsidiary that would exceed the amount 
269 The FDIC has consistently maintained that the subsidiary structure poses no 

threat to safety and soundness. See Rubin 1998 testimony, supra note 260. 

270 See Rubin 1998 testimony, supra note 260; see also Williams 1998 testimony, 

supra note 263. 

271 See Robert Thompson, PierCing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 

CORNELL L. REv. 1036, 1074 (1991). This study has been cited in prepared 

testimony presented to Congress on a number ofoccasions. 
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that it could payout as a dividend, unless it receives regulatory approval, and 
4) loans or other credit extensions by a bank to a subsidiary would be 
subject to the same limits as bank loans and other credit extensions to an 
affiliate pursuant to the prudential restrictions of Sections 23A and 23B of 
the Federal Reserve Act and purchases of low quality assets from a 
subsidiary would be subject to the limitations under Section 23A applicable 
to transactions between banks and holding company affiliates.272 
d. 	 Permitting Banks to Choose the Corporate Structure for 
New Activities Would Benefit Consumers 
Banks should have the flexibility to choose their own form of 
organization and restricting their choices will have adverse effects on 
consumers. There are good business reasons for an institution to prefer a 
subsidiary over an affiliate, namely: 1) holding companies are expensive to 
form and may be prohibitively expensive for small banks, thereby effectively 
preventing them from engaging in newly permitted financial activities, 2) 
bank management may wish to retain the earnings flow generated by a new 
line of business, 3) bank management may want to diversify earnings of the 
bank group, and 4) bank management may simply prefer siting new activities 
in subsidiaries, as a matter of corporate culture.273 Without such flexibility, 
banks would be less safe and sound for the reasons discussed in Section 
III.B.2.a. above, offer fewer choices to customers, may be under pressure to 
charge higher fees on the products or services they are allowed to offer and 
may be less able to serve the financial needs of their communities and their 
customers.274 
e. 	 No Net Safety Net Subsidy Exists. Even IfSuch Subsidy 
Existed, Firewalls Could Be Used to Contain The Spread 
of that Subsidy to Operating Subsidiaries 
This arguments consists of two parts. The first part of the argument 
is that there is no net safety net subsidy available to insured banks. This is 
because there are very high regulatory costs associated with being an insured 
bank that reduce to zero any benefits that might be available because of the 
272 See Rubin 1998 testimony, supra note 260; see also Williams 1998 testimony, 

supra note 263. 

273 See Rubin 1998 testimony, supra note 260. 

274 See Williams 1998 testimony, supra note 263. 
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existence of the federal safety net.275 Therefore, there can be no danger of 
such a subsidy spreading if operating subsidiaries are used. 
The second part of the argument is as follows. Even assuming for 
purposes of argument that such a subsidy exists, firewalls might be 
constructed that would prevent the spread of such subsidy from an insured 
bank to a subsidiary, the same way that firewalls limit this from happening in 
the case of holding company affiliates.276 This was the position taken by the 
OCC, which favored adding certain safeguard measures to H.R. 10 that 
would impede the flow of subsidized dollars to an operating subsidiary to the 
same extent that restrictions impede the flow of subsidized dollars to the 
bank holding company and its nonbank affiliates. These safeguards included 
extending the quantitative and qualitative restrictions of Sections 23A and 
23B of the Federal Reserve Act to loans from a bank to a bank subsidiary, 
requiring that a bank deduct from regulatory capital its investment in the 
operating subsidiary, requiring the consolidation of the subsidiary's assets 
and liabilities with those of the bank, and a prohibition on bank investment 
in a subsidiary greater than what it can pay as a dividend to its holding 
company without specific regulatory approvaJ.277 If such limitations were 
adopted, they would be more effective in preventing the spread of a subsidy 
than current law restricting transactions in the holding company structure. 
The example offered was the spread of a subsidy from a bank holding 
company to an affiliate. This involves a two-step process in which the 
subsidy is first transferred from the bank to the holding company in the form 
of a dividend payment and then there is a transfer of value from the holding 
company to the non-bank affiliate in the form of an equity investment or 
other transaction. Under this scenario, there are no legal restrictions to 
contain spread of the subsidy except the requirement that the dividend be 
permissible for the bank. 
f. 	 New Activities Have Been Conducted Off-Shore through 
Operating Subsidiaries in a Safe and Sound Manner 
There is empirical evidence that new activities can be conducted 
safely and soundly through operating subsidiaries. This is based upon the 
use of Edge Act subsidiaries by U.S. banks overseas to conduct securities 
activities. These subsidiaries are chartered and regulated by the Federal 
275 See infra Section IV.C. 

276 See Williams 1998 testimony, supra note 263; see a/so Rubin 1998 testimony, 

supra note 260. 

277 See Williams 1998 testimony, supra note 263. 

402 	 ANNUAL REVIEW OF BANKfNG LAW VOL. 19: 329 
Reserve Board and there is no indication that use of such subsidiaries has 
adversely affected the safety and soundness of their parent banks.278 
IV. 	 POLICY ANALYSIS OF THE CORPORATE STRUCTURE 
DEBATE: THE OPTIMAL STRUCTURE FOR NEW 
FINANCIAL ACTIVITIES 
In most industry sectors in the United States, the choice of 
organizational form used to conduct activities is a business decision not 
subject to governmental regulation. The banking industry is different, some 
would even say "special", because of the public role that banks play in the 
economy.279 As a consequence, the choice of organizational form used by a 
bank for its activities may become very significant, if it can be argued that 
such choice will have an impact on an area of legitimate government 
concern. On the other hand, if there is no compelling public policy 
consideration that must be respected, the choice of organizational form 
should be a matter of private choice, as it is in other sectors of the 
economy.280 
This section will analyze the corporate structure debate from the 
perspective of public policy. Four public policy rationales will be discussed 
- namely preserving safety and soundness, preventing conflicts of interest, 
preventing the spread of the safety net subsidy, and preserving the Board's 
ability to handle systemic risk. The purpose of this analysis is to determine 
whether there is a compelling government interest that would justify 
eliminating use of either the bank operating subsidiary or the bank holding 
company affiliate or preferring one form over the other or whether, in the 
alternative, banks should be permitted to view the choice as a private 
business decision. 
A. 	 Preserving Safety and Soundness 
The safety and soundness issue arises out of the concern that certain 
new financial activities, like securities underwriting, carry higher levels of 
risk than core banking activities and may endanger bank solvency.281 It 
278 See Rubin 1998 testimony, supra note 260. 

279 See Corrigan, supra note 2. 

280 The federal banking regulators have recognized this principle in recent 

testimony in front of Congress on financial modernization legislation. See Williams 

1998 testimony, supra note 263. 
281 See Shull & White, supra note 21, at 465. 
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should be noted that this view is not universally held, with some 
commentators arguing that permitting banks to diversify into non banking 
financial activities would actually decrease the risk of bank insolvency.282 
However, the safety and soundness issue will be discussed here because of 
the important role it has played in the corporate structure debate. There are 
several ways in which the additional risk undertaken by a bank affiliate in 
conducting such activities may affect and even endanger the stability of a 
bank and, by extension, the financial system. These include liability for 
losses incurred by an affiliate, loss of equity investment in the affiliate, loss 
of credit extended to an affiliate and loss of public confidence due to failure 
of an affiliate.283 At issue is whether one corporate structure is better than 
the other at insulating a bank from losses associated with new financial 
activities. Before undertaking a risk analysis of these factors, the available 
empirical evidence about the safety and soundness of use of bank affiliates 
to conduct new activities will be examined. 
1. 	 Empirical Evidence About Safety and Soundness of 
Bank Affiliates for New Activities 
This topic was mentioned only on a few occasions in the debate over 
financial modernization legislation. There is very little evidence available 
because of the legal barriers that have prevented banks from undertaking 
nonbanking financial activities except on a limited basis. The historical 
experience with using either form to conduct new activities is so limited that 
it is difficult to say whether there are safety and soundness problems with 
either form or whether one is better than another in containing risk. The best 
information might be found in the results of examinations of banks and bank 
holding companies, which information is not publicly available. Therefore, 
any assessment of this issue must rely on less reliable information that is 
publicly available and on information drawn from contexts in which banks 
and their affiJiates have been permitted to engage in limited nonbanking 
financial activities for some period of time, which include securities 
underwriting and dealing by bank holding company affiliates, but not by 
national bank operating subsidiaries. However, notwithstanding these 
282 See Gary Whalen, Bank Organizational Form and the Risks of Expanded 

Activities, OCC ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER 9 7-1 at 7 (1997). Daniel R. Fischel, 

Andrew M. Rosenfield & Robert S. Stillman, The Regulation of Banks and Bank 

Holding Companies, 73 VA. L. REv. 301,320 (1987). 

283 See Longstreth & Mattei, supra note 21, at 1906-1912; McCoy, supra note 21, 

at §§ 8.02 and 8.05. 

404 ANNUAL REVIEW OF BANKING LAW VOL. 19: 329 
shortcomings, there is still some value in looking at the available evidence, 
information that was largely ignored in the corporate structure debate. 
a. Holding Company Affiliates 
As discussed in Section II.B.I., bank holding companies have been 
permitted by the Board since 1987 to engage in securities underwriting and 
dealing in bank ineligible securities through Section 20 subsidiaries, subject 
to the imposition of firewalls. The Board has stated that, in its experience, 
the risks of such securities underwriting and dealing have proven to be 
manageable in a holding company framework.284 The Board liberalized its 
rules regarding the operation of Section 20 subsidiaries in 1996 and 1997, 
indicating it believed there were no serious safety and soundness issues with 
conducting such activities to a limited extent in holding company affiliates. 
It is reasonable to infer from this evidence that the holding company affiliate 
is a suitable vehicle for the safe and sound conduct of new activities on a 
limited basis, subject to regulatory and statutory safeguards. 
b. Bank Operating Subsidiaries 
Operating subsidiaries have been permitted for the conduct of 
securities activities under U.S. law in two contexts. One is the use of Edge 
Act subsidiaries of U.S. banks to conduct securities activities offshore 
subject to supervision by the Board.2ss In addition, state-chartered banks are 
permitted in some states to conduct securities activities2s6 and the FDIC 
takes the position that such activity is safe and sound for state-chartered, 
non-member insured banks under its supervision ("bona fide subsidiaries"). 
i. Foreign Subsidiaries 
To date, there has been only one empirical study published on the 
performance or riskiness of these subsidiaries.2s7 This study examined the 
284 See 62 Fed. Reg. 2622, 2623 (1997). 

28S See 12 U.S.C. §§ 611 et. seq. and 12 C.F.R. §§ 211.1 et. seq. (1999). 

286 See 12U.S.C. § 1831a(l999). 

287 See Gary Whalen, The Securities Activities ofthe Foreign Subsidiaries of u.s. 

Banks: Evidence of Risks and Returns, DCC Economics Working Paper 98-2 

(1998) [hereinafter Whalen 1998]. Because of the historic limitations on domestic 

bank securities activities, the economic studies that have been conducted have 

focused on estimating the securities returns and risks that would accrue to banking 

organizations entering this line of business, relying on data from independent 

securities firms, often on an aggregate industry basis. Because of the methodology 
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risks and returns associated with U.S. bank involvement in securities 
activities overseas for the time period 1987-1996. The type of securities 
activities conducted by the banks included securities underwriting, broker­
dealer activity, and merchant banking.288 Overall, the study concluded 
banks can lower their risk by engaging in overseas securities activities.289 
With respect to the issue of whether one organizational form is superior to 
another, the study noted that there is virtually no empirical evidence 
supporting either position because laws and regulations in effect at the time 
neither allowed banks to choose how they organized important 
nontraditional activities domestically nor required them to report 
unconsolidated financial information on their direct subsidiaries.29o 
Comparison of the securities returns and risks of direct and indirect bank 
securities subsidiaries with those of holding company affiliates using 
industry aggregation revealed some differences in performance. The mean 
securities returns of the combined bank subsidiary group were slightly above 
those of the holding company affiliates over some time intervals, and their 
measured risk was lower in all periods examined. The evidence suggests 
that permitting U.S. banking organizations to engage in securities activities 
overseas through direct and indirect bank subsidiaries has not had a 
significant, deleterious impact on their performance. The author stated that 
additional research is necessary to establish the definitiveness of these 
findings. However, the study, which is the only empirical study on the 
domestic structural issue currently available,291 suggests that the operating 
subsidiary should not be eliminated on safety and soundness grounds. It also 
suggests that the affiliate structure has not been shown to be better at 
containing risk than the operating subsidiary structure. 
ii. FDIC Bona Fide Subsidiaries 
The FDIC has permitted bona fide subsidiaries of insured 
nonmember banks to engage in securities activities since December 1984.292 
used, the relevance of those studies to predicting actual performance is questionable. 

See id. at 3. 

288 See id. at 7. 

289 See id. at 32. 

290 See id. at 28. 

291 See id. at 32. 

292 See 12 C.F.R. § 337.4 (1999). In order to qualify as a bona fide subsidiary. 

certain requirements must be met: the subsidiary must be adequately capitalized, 

have operations that are physically separate and distinct from the bank operations, 
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The types of activities that are permitted include securities underwriting and 
broker-dealer activity.293 While the experience of the FDIC with bona fide 
securities subsidiaries of insured nonmember banks has been limited, these 
subsidiaries generally have not posed safety and soundness concerns.294 
Only one FDIC-supervised institution owns a subsidiary actively engaged in 
the fuil range of securities activities permitted by the FDIC, but over 400 
insured nonmember banks have subsidiaries engaged in more limited 
securities-related activities. These activities include management of the 
bank's securities portfolio, investment advisory services, and acting as a 
broker-dealer. With one exception, none of these activities has given cause 
for a significant safety-and-soundness concern. There has been one failure 
of an insured institution supervised by the FDIC that conducted securities 
activities through a subsidiary.295 While not the sole cause of the failure, the 
business relationship with the securities subsidiary added to the cost of the 
failure because the bank had made a substantial unsecured loan that was 
used to benefit the securities subsidiary.296 
iii. Inferences from Empirical Evidence 
The empirical evidence is not conclusive because it is so limited and, 
in the case of operating subsidiaries, the evidence relates to entities other 
than national bank operating subsidiaries. However, it carries some 
persuasive authority because it indicates that the federal banking regulators, 
who are experts on assessing and taking steps to contain risk to avoid safety 
and soundness prohlems, have been willing to allow certain securities 
activities to be conducted to a limited extent in both holding company 
affiliates and operating subsidiaries. 
In none of the three examples cited has there been an indication of a 
significant safety and soundness problem. Neither the Board nor the FDIC 
maintain separate accounting and other corporate records, observe corporate 
fonnalities such as separate board of directors meeting, share no common officers or 
employees with the bank, compensate its own employees, have a board a majority of 
which is composed of persons who are neither directors nor officers of the bank, 
conduct business in a way that infonns customers that the subsidiary is separate 
from the bank and its products are not FDIC insured bank deposits nor are they 
guaranteed by the bank. There are restrictions on loans, extensions of credit and 
other transactions between an insured bank and its securities subsidiary. 
293 See 12 C.F.R. § 337.4(b) (1999). 
294 See Helfer 1997 testimony, supra note 264. 
295 See id 
296 See id 
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.­ has taken steps to limit or discontinue the securities activities in question. In 
fact, in recent years, the Board has permitted increased underwriting to occur 
in Section 20 subsidiaries, subject to a lower level of firewaHs. It cannot be 
concluded from the limited evidence available that the operating subsidiary 
form should be eliminated as a vehicle for securities activities. The 
empirical study regarding foreign subsidiaries suggests that there is no 
reason to prefer the holding company affiliate for securities activities from a 
safety and soundness perspective. 
2. Risk Analysis of Safety and Soundness Issues 
a. 	 Liability of Bank or Bank Holding Company for 
Losses Incurred by the Affiliate 
One way that losses could flow through to the bank would be if the 
corporate separateness of the holding company affiliate or operating 
subsidiary were disregarded and the bank were held liable for losses in such 
affiliate or subsidiary. Piercing the corporate veil is an exception to the rule 
of limited liability of shareholders and is widely believed to be more likely in 
the case of a parent-subsidiary relationship than in the case of a corporation 
with shareholders who are natural persons.297 Piercing may also occur in a 
holding company structure, however, and in fact there is empirical evidence 
that courts are more likely to reverse pierce to reach the assets of affiliated 
corporations than in the case of a parent-subsidiary relationship.298 It should 
be noted that there is only one empirical study on this issue, which has often 
been cited in Congressional testimony to support the proposition that 
piercing is more likely to occur with respect to holding company affiliates 
than it is with respect to bank operating subsidiaries.299 That study is based 
on an analysis of decided cases drawn from an electronic data base involving 
a wide variety of corporations and did not study piercing in the specialized 
context of banks and bank holding companies. Therefore, it cannot be 
regarded as a conclusive study on this issue. What can be said based on the 
297 See 	 William P. Hackney & Tracey G. Benson, Shareholder Liability for 
Inadequate Capital, 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 837, 873 (1982). See Thompson, supra 
note 271, at 1056 (arguing that, based on empirical evidence, courts are more likely 
to pierce in the case where the shareholder is another corporation than when the 
shareholders are individuals). 
298 See Thompson, supra note 271, at 1057. 
299 See Thompson, supra note 271. 
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available evidence and theoretical arguments is that the possibility exists for 
piercing in both contexts. 
The Board has frequently argued that the holding company affiliate 
is a superior structure because it provides a double dose of limited liability, 
through the holding company as well as through the affiliate. However, 
based on the prior discussion and the possibility of reverse piercing, it 
appears that the focus of analysis should be on steps that can be taken in both 
contexts to avoid piercing. Studies of instances where the corporate veil of 
limited liability has been pierced suggest that there are predictable factors 
that a court will look at in making its determination, including whether 
corporate separateness between the two entities has been maintained and 
whether the subsidiary has been deliberately undercapitalized.30o Prior to 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley, both the OCC and the Board imposed corporate 
separateness requirements in connection with regulatory approvals to engage 
in underwriting of bank ineligible securities. With respect to national bank 
operating subsidiaries, the OCC required that elaborate steps directed at 
maintaining corporate separateness set forth in the Operating Subsidiary 
Rule be followed in connection with its approvals for such subsidiaries to 
engage in revenue bond underwriting.301 With respect to holding company 
affiliates, the Board required that Section 20 subsidiaries be operated in a 
prudent manner, including maintaining corporate separateness and instituting 
appropriate risk management procedures.302 The OCC corporate 
separateness requirements under the Operating Subsidiary Rule were more 
explicit than those set forth in the Conditions to Board's Section 20 Orders. 
The OCC requirements include the factors that are frequently cited by courts 
in determining whether to pierce the corporate veil,303 including adequate 
capitalization, maintenance of separate accounting and corporate records, 
and observance of corporate formalities. Gramm-Leach-Bliley requires that 
national banks owning financial subsidiaries take steps to maintain the 
300 See Thompson, supra note 271, at 1064-1070. 

301 See 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(t)(2) (1999). The FDIC has adopted similar rules 

applicable to bona fide securities subsidiaries of insured state nonmember banks, 

which attempt to address the same risk. 

302 See 12 C.F.R. § 225.200(a) (1999) ("Conditions to Board's Section 20 Orders") 

(referring to maintenance of separate accounting and corporate records; independent 

trading and exposure limits consistent with parent company guidelines). 

303 See Thompson, supra note 271, at 1064-1070. 
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corporate separateness of such subsidiaries and to identify and manage the 
financial or operational risks posed by the subsidiary.304 
Because corporate separateness requirements can be and have been 
put in place for both types of entities, the focus should be on whether these 
requirements are adhered to, not on whether a holding company affiliate or 
an operating subsidiary is used. If the safeguards are adhered to, it is 
arguable that either corporate form should be able to insulate the bank from 
any undue risks associated with new financial activities. If, however, such 
corporate separateness requirements are not maintained, it is conceivable that 
the corporate veil of limited liability will be pierced and losses will flow 
through to the bank. 
b. Loss of Equity Investment 
Another potential risk is the impact on bank safety and soundness if 
the holding company affiliate or bank operating subsidiary failed and there 
were a loss of an equity investment by the corporate parent. In the case of a 
bank operating subsidiary, even a total loss of the investment in the 
subsidiary should have no affect on the stability of the bank. This was true 
under the OCC's Operating Subsidiary Rule because the bank was required 
to deduct its equity investment in an operating subsidiary from its regulatory 
capital and remain adequately capitalized after making such deduction.305 
Under Gramm-Leach-Bliley, national banks must deduct the amount of their 
equity investments, including retain earnings, in financial subsidiaries from 
their assets and tangible equity and remain well-capitalized.306 Therefore, 
even a total loss of the investment should not have any effect on the bank's 
capital ratio. 
In the case of a holding company affiliate, a loss of an equity 
investment would result in a corresponding reduction in the bank holding 
company's capital. The risk would be mitigated, however, if the investment 
in the affiliate were required to be taken into consideration in calculating the 
holding company's capital position.307 If the financial position of the bank 
304 See Gramm-Leach-Bliley, § 121(a) (new 12 U.S.C. § 5136A(d). 
305 See supra Section II.B.2. This requirement only applied if the subsidiary 
engaged in such activity as a principal. 
306 See Gramm-Leach-Bliley, § 121(a)(new 12 U.S.C. § 5136A(c)). 
307 See 12 C.F.R. § 225.200(b)(I) (1999). Investments in a Section 20 subsidiary 
were required to be deducted from holding company capital in the 1987 Order, supra 
note 83 at 502, and the 1989 Order, supra note 84, at 205. This requirement changed 
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holding company were weakened as a result of the loss, a bank subsidiary of 
that holding company would be indirectly weakened because it would be 
deprived of the possibility of looking to the holding company as a source of 
strength. There are minimum capital requirements applicable to bank 
holding companies, which would require that the capital position of the bank 
holding company be restored in the event of such a loss.308 However, it is 
conceivable that the bank would be deprived of a source of strength for some 
period of time until the holding company took steps to improve its capital 
position. It should be noted that, although the Board has consistently 
maintained that bank holding companies should serve as a source of strength 
for their bank subsidiaries, the viability of the source of strength doctrine in 
the federal courts is questionable.309 However, Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
contains a provision on the source of strength doctrine, limiting the authority 
of the Board and other bank regulators to order regulated insurance or 
securities affiliates of a financial holding company, or subsidiaries of a 
depository institution owned by a financial holding company, to serve as a 
source of strength. This language may provide an implied basis for source 
of strength authority because, by limiting it in specific contexts, it assumes 
its existence. 
c. Loss of Credit Extended to Affiliate 
Another destabilizing event might be the loss of credit extended by a 
bank to a holding company affiliate or to an operating subsidiary. Although 
the risk of default exists with any credit extension by a bank, it is 
exacerbated in this instance because of the possibility of conflict of interest 
transactions, which are discussed in Section IV.B. There should not be any 
difference in result depending on whether a holding company affiliate or a 
bank operating subsidiary is used because the statutory firewalls of Sections 
23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act are applicable in identical fashion 
to the two structures. In the case of a holding company affiliate, extensions 
of credit by an affiliated bank are subject to the arms' length, 
collateralization, and exposure limitations of Sections 23A and 23B.310 The 
OCC's Operating Subsidiary Rule requires application of Sections 23A and 
23B to extensions of credit by the national bank to an operating subsidiary 
when the frrewalls for Section 20 subsidiary were replaced by the operating 

standards in 1997. See supra Section II B.l.c. 

308 See 12 C.F.R. part 225, app. A (1999). 

309 See McCorp, supra note 268. 

310 See 12 U.S.C. § 371c, 371c-l (1999). 
2000] STRUCTURING THE FINANCIAL SERVICE CONGLOMERATES 411 
when such subsidiary conducts activities as principaP11 Under Gramm­
Leach-Bliley, transactions between a national bank and a financial subsidiary 
are subject to the Sections 23A and 23B firewalls.312 
There is also a possibility that a bank could be indirectly weakened 
because of defaults on loans made by a holding company to a holding 
company affiliate. Sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act are 
inapplicable if a holding company affiliate seeks funding from its holding 
company. Loans could be funded with dividends paid to the holding 
company by the bank.313 As a consequence, the holding company could 
transfer resources from the bank to the nonbank affiliate, even in cases 
where the bank could not do so directly. In such a case, if the affiliate were 
to default on its loan and cause a loss to the holding company, it would 
impair such holding company's ability to act as a source of strength for the 
bank.314 
d. Loss of Public Confidence Due to Affiliate Failure 
A final risk to safety and soundness is loss of reputation of a bank or 
bank holding company due to faihue of a holding company affiliate or 
operating subsidiary.315 To the extent that new activities in an affiliate lead 
to extraordinary losses and the affiliate fails, the public's confidence in 
affiliated entities, including insured banks, will likely be affected. Public 
confidence in banks is an important component of safety and soundness and 
to the extent such confidence is lost, this may be reflected in the stock price 
of the bank or holding company, it may result in a downgrade in the debt or 
311 See supra Section II.B.2. 

312 See Gramm-Leach-Bliley, § 121(b) (amending 12 U.S.C. § 371(c). A financial 

subsidiary is considered an affiliate, and not a subsidiary, of the parent bank for 

purposes of such provisions. Gramm-Leach-Bliley also includes anti-evasion 

language permitting the Board to deem an investment in, or extension of credit by, 

an affiliate in a financial subsidiary of a bank to be considered an investment or 

extension of credit by the parent bank of the financial subsidiary. 
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equity rating of the bank or holding company, thereby raising its cost of ". 
funds, or it may result in more dramatic action, such as a bank run, which 
would undermine bank stability. 
There is no reason to assume that this risk would be greater with one 
corporate structure than another. The risk can and should be addressed by 
taking steps to clarify in the public's mind the separateness of a holding 
company affiliate or operating subsidiary from any affiliated banks through 
disclosure requirements.316 
B. Avoiding Conflicts of Interest 
Another risk is the possibility that a financially distressed affiliate or 
subsidiary will be assisted by its corporate parent to the disadvantage of an 
insured bank. In addition to raising safety and soundness concerns discussed 
above, there is also the danger that such assistance will result in the 
misallocation of credit resources because decisions are not being made on 
the basis of objective criteria. This offends the policy principle discussed in 
Section I1.A. favoring the impartial allocation of credit. The types of conflict 
of interest transactions that might occur include imprudent loans to the 
affiliate, making loans at below market rates to the affiliate and sale of low­
quality assets from the affiliate to the bank. In the holding company 
scenario, it is possible that funds could be drained out of the bank in the form 
of excessive dividends payable to a corporate parent in order to subsidize 
higher risk activities}17 The incentive for engaging in such transactions is 
the problem of moral hazard, namely that the risk of loss is shifted to either 
the bank insurance funds or the public and away from private investors. 
While the risk of self-dealing exists in all corporate settings, the use 
of a holding company magnifies that risk. Because of the complicated 
structure, monitoring and detection of misconduct is more costly and 
difficult.318 In the case of financial holding companies, there is a danger that 
the risk of such misconduct will be greatest with respect to subsidiaries that 
are financial intermediaries, such as banks. This is because such subsidiaries 
316 For an example of the type of disclosure that might be effective, see Retail Sales 

Statement, supra note 102. 

317 See Shull & White, supra note 21, at 472; McCoy, supra note 21, at § 8.02. 

318 See Robert C. Clark, The Regulation of Financial Holding Companies, 92 

HARv. L. REv. 787, 832 (1979). 






tend to be larger than other subsidiaries and there is a greater likelihood that 
there will be less than complete stock ownership by the corporate parent.319 
The danger of conflict of interest transactions occurring that work to 
the detriment of insured banks is increased in a holding company structure 
where there is differential ownership of bank and non-bank subsidiaries.32o 
The danger is that the managers or controlling shareholders of related 
entities will bias transactions in favor of subsidiaries in which they hold the 
greatest interest in order to maximize the value of their investments.321 
There is no requirement of federal law that bank holding companies own all 
of the stock of their bank subsidiaries or that they maintain the same 
financial interest in bank and nonbank subsidiaries.322 Therefore, it is 
possible that a bank in which a holding company or its controlling persons 
has a minority interest might be looted in the manner discussed previously in 
order to assist a failing nonbank affiliate engaged in securities underwriting. 
The same result is possible in the case of a bank operating subsidiary that 
operates under a holding company umbrella because the possibility of 
differential ownership of the operating subsidiary is not prohibited by federal 
law.323 
It has been suggested that there is a greater potential for conflict of 
interest transactions in the case of a holding company affiliate than in the 
case of an operating subsidiary because, while a holding company may have 
incentives to manipulate transactions between and among itself and its 
subsidiaries, no such incentive exists with respect to a bank's dealings with 
its own operating subsidiaries. It has been argued that the bank's own self­
interest will prevent it from engaging in transactions with an operating 
319 ld at 833. Clark believed that such conflicts were the greatest danger posed by 

the financial holding company structure and should be closely regulated. 

320 See McCoy, supra note 21, at § 8.02. 

321 See Clark, supra note 318, at 829. 

322 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841(2),(3), and 1843(2) (1999). 

323 This result was possible, for example, under the OCC's Part 5 rules governing 

operating subsidiaries because such rules provided for the possibility of minority 

interests being held by shareholders other than the bank. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 

5.34(d)(2), (e)(I)(i)(A) (1999). See McCoy, supra note 21, at §§ 8.02 and 8.06(1). 

Gramm-Leach-Bliley requires that a financial subsidiary be controlled by one or 

more banks, but does not prohibit differential ownership. Gramm-Leach·Bliley, § 

121(a) (new 12 U.S.C. § 5136A(a)(l». 
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subsidiary that would have an adverse impact upon it.324 This argument is 
'. 
dubious. It does not seem to apply in a case where the bank operating 
subsidiary is under a holding company structure because the bank's 
management will very likely be controlled by the holding company, which 
could exert pressure to engage in conflict of interest transactions.325 Even in 
the case of bank operating subsidiaries outside of a holding company 
structure, it is conceivable that bank management would be willing to lower 
credit standards with the expectation that the risk of doing so would be 
outweighed by the prospect of receiving a steady stream of dividends from a 
subsidiary engaged in a more profitable business than the bank itself could 
engage in, such as securities underwriting. 
The possibility of conflict of interest transactions exists with respect 
to both holding company affiliates and operating subsidiaries. Sections 23A 
and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act326 address the problem of conflict of 
interest transactions entered into by member banks and their subsidiaries 
with affiliates.327 Section 23A limits the type and volume of transactions 
that may be entered into. Types of regulated transactions include loans or 
extensions of credit to the affiliate, purchases of securities issued by the 
affiliate, asset purchases, accepting securities issued by an affiliate as 
security for a loan to a third party, and issuing credit supports on behalf of an 
affiliate.328 The volume limitations prevent transactions with individual 
affiliates and aggregate affiliate transactions in excess of 10 and 20 percent, 
respectively, of a bank's capital and surplus.329 Additional protections 
include a ban on most sales of low quality assets to a bank330 and a 
324 See Longstreth & Mattei, supra note 21, at 1903-1904 (suggesting that, as a 





325 See Eric J. Gouvin, Resolving the Subsidiary Director's Dilemma, 47 HASTINGS 

LJ. 287,290 (noting that boards of subsidiaries may approve activities that serve the 

interest of the parent). 

326 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 371c, 371c-1 (1999). These sections originally applied only 

to member banks of the Federal Reserve System, but have been extended by 

Congress to insured nonmember banks and savings associations in the same manner 

they apply to member banks. See 12 U.S.C. § 18280); 12 U.S.C. § 1468 (1999). 

327 "Affiliate" is a term of art directed at capturing control relationships involving 

member banks where conflicts of interest are most likely to arise. See 12 U.S.C. § '­
371c(b)(I) (1999). 

328 See 12 U.S.C. § 37 1 c(b)(7) (1999). 

329 See 12 U.S.C. § 371c(a)(I)(1999). 
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requirement that extensions of credit to and credit supports issued for the 
benefit of affiliates be collateralized.33 ) Section 23B requires that 
transactions with affiliates be on an arm's length basis.332 
Prior to Gramm-Leach-Bliley, Sections 23A and 23B did not apply 
to transactions between banks and their operating subsidiaries.333 However, 
the OCC's Operating Subsidiary Rule requires the application of Sections 
23A and 23B to transactions between the bank and an operating subsidiary 
engaging in activities that are impermissible for the bank.334 Under Gramm­
Leach-Bliley, transactions between a national bank and a financial subsidiary 
are subject to the Sections 23A and 23B firewalls. 335 
To summarize, many of the most significant conflict of interest 
transactions that may arise with respect to banks and their affiliates, both 
holding company affiliates and operating subsidiaries, are regulated by the 
provisions of Sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act. In addition, 
in connection with approvals of new activities in holding company affiliates 
and operating subsidiaries prior to Gramm-Leach-Bliley, both the Board and 
the OCC imposed additional conditions to prevent other conflict of interest 
transactions that would damage the affiliated bank from occurring.336 These 
331 See 12 U.S.C. § 371c(c) (1999). 
332 See 12 U.S.C. § 371c-l(a)(l) (1999). 
333 The definition of affiliate in the statute excludes bank subsidiaries, except to the 
extent that the Board has determined by regulation or order that such subsidiary 
should be considered an affiliate. See 12 U.S.C. § 371c(b)(2)(A) (1999). The Board 
proposed a rule-making in 1997 which would have applied Sections 23A and 23B to 
bank operating subsidiaries that engaged in activities impermissible for the bank 
itself, including national bank operating subsidiaries. See Federal Reserve System, 
Proposed Rule, Applicability of Sections 23A and 23B ofthe Federal Reserve Act to 
Transactions between a Member Bank and Its Subsidiaries, 62 Fed Reg. 37744. The 
Board proposed to extend Sections 23A and 23 B out of concern about the potential 
for conflict of interest transactions occurring between banks and their subsidiaries. 
62 Fed Reg. 37744, 37746. The Board was concerned about the imposition of 
firewalls by the various bank regulatory agency on an ad hoc basis and believed that 
applying the statutory firewalls would enhance corporate separateness. See id. The 
rule has not been adopted as of October 1999 . 
334 See 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(f)(3)(ii) (1999). 
335 See Gramm-Leach-Bliley, § 121(b) (amending 12 U.S.C. § 371c). 
336 As noted previously, the Board required extensive regulatory frrewalls between 
member banks and their affiliates in connection with its approvals of securities 
activities in Section 20 subsidiaries. It removed many of these firewalls in 1997 
although additional restrictions on conflict of interest transactions not covered in 
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regulatory firewalls strengthened the statutory firewalls of Sections 23A and 
23B. 
Firewalls are not foolproof. It should be noted that there has been no 
empirical study done of the effectiveness of firewalls. However, several 
commentators have noted that firewalls can be evaded and may give way 
under circumstances where they are most needed.337 Nevertheless, a 
comprehensive set of firewalls is the best line of defense against 
unacceptable conflict of interest transactions occurring.338 Gramm-Leach­
Bliley does not alter the continued application of the firewalls of Sections 
23A and 23B to affiliates of financial holding companies339 and it extends 
those firewalls to financial subsidiaries of national banks.340 Gramm­
Leach-Bliley also strengthens the Board's authority by providing that it may 
impose prudential limitations on transactions between banks and other 
affiliates in a financial holding company framework in order to prevent 
Sections 23A and 23B remained in place, such as limitations on extensions of credit 
to customers to support purchases of securities underwritten by the affiliate and a 
requirement that intra-day extensions of credit to the affiliate be on market terms. 
See supra Section II.B.1. In connection with approvals under the Operating 
Subsidiary Rule, the OCC required additional safeguards similar to those imposed 
by the Board in its revised firewalls for Section 20 subsidiaries. See supra Section 
ILB.2.c. 
337 The most often quoted remark in this regard was made by Walter Wriston, 
former chairman of Citibank, that "it is inconceivable that any major bank would 
walk away from any subsidiary of its holding company." Hearings Before the 
97thSenate Committee on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, Congo (1981) 
(testimony of Walter Wriston). Former FDIC Chairman Ricki Helfer has stated that 
the firewalls of Sections 23A and 23B "are not impenetrable ... of course in times 
of stress fire walls tend to weaken, and transgressions have occurred both within and 
outside the reach of the regulators . . . pressure can be exerted from its holding 
company as well as from subsidiaries." Hearings Before the Subcommittee on 
Capital Markets, Securities & Government Sponsored Enterprises of the House 
Committee on Banking & Financial Services, 105th Cong (1997). See Shull & 
White, supra note 21, at 459-460. 
338 See John R. Walter, Firewalls, 82 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond 
Economic Quarterly 15 (1996) (discussing circumstances under which bank holding '. 
companies have incentives to shift losses to affiliated banks and arguing that 
firewalls serve to limit such risk shifting). 
339 See Gramm-Leach-Bliley, § 103(a). 
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evasions of law, significant risks to a bank, or other adverse effects, 
including conflicts of interest.341 
Comparing the holding company affiliate with the operating 
subsidiary from the perspective of avoiding conflicts of interest, it does not 
appear that either form should be eliminated or that one form is inherently 
superior to the other. The possibility of damaging conflict of interest 
transactions exists with both structures. An appropriate focus is whether 
there are adequate statutory and regulatory firewalls in place that might be 
counted on to prevent such transactions from occurring. Even prior to 
Gramm-Leach-BliIey, there seemed to be little difference, if any, between 
the firewall protections afforded by use of holding company affiliates or 
operating subsidiaries. 
C. Preventing the Spread of the Federal Safety Net Subsidy 
There are two aspects to this question. One issue is whether the 
federal safety net subsidy actually exists. The other issue is whether one 
corporate structure is superior to the other in containing the spread of such 
subsidy beyond its intended purpose, namely to protect banks and the 
stability of the financial system. 
With respect to the existence of a subsidy, evidence has been 
introduced on both sides of the issue. The Board has advanced evidence that 
such subsidy does in fact exist.342 Other economists have challenged this 
conclusion, including an OCC economist whose report has been cited in 
Congressional testimony on the issue.343 The argument made by such 
economists is that only a small minority of banks enjoy even a gross subsidy. 
This means that, even before factoring in the costs of bank regulation, a 
majority of banks pay more for the safety net than it is worth. Recent 
legislative and regulatory measures (risk-based capital requirements, prompt 
corrective action provisions, risk-related deposit insurance premiums) have 
further reduced any gross benefits from the federal safety net.344 These 
341 See Gramm-Leach-Bliley, § 114. 
342 See Myron Kwast & Wayne Passmore, The Subsidy Provided by the Federal 
Safety Net; Theory and Evidence, JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL SERVICES RESEARCH 
(1998). John R. Walter, Can a Safety Net Subsidy Be Contained, 84 FED. RESERVE 
BANK RICHMOND ECON. Q. 1 (1998). See also George G. Kaufman, Comments on 
The Subsidy Provided by the Federal Safety Net; Theory and Evidence, JOURNAL OF 
FINANCIAL SERVICES REsEARCH (1998) (criticizing Kwast & Passmore). 
343 See Gary Whalen, The Competitive Implications of Safety Net-Related 
Subsidies, OCC Economics Working Paper 97-9 (1997). 
344 See id at 4. 
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economists argue, in addition, that the costs of complying with onerous bank 
regulations must be netted against any gross subsidy that in fact exists, with 
the end result that the net subsidy enjoyed by most banks is minimal and 
may even be negative.345 It is difficult to draw firm conclusions as to 
whether a subsidy exists or not Based on available evidence.346 
Assuming for purposes of argument that a subsidy does exist, the 
next issue is whether one structure can better contain the spread of such risk. 
One way in which the subsidy could spread would be through infusions of 
equity by the bank to its operating subsidiary. This is unlikely to occur with 
an operating subsidiary, because under Gramm-Leach-Bliley, as well as 
under oee's Operating Subsidiary Rule, a national bank's investment in an 
operating subsidiary must be deducted from the bank's capitaJ.347 Because 
the bank is required to be adequately capitalized after the investment is 
made, there is no greater incentive for the bank to downstream equity to its 
operating subsidiary than there is for the bank to upstream payments to a 
holding company in the form of dividends,348 which could then be 
down streamed by the holding company to a holding company affiliate. In 
addition, under the oee's Operating Subsidiary Rule, the bank was subject 
to risk diversification requirements limiting a bank's investment in any 
subsidiary to ten percent of the bank's capital and surplus. This provision 
further limits the ability of a bank to spread a net subsidy to an operating 
subsidiary through equity infusions. In contrast, in the case of the holding 
company, no comparable legal impediments would prevent a net subsidy 
from flowing from a bank through the holding company to a nonbank 
affiliate. 
Another way that the subsidy could be spread would be through 
credit extensions from an insuted bank to an operating subsidiary on terms 
more favorable than those that would be offered to a nonaffiliate. This is not 
permissible under either Gramm-Leach-Bliley or the oee's Operating 
Subsidiary Rule, however, because banks must comply with the arm's length 
345 See id at 20. 

346 The Financial Services Roundtable has just published a series of papers refuting 

the argument that a safety net subsidy exists. See Financial Services Roundtable, '. 

Refuting the Federal Safety Net "Subsidy" Argument (I999). 
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requirements of Section 23B of the Federal Reserve Act.349 In addition the 
collateralization and exposure limits of Section 23A are also applicable to 
the bank.350 In contrast, a holding company's extension of credit to an 
affiliate is outside the scope of Sections 23A and 23B. If such extension of 
credit were funded with dividends from an insured bank, any net subsidy 
could be transferred to the holding company affiliate through such an 
extension of credit. For these reasons, it does not appear that the holding 
company affiliate is a better means for containing the risk of spreading the 
. federal safety net subsidy to nonbank activities than the operating subsidiary. 
D. 	 Preserving the Federal Reserve Board's Ability to Handle 
Systemic Risk 
This policy argument has been hinted at in Congressional 
testimony,351 but has not been at the center of the corporate structure debate. 
There has been no discussion of the issue by commentators on the debate, 
although some have suggested that it relates to the "regulatory turf issue",352 
which this author has assumed means a power struggle over regulatory 
jurisdiction with no important consequences for the public interest. While 
that may indeed be the case, it is also conceivable that there is an important 
public policy issue lurking here. 
Constructing an argument based on the limited available evidence 
might go as follows. The Board has consistently maintained that it must be 
involved in bank regulation if it is to effectively perform its functions as a 
central bank. One of these functions is to serve as lender of last resort for 
troubled banks. Because the Board must bail out troubled banks whose 
failure may pose risks for the financial system as a whole, it must be allowed 
to serve as the regulator for new activities conducted by banks that fall into 
that category. Only in this way will it be able to act effectively to minimize 
the risk to the U.S. financial system caused by large bank failures arising as a 
result of new financial activities.353 In the context of the corporate structure 
349 See Gramm-Leach-Bliley, § 121(b) (amending 12 U.S.C. § 37Ic). 12 C.F.R. § 
5.34(f)(3(U) (1999). 
350 See id. 
351 See 1999 Greenspan testimony, supra note 19. 
352 See Longstreth & Mattei, supra note 21, at 1921. 
353 A recent example was the involvement of the Federal Reserve in the Long-Term 
Capital Management ("L TCM") case. Members of the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve indicated that there actions were motivated by concerns about the 
impact on the financial system. See Hearing Before the House Banking and 
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debate, this meant that new financial activities of large banks must be located ", 
in holding company affiliates, which are subject to Board supervision, rather 
than in bank operating subsidiaries, which are not.354 The Board's interest in 
bank regulation is different in kind than that of the Comptroller because of 
its larger role as a central bank in the context of bank failures. Therefore, 
regulation by the Comptroller cannot be deemed to be a substitute for • 
regulation by the Board with respect to large banks. 
This may have been the motivating factor for the Board's insistence 
on use of a holding company affiliate for new financial activities in the 
corporate structure debate. Such structure would have addressed the Board's 
concern because most banks operating in the U.S. are already part of a 
holding company structure.3ss The only holdouts are small community 
banks.3s6 This means that new financial activities conducted by large banks 
would automatically have been subject to Board supervision if the holding 
company affiliate were the exclusive vehicle for new financial activities. 
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley compromise on the corporate structure 
issue seems to confirm this belief about the Board's motivations. The 
compromise requires that large national banks must have at least one highly­
rated outstanding issue of unsecured long-term debt in order to own a 
financial subsidiary.357 Small national banks owning financial subsidiaries 
are not subject to this requirement. The asset size of a financial subsidiary 
owned by any national bank, regardless of size of such bank, is limited, both 
Financial Services Committee on Private Sector Refinancing of the Large Hedge 
Fund, Long-Term Capital Management (1998) (testimony of Chairman Alan 
Greenspan) ("Had the failure of LTCM triggered the seizing up of markets, 
substantial damage could have been inflicted on many market participants, including 
some not directly involved with the firm, and could have potentially impaired the 
economies of many nations, including our own"); Hearing Before the House 
Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit of the Banking and 
Financial Services Committee (1999) (testimony of Govemor Laurence Meyer). 
354 The Board's ability to function as lender of last resort would only be impaired if 
a large portion of new financial activities were to be relocated in bank operating 
subsidiaries and it has not been established that this would occur. For the Board's 
view of this matter, see supra note 23. 
355 See Louis Whiteman, Some Banks Find Good Cause to Form Holding 
Companies, American Banker, January 9, 1998. The Board estimated that by the '. 
end of 1998, fewer than 20% of banks would operate without a holding company. 
356 See id. Banks operating without a holding company controlled only 4% of the 
assets held by U.S. banks. 
357 The compromise is described supra in Section III.A. 
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as a percentage of total assets of the parent bank and in absolute terms. The 
requirement that large national banks with financial subsidiaries have at least 
one outstanding issue of highly rated secured debt appears to replace earlier 
language in the House and Senate bills requiring large national banks with 
financial subsidiaries to operate within a holding company structure. This 
suggests that the Board accepted the compromise because it believed that the 
use of unsecured debt would serve to curb excessive risk-taking by large 
banks and their holding companies through exercise of market discipline by 
the holders of such debt. While this is not a substitute for Board oversight of 
new financial activities of large banks, it serves as a means to mitigate risk. 
From the Board's perspective, very little additional risk is introduced into the 
financial system as a result of this compromise. The Board would not have 
had direct regulatory authority over financial subsidiaries even under the 
earlier House and Senate bills, although it would have had authority over the 
holding companies of large banks owning such subsidiaries, thereby giving it 
early warning of any trouble involving financial subsidiaries owned by such 
banks. Even under the compromise, however, it is likely that most large 
banks owning financial subsidiaries operate under a holding company, 
providing the Board with the same early warning system, regardless of an 
explicit requirement in the statute for a holding company structure. Another 
risk mitigation factor is asset size limitation on financial subsidiaries, which 
serves to contain within manageable parameters the potential impact on the 
financial system of failure of a financial subsidiary or its parent bank as a 
result of new financial activities. Yet another mitigating factor is the 
introduction of bank broker-dealer regulation by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, providing additional oversight of such activities.358 Finally, 
small national banks are excluded from the unsecured debt requirement, 
suggesting that the concern is with larger banks, the failure of whose 
financial subsidiaries might have an impact on the financial system. One 
could reasonably conclude from this analysis that the Board's position in the 
corporate structure debate was driven by its concern about the potential 
impact of failures of large banks or their subsidiaries on the stability of the 
financial system, i.e. systemic risk. 
When one considers the corporate structure debate from this vantage 
point, it becomes apparent that there is more at stake than the right of 
bankers to have the flexibility to make private business decisions on their 
.f own terms. Indeed, it appears that the corporate structure debate is really 
about the ability of regulators to fulfill their legislative mandates effectively. 
358 Gramm-Leach-Bliley, §§ 201, 202 (amending 15 U.S.c. § 78c(a)(4), (5)). 
422 	 ANNUAL REVIEW OF BANKING LAW VOL. 19: 329 
The public policy issue of permitting the Board to effectively function as a 
lender of last resort is of crucial significance and should not be ignored in the 
corporate structure debate. However, the danger in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
compromise is that it effectively closes the door on the debate, at least for the 
time being, without having thoroughly examined the systemic risk factor. 
V. 	 CONCLUSION: THE OPTIMAL CORPORATE STRUCTURE 
FOR NEW FINANCIAL ACTIVITIES 
Actions taken by federal banking regulators in the years immediately 
preceding Gramm-Leach-Bliley changed the landscape of activities 
restrictions for national banks and their affiliates. Such regulators, who are 
charged with safeguarding the safety and soundness of banks, concluded that 
certain activities considered off-limits only twenty years ago, including 
underwriting bank ineligible securities, could be conducted in either a 
holding company affiliate or an operating subsidiary of a bank. The 
regulators did not permit banks to engage in such new activities with 
reckless disregard for the increased risks perceived to accompany them, but 
rather placed strict limits on the amount and type of such new activities that 
could be conducted and required banks to comply with prudential safeguards 
directed at preventing the spread of risks that may exist. While such 
regulatory activity is not determinative of the issue of whether there is an 
optimal corporate structure for the conduct of new activities, it is highly 
persuasive. The regulators proceeded cautiously, permitting new activities 
only as historical experience with such activities and as the individual 
circumstances of each applicant bank have warranted. The logic of their 
actions is compelling and the flexible approach they have taken on the 
corporate structure issue has merit. 
In contrast to the approach taken by the regulators, the Gramm­
Leach-Bliley compromise adopts a rigid framework for the corporate 
structure banks may use for new financial activities. Under Gramm-Leach­
Bliley, the holding company affiliate has emerged as the clear winner in the 
corporate structure debate, although use of an operating subsidiary is also J 
permitted to a more limited extent. While Congressional concern about 
containing the risks associated with such deregulation is justified, the choice 
that was made, distinguishing between holding company affiliates and .~ 
operating subsidiaries and imposing additional regulatory constraints on use 
of operating subsidiaries, is not warranted by the available evidence on the 
nature and extent of such risks. Congress has imposed restrictions on 
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corporate structure where it has not been satisfactorily demonstrated that 
additional risk exists and where no legitimate policy objective may be served 
• '" by the distinction that was drawn in the legislation. 
This paper set out to answer three questions. First, is there any 
reason to eliminate use of either the operating subsidiary or holding 
company affiliate as a vehicle for new financial activities based on safety 
and soundness considerations or for any other reason? Second, is there any 
reason to prefer one structure over another, whether based on safety and 
soundness considerations or for any other reason? Third, if there is no 
compelling governmental interest in eliminating one structure or preferring 
one over the other, should banks be free to choose the corporate structure 
they will use for their new lines of business? The author has concluded that 
the answer to the first two questions is no, while the answer to the last 
question is a qualified yes, subject to further consideration of the unexplored 
factor of systemic risk and its relationship to corporate structure in this 
context. 
There has been a dramatic shift within the past few years in the 
terms ofthe corporate structure debate. While the holding company affiliate 
was long viewed as the exclusive route for new financial activities, Gramm­
Leach-Bliley permits some use of operating subsidiaries. This is definitely 
progress, but the compromise is not ideal for it imposes far greater 
restrictions on choice of corporate form than many bankers and economists 
would like to see. The proposed legislation does have its virtues, however. 
Allowing smaller banks to engage in new financial activities through an 
operating subsidiary permits new entrants to the market without significant 
risks being created for the financial system. Requiring large banks to 
conduct such activities in operating subsidiaries subject to additional 
regulatory constraints reduces the potential for unmanageable risks to the 
financial system as a result of new financial activities. On the other hand, it 
is not clear that the Gramm-Leach-Bliley compromise is the most effective 
way to deal with the issue of systemic risk in this context. Other alternatives 
might have been considered if the issue had been publicly debated. The 
compromise has set in stone a distinction between the use of holding 
company affiliates and bank operating subsidiaries for conducting new 
, 	 financial activities that may not be necessary from a public policy 
perspective. Further study should have been and still should be conducted 
on the systemic risk issue in order to clarify what is at stake. Perhaps over 
time the additional restrictions imposed on use of operating subsidiaries will 
be relaxed, if experience shows that use of financial subsidiaries does not 
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create greater risks for the financial system than use of financial holding .. 
companies and their affiliates. 
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